

THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

NO. 3.—JULY, 1901.

I.

HOW WE KNOW CHRIST.

BY WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, PH.D.

In illustrating his relation to his people the Saviour found it necessary to employ various analogies and figures of speech. This was due mainly to the native poverty of human speech, which, having been used to express the various terrestrial relations, was incapable of directly expressing the celestial relations which were brought to light by the life and work of our Lord.

Among the analogies which the Saviour used to illustrate his relation to his people, there is probably none that is more replete with interest and suggestion than that of the shepherd and his sheep. There is none other that gives us such a vivid and such a lifelike picture of the mutual trust, confidence and knowledge, which exist between Christ and his people. As the shepherd cares for his sheep, and knows them; so does Christ care for his people, and so does he know them. And as the sheep know their shepherd's voice, so do Christ's people know him, yielding to him the same full and implicit obedience. "He that entereth in by the door is the shepherd of the sheep. To him the porter openeth; and the sheep hear his voice: and he calleth his own sheep by name and leadeth them out. When he putteth forth all his own, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him: for they know his voice" (John 10:3, 4).

Now, it is while illustrating this last point, the mutual knowledge between himself and his people, that Jesus uses his supreme analogy. The analogy of the shepherd and the sheep answers only in part. As far as it goes it is beautiful and striking. The Oriental shepherd has a name for each one of his sheep; in the morning, when he comes to the fold, in which a number of flocks, belonging to different shepherds, have been kept during the night, he goes in among them, calling his own sheep by name; and each one, as it is called, responds by coming forth out of the gathered multitude. And then, when they have all been called forth, the shepherd goes before them, leading them out to the green pastures, all following his voice with implicit confidence and trust. It is a beautiful illustration of mutual confidence and trust; and it is likewise a striking illustration of mutual knowledge. So long has the shepherd been with his sheep, so closely has he identified himself with them in all their interests, that he has learned the peculiarities of each, so that they stand before him, not as a flock, but as individuals. And the sheep have likewise come to know the very accents, the very least intonations of his voice, so that they seem to stand to him in the relation of personal friendship. As far as it goes, it brings out most beautifully the relation between the Saviour and his people. But it stops short at the very point, where he goes on to speak of how the sheep thus know their shepherd's voice, how his people come to know him in such a way as to place in him that implicit confidence and trust, which perfect obedience implies.

Now, the point to be noted is that, when Jesus comes to carry out his thought by showing how his people know him, he finds himself under the necessity of employing an altogether new analogy, and one which at first startles us by its boldness. Where does he find an adequate analogy to illustrate this mutual knowledge between himself and his people? Not in nature, not in any relation existing between man and the animal below him, not even in any relation existing among men; he finds it in the relation existing between himself and his Father in heaven. "I am the good shepherd: and I know mine own, and mine own know me,

even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father" (John 10:14, 15. R. V.).

This fact is in itself worthy of special note. With all his wonderful insight into the phenomena and laws of nature, with all his wonderful knowledge of the relations between men and things, the time came, when the great Teacher could not find an illustration adequate to express his thought, in the world of nature below man, nor in any of the relations to be found among men, nor even in any of the relations existing among the angels above men: he had to go to the highest relation, of which it is possible for us to conceive, to the relation existing between him, the only begotten Son, and his Father in heaven.

It may help us to appreciate the significance of this analogy, as well as its meaning in this connection, if we recall the Saviour's use of it in other places.

In the synagogue of Capernaum, at the time of the great Galilean crisis, he used it to illustrate how it is that we come to have eternal life. "As the living Father hath sent me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth me, he shall also live because of me" (John 6:57). Life even in the realm of nature is a great mystery. So far as we can see, it always comes from antecedent life. But what is it? Whence did it originally come? Whither does it go, after its brief course here is run? Natural science can not tell. But what is thus true of Natural life is still more true of eternal life. Jesus Christ alone has brought that to light; he alone can give it; and he alone has told us whence it comes and how it is maintained. We possess it, not because of anything there is in us, but because we are in him. To him the Father has given to have life in himself; and to him only. We have that eternal life only because we have been mystically joined to him; and he explains that we have it in and from him just as he himself has life in and from the Father. The Father alone is the fountain and source of life. All things come forth ultimately from him; and they exist, because they are upheld by him continually in their order and course. So also does all life come forth from him, and continue

in existence as it is lived in him. But it comes to us not immediately or directly; but through the everlasting Word of the Father, by whom all things are made, and in whom they exist. He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the very image of his substance; and through him the creative and sustaining energy of the Father goes forth into his universe, so that we live because of him, just as he lives because of the Father. The explanation leaves the subject a profound mystery still; yet it helps us to realize how life has come to us, and how it is to be maintained in us.

The Saviour again used the same analogy, when he spoke of the law, which should govern that life. That law is the law of love, and its manifestation is in the form of Christian unity. Now, to illustrate that law, and to explain that unity, Jesus again found it necessary to look beyond this earth for his illustration. "Holy Father, keep them in thy name which thou hast given me, that they may be one, even as we are" (John 17: 11). "Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe on me through their word; that they may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us: that the world may believe that thou didst send me. And the glory which thou hast given me I have given unto them; that they may be one; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovedst them, even as thou lovedst me" (John 17: 20-23). Nothing on earth or in nature could serve as an adequate illustration of this highest law of the Christian life. There is only one thing with which it could have been compared, and that is the love between the Father and the Son in the adorable and blessed Trinity. "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love" (1 John 4: 7, 8). And so there was nowhere an analogy, which could adequately illustrate the unity of believers, except the unity which exists between the Father and the Son.

Jesus used the analogy once more, when after his resurrection

he came to speak of the mission of the disciples. When he appeared in their midst on the evening of the first Easter day, he said, "Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you" (John 20:21). It is the thought which he had already uttered in his high priestly prayer. "As thou didst send me into the world, even so sent I them into the world" (John 17:18). He had come forth from the bosom of the Father, "the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance." He had come to reveal the Father's love to a sinful and dying world. And on that mission he now sent forth his disciples. As he had been the light of the world, so they were now to go forth, bearing his image, changed from glory into glory, and shedding forth his beauty and glory through a holy love in a dark and benighted world. They were to be his representatives in the world; and they were to stand in the same relation to him as he had before stood to the Father.

Now this fact that, when the Saviour came to speak of the highest and the most intimate relation existing between himself and his people, he should in the nature of the case have been compelled to take his analogy, not from earth nor from earthly relations, but from the relation which had from all eternity existed between himself and the Father, is remarkable. But it is what we should have expected. Just as Moses, when he came to build the tabernacle, was commanded to build it, not after any model which he had seen on earth, but after the pattern which had been shown to him in the mount; so, when Jesus came to build the real tabernacle, of which the tabernacle of Moses was but a shadow and type, it was natural that he should take for his model, not anything to be found on earth, but only that which he had seen with his father in heaven. As the pattern of the Christian's life is nothing short of the perfect character of our Father in heaven (Matt. 5:48), so the model, or the analogy, which illustrates the deepest facts in the Christian's life and experience, must be found not on earth but in heaven.

When, therefore, we come to study that innermost and tenderest relation between the Saviour and his people, which he in-

troduced by this parable of the Good Shepherd, we need not be surprised that he goes to heaven for his illustration. What is the likeness and the measure of that mutual trust, confidence and knowledge existing between him and his people? It is like the trust, the confidence and the knowledge existing between himself and the Father. "I know mine own, and mine own know me, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father." He knows his sheep as perfectly as the Father knows him, and after the same manner; and his sheep know him as he knows the Father, in the same inward, direct, and finally absolute form.

But when we have now got that thought, what after all have we gained? Does the illustration help us to understand the fact? Has it not rather shrouded the whole subject in still deeper mystery? We can know something of our own knowledge by observing the operations of our own minds; but how can we know what was in the mind of Christ? How can we know anything about that inner relation between Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, and the Father, in whose bosom he has dwelt from all eternity?

Evidently Jesus Christ took it for granted that he had revealed enough of his inner life and consciousness to enable us to understand to some extent the illustration which he employed. And somewhere in the revelation of that inner consciousness we must find the clue by which to explain how and to what extent we may know him. And in that explanation we must be able to find light on the problem, which has perplexed so many, the problem, namely, of how we may have *certainty* for our faith together with *full assurance* of salvation.

The subject has two sides: Christ's knowledge of his people; and his people's knowledge of him. Into the first part we shall not pretend to inquire at this time. Enough to note the fact involved in the comparison, that Christ knows us, his people, even as the Father knows him; that is, he knows us absolutely, perfectly, to the uttermost depths of our being. And he knows all his sheep in the same perfect manner. No matter in what fold they may be he knows them; and he knows how to find them.

There is none so insignificant as to escape his notice. There is not an infirmity in any of them so small as to be unworthy of his attention. There is not one of them with a sorrow so trifling as to be beneath his consideration and help.

In turning to the other side of our subject, how Christ's people know him, we are compelled by the analogy before us, first of all to inquire how Jesus Christ, as the Son of God and of man, knew the Father. The inquiry must proceed on the basis of that revelation of his own inner consciousness, which is given to us in the New Testament.

We run no risk in affirming that Jesus had learned from the Old Testament Scriptures. We are expressly told by St. Luke that, as a child, he "grew, and waxed strong, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon him" (Luke 2:40). And when he had been to Jerusalem for the first time, where he astonished the doctors of the law by his understanding and answers, we are again told that he "advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men" (Luke 2:52). And from the quotations, which he subsequently made in his public teaching, we also know that he was familiar with the Old Testament Scriptures. At the feet of his mother, in the public reading of the Scriptures in the synagogue and in the temple, and by his own subsequent reading and reflection, he learned what was in the Scriptures. And as he learned the history of his people, the law which had been given by Moses, and the psalms which had been consecrated by the devotions of generations of his people, so he would also learn of that God, whose mind and will had been the inspiration of his people's history and literature. We need not hesitate to affirm that Jesus learned of God through the Scriptures, which he studied. That was the very purpose of those Scriptures, to reveal Jehovah God unto his people; and it would be strange indeed if they had contained nothing for the mind of Jesus on this one central theme. For just as he found his Father's house in the temple at Jerusalem, so would he also find in the Scriptures the reflection of his Father's face and the evidence of his love.

But, as a careful comparison between the teaching of Jesus and that of the Old Testament abundantly proves, his conception of God differed very widely from that which he found in those ancient writings. As Professor Gilbert says, in passing from the Old Testament and the later Jewish writings to the Gospels, we "find that between the dominant Old Testament conception of God and the conception of him which Jesus had, the contrast is profound; while between the contemporaneous Jewish conception and that of Jesus, there is an illimitable gulf." How do we account for the fact?

It will not do to say that Jesus found in those Old Testament Scriptures what none of his contemporaries could see; for, although it is doubtless true that he had an insight which enabled him to see in Moses and the prophets what none others were able to see (see Luke 24: 27, 45-47), yet that would not account for the fact that we find in his conception of God a distinct advance on all previous revelation. Even with the light which he himself has thrown upon the writings of Moses and the prophets, we look in vain for the conception of the Fatherhood of God which we find in his teaching. While he had no doubt, as a child and as a youth, learned of God from the Scriptures, there was a light which dawned upon his mind, which clearly went beyond all that had been seen and recognized by the prophets of old.

Now, it can surely not be an idle question to ask how this higher and purer conception of the Father dawned upon his consciousness. It must have come to him from within, out of the depths of his own inmost experience. He stood in the bosom of the Jewish economy; he drank out of the wells of the revelation which had been made to his people: through them he entered into communion with the Divine, which was then, as it is now, everywhere present in the Divine Word, and in that communion he felt the warm embraces of his Father's love, which enabled him to enter into the inmost depths of that Father's heart. In his own sinless purity, he entered into such union with the Father that the whole character of the Father's heart shown forth

through his own inner consciousness and life. That enabled him to see and know the Father, as no one had ever seen or known him before.

And it is worth while emphasizing the fact that this inner experience came to him through the communion into which he was admitted by his position as a child of the Old Testament covenant; for he was a child of the covenant, and not of the heathen world on the outside. It was through that covenant fellowship that he entered into that inner communion with the Divine, which enabled him to see into the depths of the Father's heart as no one had seen before. It was the basis of his life; and by realizing all that was involved in it, he was enabled to mount aloft in his sinless and perfect life to the perfect communion, which lay at the basis of his perfect insight.

Now, the knowledge of God, which came to Jesus through this inner experience of his sinless life, was in the nature of the case direct, immediate, intuitive. It was of the nature of a direct inner vision. That is the way he himself characterized it. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness. If I told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things? And no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven" (John 3: 11-13). In the purity of his own inner life, Jesus stood in direct and immediate communion with the life of God in heaven. That opened to his vision the realities of heaven; so that when he spoke of the Divine he could speak of that which he had seen and heard.

In the nature of the case there must be some truth which we see and know by direct and immediate vision. Such truth is known, not by the evidence which is borne to it by other truth, but by the evidence which comes from its own presence. Such truth we know with absolute certainty—a certainty which springs out of its very nature. This was the case with this knowledge which Jesus thus had of the Father. He knew the Father by direct inward vision; and he gave us his conception of the Father, not

on the basis of any evidence, which he had derived from the Old Testament, but on the evidence which he had derived from his own experience. "We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen." And though he immediately added to Nicodemus, "and ye receive not our witness," there were those who did receive it; for they recognized that he spake unto them as one that had authority, and not as the scribes.

And this direct inner knowledge, which Jesus had of the Father, not only carried with it the seal of absolute certainty, but it inspired perfect confidence. The confidence with which the sheep follows the shepherd through the wilderness to the green pastures is but a very faint image of the confidence with which Jesus followed his Father's voice through all the trials and sufferings of his early life. Even at the lowest depths of his humiliation, when his soul was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death, he yet absolutely followed the leadings of his Father's will, saying, "Not my will, but thine be done."

To the inquiry, How did Jesus know the Father? we therefore reply by saying that he knew him through the Old Testament Scriptures and through the covenant promises in which he stood; he knew him through the inner experiences of his sinless perfect life; he knew him by a direct inner vision of faith; he knew him with the absolute and immediate certainty, which such direct vision always gives; and he knew him with the assured confidence, which only absolute and perfect knowledge can give.

And this now is the way in which we, his people, know Christ. There a parallel between Christ's knowledge of the Father and our knowledge of Christ in each one of these particulars.

We know Jesus Christ from the Scriptures. In them we have the living portrait of his earthly life and character. The Gospels give us his words, his teachings, his deeds of kindness and love to all men and especially to the sick and the afflicted, and the account of his death, his resurrection, and his ascension to the right hand of the Father. And not only do we learn of him through the Gospels, but the entire New Testament is full of his glory. Yea, and the whole Bible, Old as well as New Testament,

testifies of him. As he learned of God through the Old Testament Scriptures, so do we learn of him through our Scriptures, now enriched and enlarged by the addition of the New Testament.

But the simple outward letter of the Scriptures is not sufficient to give us the knowledge of the Christ, which we need for our salvation and for our edification in the new life. The letter of the Scriptures, regarded simply as an outward *traditum*, as a mass of information handed down to us from the fathers, and nothing more, may serve to hide him from us rather than anything else. There are many, we well know, who go to their Bibles to read history, to study its inimitable poetry, even to study the wonderful characters, which are therein portrayed, but who never come to any real or saving knowledge of Christ. For its one main end and purpose the Book continues to be for them a sealed book. They see in Christ the portrait of a man, a wonderful man indeed; but they fail to find in him the image of the invisible God. He reveals to them nothing of God or of heaven; and as a consequence they come away from the sacred oracles very little the wiser for their study, and certainly not with the saving knowledge, which communion with the inner realities, which those oracles reveal, is intended to bring.

Now, what the case requires is such an inner vision of the truth as it is in Jesus, as shall bring us into direct *rappor*t with his glorious person. The outward letter brings to us the facts; but there must be in us such an inner apprehension of the meaning of the facts that we shall have a direct inner vision of the truth, just as Jesus through the knowledge which the Old Testament suggested and supplied came to have a direct inner vision of the Father's character and love. He stands for us in the place of the Father; he is for us "the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance"; and he comes to be for us the ultimate truth, which we must become enabled to apprehend by the immediate intuitions of our inner being.

If we lack this power of immediate and intuitive apprehension of the glory of Christ, as the only begotten of the Father, which is revealed to us through the outward facts of the sacred

record, we have no power of knowing him ; and there is nothing in the way of outward evidence or logic that can help us to the apprehension. It is just as it is in the realm of truth anywhere. In Geometry there are certain ultimate truths, certain axioms, which no man can prove to us, but which we must be able to see by the evidence which we find in them as such. Language and illustration may help to place them before the mind in intelligible form ; but, if a mind has not the inner vision by which to see the truth that is in them, there is no power in heaven or on earth that can help it to their apprehension. So the Bible may set the Christ before us in a truthful and intelligible form ; but unless we are able, through the outward letter, to see his glory by an act of direct intuitive vision, we can not know him.

This, of course, does not mean that we get our doctrine about Christ, the doctrine about the constitution of his adorable person, in that way. Our doctrine about Christ is something very different from our knowledge of the living Christ himself. The one is like the theorems in Geometry, which we get by demonstration, as the result of a process of reasoning ; the other is like the axioms, which we get by immediate, intuitive vision of the truth. We are concerned now, not about the doctrine concerning Christ, but about the knowledge of his adorable person. The latter only has in it the power of an endless life, as defined by the Saviour himself in his great high priestly prayer (John 17 : 3).

But how now does it happen that some men have this power of direct inner vision of the truth as it is in Jesus, while others do not have it ? How do we come to possess this inestimable gift ? We have it, according to the illustration with which we started out, just as Christ had his direct, immediate vision of the Father's glory and love, that is, we have it out of the depths of our spiritual communion with him. And the difference between the men who have it and the men who have it not is at bottom the same as the difference between Jesus and the Jews who condemned him to the cross for speaking blasphemy.

Jesus read the reflection of the Father's character in his own

consciousness, because of the communion which he always had with the Father in his holy life. His will was always turned toward the Father in an absolute obedience; and hence there never was the deflection of so much as an hair's breath in the Divine light and glory as that came streaming into his soul. He had a direct inner vision of the Divine, because there never was so much as a cloudlet of disobedience or doubt to obscure it. And in the proportion in which we get our wills into the same state of inner harmony with the Divine, through a holy obedience, will we have the same direct inner vision. "Jesus therefore answered them, and said, My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself" (John 7: 16, 17).

But this willingness to obey, this inner harmony between our wills and the Divine can be begotten in us only by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Naturally we have it not. Naturally we are aliens; and our wills are inclined to hate God rather than to love him. It is only as we are born again from above that the disposition can be in us. And as the Holy Spirit is the one through whom we have this blessed gift, it is through him that we learn to see and know. Only as he bears witness with our spirits, only as he opens our eyes, can we see.

But this inner vision, when once our eyes are open, gives *certainly* to our faith. We may be mistaken in the conclusions, which we draw respecting the Christ. We may make mistakes in our apprehension of all that is involved in his adorable person, just as we may make mistakes in our demonstrations in Geometry; but with reference to him as our Saviour and Friend we can be no more mistaken than we can be with reference to the axioms in Geometry. The history of the Church has proved this. Her doctrines about the Christ have been developing and changing from the day of Pentecost on down to the present; and in the nature of the case they will continue to develop and change until the end of time. We shall perhaps never succeed in expressing all that our vision sees in his adorable person; and

until that is done, our doctrines concerning him must continue to be modified and changed. But with reference to his person, as the effulgence of the Father's glory, the Church has never for one moment had any doubt. Through all the vicissitudes of her wonderful history, through all the strifes of her theological wars, through all the corruptions even which have crept into her life, she has always held on to her faith in him. She has known him even as she has known herself. And so it is with all her children. I may perhaps doubt my own existence; certainly I may be mistaken in the formulas in which I express my deepest convictions; but so long as a spark of the heavenly life remains in me, I cannot doubt the deepest truth, which that life has brought to my mind.

And this knowledge, which thus comes to us through the certainty of such direct and immediate vision, gives the *assurance* of salvation. As the knowledge rises into distinctness, will the assurance grow. It may at first be hesitating and faint. But for that we can easily account by remembering the manner in which the knowledge of Christ comes to us. We may have been very poor and listless students of the Scriptures, through which we get our facts with reference to his life. We may not have the facts before us sufficiently to give us a distinct impression. Or we may not have been willing at all points to submit ourselves to the Father's will as revealed in him; and as a consequence our vision may have been distorted. But in the proportion in which we have studied the facts, in the proportion in which we have yielded to him a hearty obedience, in that proportion do we know him, and in that proportion also do we feel assured that we are accepted of him.

II.

HEULDREICH ZWINGLI

BY REV. C. CLEVER, D.D.

Among those heroic spirits who make the sixteenth century so glorious, Zwingli is neither first in the second rank, nor second in the first. Standing upon a sure foundation, his vision is as clear, his arm as strong, his heart as courageous and his soul as pure as the greatest and best. It is gradually dawning upon the minds of historians and patriots, that in his life and purposes there is yet much gold which when slightly changed, in the melting and coining, will become eminently useful in helping modern life to the broader field in which its achievements must be accomplished. The *motif* for the last life of Zwingli seems to have been, to rescue his life and teachings from an undeserved neglect. The present age needs to be reminded that he, of all the Reformers, insisted from early morn till dewy eve, that religion must make itself felt, as a force in practical life. It would not do to simply insist that it was a gilded haze of glory, that permeated the upper atmosphere, at which men could gaze, and be encouraged to hold on a little while longer. For him it must put on its everyday working clothes, and move about in the council chamber and upon the exchange. There is none of the Reformers whose thoughts, when once developed, will find a heartier reception, while wrestling with the new problems, raised by these modern times. It must never be forgotten that Zwingli was a young man, comparatively, when he died on the bloody battlefield at Cappel. He had not had time to systematize the truth, as it had appeared to him. He had thrown himself, with unstinted devotion of time and mind, into the practical reforms of church and society. He did not dominate the state, with the same theocratic earnestness, that Calvin manifested at Geneva; but his hand was no less busy in helping forward such

movements, as enabled the second generation of Reformers to do greater things. Without Zwingli's religion and patriotism, manifesting themselves in everyday life, Geneva and Heidelberg would figure far less prominently in the history of the Reformation. If he would have attained unto the fullness of his days, there would doubtless have been no need of a new Theology, to counteract the dogmatic severity of modern theological conservatism.

He was the most unfettered of all his contemporaries. Luther was perfectly right when he thrust back the friendly hand extended at Marburg, remarking, *Thou art of another spirit than we*. The promised land into which Zwingli looked, had wider boundaries, possessed greener fields and nobler rivers, and was overarched by a bluer sky than any upon which Luther looked. He was a milder, more rational, humaner spirit than any of his contemporaries. In his theological writings he was as severe in his logic as Calvin; in his blows against the wrongs of Church and State he struck with as steady a hand as Luther, if not quite as heavily. In learning he was scarcely inferior to Melancthon, and if the tenor of his life would have been along the line of universities only, he would have been his equal. In humanistic views of literature and life he was as broad as Erasmus.

Zwingli was not dependent upon any one else for the glory that he won. In the open breach that he made with Rome and the organization that he gave to the Protestant Church in Switzerland, he was simply striking out a new path opened to him by the Holy Spirit; and the faithful study of the Scriptures. "The important movement of which Zwingli might be said to be the originator and head was wholly independent of Luther, that is to say, Luther was in no way whatever, directly or indirectly, the cause or the occasion of Zwingli's being led to embrace the views which he promulgated or to adopt the course which he pursued." * In the early part of his life he had showed a spirit that would not be satisfied till the truth had become a personal possession.

* Reformers by Cunningham, p. 214; Hibbert Lectures by Beard, p. 229.

Among the students in the university in Vienna, he was distinguished for his love of truth as well as for his aptitude in acquiring knowledge. The same spirit marked the whole course of his life. There is in his mental and spiritual makeup a calmness, which was provoking to the raptures of Luther. He could not understand the earnest Saxon monk, the shadows of darkness that swept across his horizon, the trembling and fear with which he came out of the conflict. On the other hand, Luther could not appreciate the practical common sense which marked the whole course of Zwingli. In the life and activity of the latter there is "an admirable and cheerful good sense, a keen apprehension of the simplicity of piety, a firm grasp of religion on the ethical and practical side." But the sense of mystery does not weigh upon him; the contemplation of divine things neither excites him to paradox nor awakens him to rapture.*

Zwingli appears before us, first of all, as a patriot. He was born in a land where patriotism was as bracing as the breezes which swept through the valleys from the Alpine mountains. The stories of Tell and Winklereid fired his youthful brain. Long before he thought of a Reformation of the church, he had set his heart upon a purifying of the state. He had resolved that the morals of the state had been corrupted by the life that the Swiss soldiers led when fighting the battles of foreign lands. The thought of bartering the best blood of Switzerland for gold became as horrible to him as a nightmare. To see and hear the bargaining of Papal and French agents when bidding for the courage and bravery of the youths of his beloved land, moved him with deepest indignation. He resolved that it must stop. National deterioration would follow, till finally there would be no Swiss in Switzerland. Being a patriot from his youth up, he first felt the incongruity of soldiers coming back to their pure homes seething with the vices of the southern countries of Europe. These lands were wealthy, but immorality had so weakened the men that they could not gain their victories without the sturdy soldiers who had always gained theirs against all odds. Then he

* Beard's Hibbert Lecture, p. 231.

resolved that the French should not be allowed to offer bribes to officers for recruiting its depleted armies from the youths of Switzerland. In the early effort to accomplish a reformation of abuses, Zwingli went with the troops, hoping to restrain and keep them from falling into those vices which were so common in pre-Reformation times. He soon realized that the current was too strong. The ebb and flow of these tides of wickedness swept men, in companies, from the moral standing ground on which they stood when they left the home land. By the Eternal he will lift his voice. He will preach against these things. His patriotism, fired by the few faint rays of truth that had come to him already, will no longer allow him to keep from uttering a protest. At first he would spare the Popish emissaries on account of the respect that he still retained for the hierarchy. It soon dawned upon him that even this must cease if national righteousness is not to be swept away.

Not only were the soldiers demoralized, but official corruption was universal. Men in public station thought it not robbery to gain fortunes by receiving foreign gold. They vied with each other to give attention to the offers that were made in the market place for blood. Statesmanship was measured by the number of bribes a man could get, in order to secure soldiers for a foreign contingent. Money flowed into the country from the coffers of royal and papal treasuries.

It soon became apparent that it was no easy task to clean out this Augean stable of political corruption. The love of gold had fortified the populace against interference, and patriotism had well nigh been extinguished on the most sacred altars. But the man was at hand who would not compromise, who would not be silent, who would not spare and who would be heard. He would inaugurate a movement that would finally root out every form of corruption, even though sanctioned by the highest human authority then recognized. "Zwingli began his work as a political reformer; his first efforts were directed against political abuses, and some of his noblest words were spoken in the cause of a distinct national life, free from foreign interference." Even

after he was swept on to demand a reformation of the church, he did not forget the needs of the state. In this he differed from Luther. The Reformation in Switzerland was not only an ecclesiastical, but a political one. There was a contest between the republican and reforming parts as in no other part of the Reformation. Zwingli determined that the country must be purified from the effects of foreign influence, that morals and patriotism were essentials of good politics. Those who had been debauched by the influence of foreign gold and moral pestilence resisted the plain preaching of the new reformer. The tide arose higher and higher, till finally Zwingli had conquered and that part of Switzerland which became Reformed arose as a model before all the nations of the earth. Of Zwingli, Henri Martin says in his history of France, The work of Zwingli may be considered as the most powerful effort that had been made to purify the Renaissance and to bring it into the service of the Reformation in Jesus Christ.

In this day, when reformers of every shade are questioning as to the means whereby Christianity may influence the state without uniting them, a careful study of Zwingli and the history of Zurich would at least be a blazing of the trees for a future highway along which men could travel. It would be a healthy tonic for those whose pessimism questions the power of Christian morality to permeate the sphere of politics, and clear the field of those influences that destroy patriotism and cut the nerve of disinterested statesmanship because backed by the power of wealth. For this Zwingli is sometimes reproached, for being a politician rather than a religious reformer. It is true that his country's interests lay as a burden upon his heart, but his endeavor always was to guide the Republic "to the advantage of righteousness and the interests of the Protestant Church." It might be too much to say that he never succumbed to the peculiar temptation of politics, but his aim was always for the final establishment of a civic righteousness, which would be conducive to a healthy growth of patriotic religion and religious patriotism.

In the early part of his career, Zwingli was heartily in sympathy

with Erasmus and the humanists. From Erasmus he received letters which proved that his mind was strong and his future bright enough to give promise of usefulness in extending the new learning. His interest in education had been aroused by the lack of opportunities to those who wanted to get beyond the simplest rudiments of learning. He himself, though somewhat more highly favored than many of his contemporaries, had to struggle hard to reach the eminent ideal which he had set before him. He determined that he would, if possible, provide educational advantages for bright-minded youths, at least in his own parish. As soon as he became the pastor at Glarus he gave himself to a severe mental discipline, and founded a Latin school. This was attended with such success that it encouraged him to press the duty of founding such schools upon the state. He was a hard student himself, and he aroused a like enthusiasm in his pupils. He had introduced with his school the idea of sympathy between teacher and pupil. He followed with a fatherly interest those who went out from his school into the different universities. His pupils never forgot the kindly interest of the young priest of Glarus.

In a treatise on *The Christian Education of Youth*, we have the fundamental ideas that Zwingli regarded as essential for the proper education of youth. He did not have time to fully develop them at Zurich. It had to do with a people who were working with the most primitive methods of education. The spell of mediæval methods had not been broken. The freest minds were still shackled in their struggle to get out of the old into the new age, which would soon break upon the world. One of his best biographers says: Scarcely was any other man so well prepared as he to work for this end; hence Christian earnestness, humanistic wisdom and training for contact with the world are united in a beautiful harmonious whole. It is a safe philosophy of life, emanating from a thoroughly trained and experienced man, whose heart was filled with the abiding joys of a higher life in the light of the Holy Gospel." When he was called to Zurich he found that the schools had fallen into great disrepute.

Dissolute monks had posed as teachers, and the sluggish manner of instruction had caused the common people to despise the promises that had been made for the benefit of the young people. He sought with his accustomed earnestness to put the schools on a new basis. Though he did not lose sight of the advantages of religious instruction, he realized that good citizenship must be educated in the wisdom of all the ages past. He engrafted upon the principal gymnasium a higher institution. He would have the young men taught practical theology, ancient languages and the sciences as far as the advance in this particular sphere of mental training would permit. That this end might be attained, he secured a faculty of some of the most eminent teachers of that day. The mental training was as far removed as possible from superficiality. Had Zwingli been permitted to develop his ideas as formulated in his treatise on education, he would have anticipated much that has been developed by our modern public school system. He was a man of the people. He insisted that the people needed education which should be placed within the reach of all. It was because of his interest in education that he became such a prominent citizen. Zwingli was not only respected as a theologian, but as a man of affairs. Before he had left Glarus, while he had scarcely begun to preach the true doctrines of the Reformation, he was one of "the most prominent and influential public men in Switzerland. He was zealous for intellectual culture and political reform but shows no special interest in the spiritual welfare of the Church" (Schaff).

As an earnest pastor and preacher he soon found helpers in every sphere of life. Some of the royal youths that he had educated became so warmly attached to him that they joined him in every effort to incarnate the ideas that were begotten in his heart by the brooding of the Holy Ghost. He possessed many of those qualities that recommend a preacher to the people. He had a handsome face of more than middle size, with a voice cultivated to perfection and possessing a winsomeness that found its way to the heart. He could weep with those who weep, but he could laugh with those who laughed.

He was soon acknowledged as the greatest preacher in Switzerland. He forsook the jejune legends and the outrageous stories with which the monks were accustomed to adorn their apologies for sermons. He became an expository preacher. Having committed whole books of the New Testament, he was well able, by proof passages, to make a verse or chapter sparkle with the words of the writers whom the Spirit had inspired. He did not at once attack the church. He was not at first moved to nail a set of theses to the church door. He found that the human heart had been blasted and scarred by sin. This could only be remedied by the blood of Christ. He sought by giving his people a course of sermons, or a whole book, to set before them Christ and Him crucified. For this end he began with the Gospel of Matthew. His using the Gospel instead of one of the Epistles shows the practical tendency of his mind. "His sermons as far as published are characterized, as Hagenbach says, by spiritual sobriety and manly solidity." His object was to reach the people by a positive declaration of revealed truth, "Piety, he says, is a fact and an experience, not a doctrine or a science. The Christian life is innocence. * * * But no soil produces innocence more richly than contempt of one's self. All the writings of the apostles are full of this opinion, namely, that the Christian life is none other than a firm hope in God through Jesus Christ, and an innocent life after Christ's pattern." It is easy to understand how a heart, filled with such ideas, would find its pleasure in expounding the Gospels. And we need not wonder that it sounded new and strange to the great congregations that hung upon his words in the great cathedral in Zurich. Such preaching had never been heard in Switzerland before. When once it had taken hold upon the hearts, the seven devils that had taken possession of the unfurnished pulpits of Christendom would be put to flight. It would compel men to assume the practical duties demanded in the sermon on the mount. It is, said Zwingli again, the part of a Christian man not to talk magnificently of doctrines, but always with God to do great and hard things. It is this feature of his reformatory work that gives it such a breezy atmosphere of good sense.

The theology of Zwingli must be learned from a syllabus, rather than from a finished work. The opportunity for a work like the Institutes of Calvin did not present itself. His activity, in state, and school, and church, prevented him from giving the time to the work of systematizing his thought. He had arrived at that time of life when men can do such work, and he was eminently equipped for it, but he fell on the battlefield, when performing the sacred duty of ministering to the wounded and dying.

Zwingli was an original theologian. In the great fundamental doctrines of Christianity, as embodied in the ecumenical creeds, he is at one with all of them. His theology contains germs of truth, which have found ready acceptance by some of the brightest minds of the present time. When much of the theology of the past has fallen into disrepute there is some of Zwingli's that meets the demands. His theology was founded upon the New Testament. He was not as speculative as Calvin or Luther, but far more practical. He broke more effectively with every form of tradition, and in many respects was far in advance of his age. It was because of his great work as a pastor and teacher, and of the active part that he took in the welfare of his country, that his theology has a different hue from any of the rest. Ranke says while Luther's main object was the reform of doctrine, which he thought would be necessarily followed by that of life and morals, Zwingli aimed directly at the improvement of life. Zwingli kept mainly in view the practical significance of scripture as a whole; his original views were of a moral and of a political nature, hence his labors were tinged with a wholly peculiar color." It is not necessary to remind the readers of this REVIEW of those theological tendencies that Zwingli had in common with all the rest of the Reformers. He was largely in agreement with his brethren, and none would have been more ready to unite on essentials, and save the church from being rent. This difference in theology came from the difference of temperament, the different way in which he reached the standpoint of the Reformation and the different course of studies he pursued. Being raised in a family in rather good circumstances, and far above the average in in-

telligence and religious character, he did not feel the awful consequences of sin as some others. He never had an emotion that drew him toward the cloister. His reading was not of devotional books almost to the exclusion of all else. He was a humanist and through this reached the standpoint that enabled him to see the necessity of reform. It was shocking to some of his compeers that he should have insisted upon the salvability of the heathen or of unbaptized infants. These things are not held against him at Marburg, but with them out of the way, the settlement of the dispute on the Lord's supper would have been materially aided. He is willing to allow ratiocination to play a part in the solution of theological problems, that was far from the mind of Luther. He is frequently charged with being a rationalist. That there should be a rationalizing element in his theology, is a corollary of his temperament. And yet it is held under control to the higher element of faith. He does not systematize, or rather he did not systematize his doctrine. What he would have done if he would have lived longer we cannot tell.

This accounts for the practical tendency of all his thinking. He meant to present a Gospel, or rather the Gospel, as something that was provided for every-day use, and as a formative energy in the affairs of men. "Its ultimate object was practical; if it aspired to soar on the wings of faith into the heavenly abyss of the divine decrees, it always came back to earth with a message of innocence and purity and justice between man and man. Zwingli's sympathy with Erasmus and the scholars of the Rhineland, which never failed him, both prevented him from becoming narrowly ecclesiastical and helped to keep him human." In all this we see the rounding out of that temperament which early displayed itself in his education. He created for himself an environment that would furnish him a genial soil for the highest development of his real self.

With all his devotion to the new learning, and at first servile submission to Humanism, he became the most earnest defender and expositor of the Word of God. Calvin is a greater commentator, but often reads into the scripture, where Zwingli would sit

at the feet of the master and hear what He had to say. Luther appears before us always as the heart-sick monk finding the chained Bible, and falling upon the doctrine of Justification by Faith. It was the doctrine that he made the test of a standing or falling church. Zwingli emphasizes the word of God as the only rule of faith and practice. This is the objective principle which controls his whole theology. With all the practical energy of his heart and thought, he was more loyal to the objective principle of the Reformation than any of his fellow reformers. It was because of his intense feeling of the need of a practical religion that he postulated so firmly something objective. Luther was subjective. His subjectivism ran riot when he came into the sphere of Biblical criticism. He tossed about epistle and doctrine with a criminal recklessness which would not tally with his subjective apprehension of the doctrine of justification by faith; not so Zwingli. He accepted the Catholic canon, with the exception of the Book of Revelation. In this he failed to find the style and thought of the eagle-eyed St. John, and hence doubted its genuineness and authority. While there have been long years when the legitimacy of criticism has been denied, yet now it might be well to listen to the words of one whose loyalty to the word of God brought him to know Christ with a certainty that never could have been attained in any other way. He insisted upon "the exclusive and absolute authority of the Bible in all matters of Christian faith and practice." Luther demanded that nothing be disturbed in church or cultus or doctrine that was not condemned by the Word of God. This went far towards doing away with many abuses which had so long held sway in the medieval church. With such a view of the requirements of the Bible the break would not be as radical as in Switzerland, either under Zwingli and later under Calvin. Zwingli insisted that nothing but what was commanded in the Bible should be allowed to remain. This meant sending the plowshare through that whole round of customs that had sprung up under traditions which had come to be regarded as sacred, if not more so, than the Word of God itself.

The most original and prominent doctrine, associated with Zwingli's name, is that of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In Baptism already he had taken ground somewhat different from the doctrine of the church. It had been regarded as bestowing in some mystical way, a grace which was not dependent upon repentance and faith. It became for him a pledge of fidelity on the part of the recipient. The blessing came in the way of putting the individual in a new relation to the operation of the spirit, and grace, whereby the perfect man would be actualized. Already here he draws a sharp distinction between the sign and the thing signified. This is so drawn, and sometimes the distinction is so marked, that there is such a break between them that it is hard to see where they touch or interpenetrate each other.

When he had come to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper this thought hindered him. If at Marburg, some sweet spirit could have formulated that view which later was formulated by Calvin, there might have been a better ending to the conference. Luther had taken great offense at Zwingli's charity for some of those who had opposed him. He thought of him as an open enemy of the cause of Reform. He could not forgive those humanistic and rationalistic elements in his theology which did such violence to his own subjective apprehension of the truth.

It is generally supposed that Zwingli regarded the elements in the Supper as signs and seals and nothing more. In his utter rejection of the whole scholastic theory of the sacrament, it is just possible that he was carried farther than he intended. We see the pendulum when it has swung farthest from the center. While it is there the hand that held it is suddenly chilled in death, and could not guide it back to the place he would have had it rest finally. Without a single concession from his opponent, he remained stolid. Judging from his general character, he would have been ready to have met more than half way any advance that would have been made. When with outstretched hand and tear-swollen eye, he begged for a brotherly recognition, he showed a conciliatory spirit that would have done much to bring about a compromise.

Even though so wary of falling into the ideas inherited from

the scholastic ages, "he fully admits that the sacraments are divinely instituted and necessary for our two-fold constitution; that they are significant and efficacious, not empty signs; that they aid and strengthen our faith and so far confer spiritual blessing through the medium of appropriating faith. In this wider sense they may be called means of grace." (Shaff's Creeds, Vol. I., p. 373.) With such a position secured, it is easy to see how John Calvin could formulate his view of the Lord's Supper which is now more widely accepted than any other, yea more, we are safe in saying, that but for the unfortunate ending of Zwingli's life when he had scarcely attained his intellectual majority, he himself would have reached the same conclusion.

When he was forced to contend for infant baptism against the Anabaptist, he attained a position which is far more satisfactory than the one with which he started. There was an intellectual clarifying of the vision and an ascription of spiritual value that satisfies the second generation of Reformers, and even holds its place largely at the present time. The same logical process would have brought him, very near if not altogether, to the position which Calvin assumed.

When battling with the Romish mass, he asserted the memorial idea which had been entirely lost sight of. He asserted it with an emphasis which could not be sustained when set over against a milder form of the doctrine of the presence of the Lord. He must lay all the emphasis upon faith as the channel through which the blessing comes. In the confession sent to King Francis I. shortly before his death we find these words: "We believe that Christ is truly present in the Lord's Supper; yea we believe that there is no communion without the presence of Christ." He is present in the midst, where two or three are gathered together in His name. How much more is He present when the whole congregation is assembled, and using the means which have been divinely provided for the nourishment of the people.

As a Reformer, Zwingli was not just like the rest. Though occasionally there came moments of melancholy, yet he was always hopeful. He had done a work that would lustre any name.

He had compelled the people to recognize the Gospel as a rule of life. The results of the effort were simply marvelous. He transformed Zurich from a city given over to worldliness and greed begotten of foreign gold, to a patriotic, self-respecting, sober and pious place. He roused their energy, that they were not simply adherents of the faith, in an easy-going manner, but were ready with martyr's blood to seal it for coming generations. He had done all this by appealing to the hearts of the people by the simple Gospel of the blessed Son of God. He had no great Elector whose hand was ever stretched out to uphold him. He appealed to the people. He was a man of the people and felt the power lodged in them, when once it was aroused and sanctified by the Gospel. In this day, when men are beginning to realize the idea of the Kingdom, Zwingli is being revived. Though he did not reach it, his eyes were set toward it. He had the first faint streaks of the vision divine which has grown for us with the fullness of the day. This humanistic spirit made him that he would call nothing common and unclean that the Lord had sanctified. He saw that this was God's world and belonged unto God's children. If they were loyal to Christ, they would be able to possess the land for Him. Zwingli saw God in all the world, and felt assured that His activity was felt far beyond the boundaries of the Church. Unbaptized infants would not be lost. Heathen who had lived up to the light granted unto them, would come to the enjoyment of heaven. Home school and government were but different forms of activity, through which the Holy Spirit was laboring to bring about the millennial hour. With this broader and more comprehensive view, Zwingli "handed down to the Reformed theology a freer spirit, and though it was often eclipsed by other elements, it has not been without its continuous influence to the present day." The Reformed Church cannot do a more graceful thing than to aid historians and members of other communions in giving new meaning to the life and teachings of Zwingli; in showing to ourselves, as well as to others, that the breadth, cheeriness and hopes of modern theology are rooted largely in the thoughts of the great Reformer of Switzerland.

III.

ISRAEL'S IDEA OF HEREDITY.

BY REV. J. EDWIN HARTMAN.

The Old Testament idea of heredity is centered in its expression in the Abrahamic covenant and the second commandment. In the former we have the idea in its unalloyed purity; it must have come first. For the children of Israel it stands as the covenant with Eve stands for the race (Gen. 3: 15). "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel." As yet there has been no differentiation; what is true of Eve and the serpent shall be true of all their seed. The first differentiation is cited in Gen. 4: 20-22, where it is said Jabal is the father of tent-dwellers and cattle owners; his brother Jubal, the father of musicians. In the covenant with Abraham there is left no room for differentiation; what is true of him or any one of his offspring is true of all his descendants. In them or "in thee" shall all the nations of the earth be blessed. But when we come to the second commandment we find a distinct mark between two possible lines of heredity—cursing for the idolater and his progeny, blessing to the thousandth generation of the true Jehovah worshipper. An understanding of this commandment is necessary in order to reach a proper conception of the idea of heredity as held in Israel. In a sense it is the cornerstone of the decalogue; in a sense it is the rock of destruction upon which Israel was ever in danger of suffering shipwreck. The other commands, excepting the first, the nation might break and live on; to be indifferent to the requirements of the second was inevitably suicidal. Hence, from the wild eloquence of Elijah on Carmel to the gloomy pathos of Hosea, the prophets knew and preached but a single text, and that was the second

commandment. Finally what seemed the unforgiven and unforgivable sin against this law brought in the need and the teaching of the suffering Servant and the Messiah. When, therefore, we touch this command we have laid our hand upon the heart of the history of Israel and the very core of the Old Testament.

The second commandment has to do with idolatry. The injunction to make no graven image nor worship any other than the revealed Jehovah, is something quite distinct from the added threat and promise. And yet the latter are not simply super-added as mere motives or inducements toward obedience. They are inevitable; indeed, so much so that it were proper to term them the declaration of necessary consequences. Obey!—this is the divine purpose which reaches far through the ages. Disobey!—this leads away from the divine purpose, immediately into annihilation. Obey—link thyself to the purpose of God, follow along “the line of progress”—and blessing must follow as a consequence even to a thousand, *i. e.*, to indefinite generations. Disobey—cut loose from supreme purpose, launch out alone, and at the third or fourth generation must you have drifted back to obedience or been irretrievably lost in extinction. The curse is, in a sense, the disobedience itself and not only the consequence. Out of the millions God chose one whom he called Abraham to be the father of true worshippers. This was the holy purpose. For the children of Abraham to return to idolatry was necessarily to go back from the few blessed to the lost millions. In three or four generations of idolatry the truth would be lost. But to follow the leadings of God’s purpose brought men just as necessarily through a thousand generations, nearer to the light of final and complete redemption from error.

It is essential to note, in the first place, that the idea in early Israel was intensely social; in the second place, that its regulation was left in the hands of Jehovah; and last, that as the idea lost its social aspect it lost its ethical power; or in other words, in proportion as it was individualized, its regulation was withdrawn from the power of God and placed under the superintendence of mere nature, *i. e.*, fate.

I. The idea of heredity had no meaning for Israel except as related to her corporate consciousness. The individual was a mere atom in a great organism. He owned and exercised no will of his own. Even many of his emotions were but a meagre contribution to an intense national feeling. If he loved and rejoiced, it was only as the nation loved and rejoiced; if he hated it was as the whole people hated; if he mourned it was only a part of a great social sorrow. So it comes that many of the sweetest and tenderest of the psalms which, for the present day, seem to gather most of their beauty from their apparent expression of purely individual sentiments, are really the outpourings of a corporate consciousness. The twenty-third psalm, *e. g.*, whose first personal pronouns throughout seem to make it altogether individualistic, is, on the contrary, the faith of a nation. The "my" and the "I" and the "me" stand, not for the simple trust of some ancient psalmodist, but of Israel, the child of God, the flock of the great shepherd.

Similarly, if there was sin it was the nation's sin, and retribution fell upon all. An example of this is found in the case of Achan (Josh. 7), when he appropriated the devoted thing. "And the Lord said unto Joshua, get thee up; wherefore art thou thus fallen upon thy face? Israel hath sinned; yea, they have even transgressed my covenant which I commanded them. Therefore the children of Israel cannot stand before their enemies, they turn their backs upon their enemies because they are accursed." Achan alone had committed the deed; before he was discovered Israel suffered dire defeat at the hands of the inhabitants of Ai. After he was found out all Israel "put her sin from her" by stoning him, and not only him, but also his wives, his children, his servants and his cattle.

In the interpretation of the idea of heredity this social significance is of paramount importance. The breaking of the second commandment was not thought of as an individual possibility, nor could its consequences pertain only to the individual's posterity. If there is idolatry it is a social sin; and the consequences of a social sin must be social retribution. It is Israel

as *Israel* to the third or fourth generations accursed; or it is *Israel as Israel* to a thousand generations blessed, according as they obey or refuse to obey the divine will. The individual as such has no power to sin apart from the communal sanction; and wherever he is able to usurp this power he necessarily casts a blot not only nor particularly on himself, but upon the soul of the whole people, which he represents.

We have said the individual as such has no power to sin apart from communal sanction. This assertion we limit for our present purpose to the violation of the second commandment. Religion is normally a social fact; in isolation there can be no religion; rob a man of human fellowship and he is robbed of God. Even asceticism is only an interval in the history of religion, flourishing at most only a few centuries, and bridged on every hand by a piety, if not more genuine, certainly more active and effective. And certain it is that the monastery very soon replaced the more individualistic forms of asceticism. Just as it is impossible to have a religion at all apart from society, so also is it, only to less extent perhaps, impossible to profess a religion radically different from that of the community. Now a community may be very small, indeed; but small as it is, a community is still essential to a form of religion. No sane individual can profess a religion purely his own. If this be true in our day of extreme individualism, how much more so must it have been in that day of *Israel* when the only real consciousness was corporate. Therefore if one man be an idolater he has his associates in sin; and the whole community of which he is a part must suffer his penalty with him.

This social doctrine of heredity anticipates the notion of the transmissibility of acquired traits as held by modern science. And of necessity; for whether the theory that acquired traits are transmitted in the individual sense be true or not, it is beyond all controversy that from the social standpoint this theory, properly modified, cannot be escaped. *Israel's* ideas and the modifications of these ideas were acquired and transmitted. *Israel* shaped her idea of heredity—and the modified idea, in turn, potently and remarkably shaped *Israel*.

Science is at present interested in, at least three distinct theories of heredity, which we shall attempt to state briefly in this place. The first is that of Darwin according to which acquired characteristics are transmitted to progeny. All theories provide two elements, or two sets of distinct cells in every organism, which we may term the somatic—that element which comes and goes with each generation; and the germ-principle—that element which is passed on from the soma of one generation to form the soma of the next. According to Darwin every somatic germ in an organism casts off what he calls a gemmule which is a sort of miniature type of its parent somatic cell, and this gemmule, combining with all the other gemmules from all the other somatic cells of the organism, is passed on to constitute the soma of the next generation. Any modifications, therefore, in a particular somatic cell would tend to produce a similar modification in a resultant somatic cell owing to the influence of each cell of a previous soma upon its respective gemmules.

The second theory is that of Galton, which maintains that the germ-principle is continuous from one generation to another; that is to say, the soma does not *produce* the germ-principle, which he calls stirp, but simply *contains* it. The soma is, as it were, the channel through which the stirp has flowed through all generations as a river over its bed. This theory does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a modification of the stirp by the soma and hence, by reaction, of some particular soma. Galton has said that such modification may, and perhaps does, occur; but it is not so frequent nor so inevitable as is allowed by the Darwinian theory.

The third and last theory is that of Weissman. This is very similar to Galton's, differing only in the assumption that the stirp or germ-plasm is *perpetually* continuous and *absolutely* stable. This germ-plasm had its origin in the unicellular life ages ago; without undergoing any change these single, simple cells were built up into multicellular organisms, and as such have continued unchanged and unchangeable to the present day. Differences in organisms are due to two facts: (1) to the influence of external

environment upon the single cells before they were taken up into complex organisms ; and (2) to the different proportions in which these differing cells find themselves as a result of sexual crossings. But by such crossings there is no real amalgamation of the germ-plasm of the male and that of the female ; there is only a mixture ; as if sand and chalk be mixed—the sand remains sand, the chalk, chalk, although the resulting compound is very different from either of its constituents. From the fact that the germ-plasm is perpetually continuous and absolutely stable, it follows that there can be no possibility of transmitting traits acquired in one generation to the next ; for they are accidents of the soma. This theory then is at the opposite extreme from that of Darwin, while Galton's is a mean.

Our purpose in sketching these theories is merely to suggest without extended elaboration an analogy between the social organism, so called, and the individual organism, and thus determine more fully the nature of the idea in Israel in the light of modern science.

If each generation of Israel as it arose represent the soma, and the ideas which modified and inspired her life throughout, represent the germ principle, it is not difficult to note the relation of each to each. It is evident that no generation produces an idea purely *de novo* ; ideas can be and are received, entertained, and developed, but not produced by any one mind or set of minds. Hence the Darwinian theory of gemmules is out of the question in this application. Moreover, as the history of Israel clearly demonstrates, ideas can be and frequently are modified—changed sometimes to an extent where they are scarcely to be recognized as the remains of their originals. Such change may be wrought in the course of a very few or a great number of generations. It is usually accomplished by the voluntary or unconscious intention or circumstance of the generation. So that Weissman's theory is as little to be applied here as Darwin's. The theory of Galton remains, and here, as in its proper application, it seems not only the most reasonable of all, but also the one which seems to account in a more adequate manner for

all the facts which any theory is bound to meet and satisfy. According to this, Israel's ideas continue as they are; the generations that come and go can neither create nor annihilate them. But under certain conditions they can modify, and such occasional modifications can be and are transmitted. Israel to-day is still Israel; but she is Israel plus the certain acquirement of her yesterday. Yesterday she was idolatrous—to-day she is accursed; for devotion to falsehood where truth has been enshrined always works a fitting degradation. "The iniquities of the fathers upon the children" was cried into the ears of Israel by the prophets until she grew deaf; and while she sat upon the desolation of her vanquished city before the conqueror bore her captive to a foreign land, she came to herself and remembered that the prophets were right. Her defeat was due to her fathers' idolatry but also to her own, which was a direct inheritance. The fathers' religion is almost invariably the children's religion. The truth, because it was the truth, would have barricaded Israel against any foe that might have been marshaled against her. To-day the Jew stands as a preëminent example of the inevitable consequence of the father's sins; and the Christian, as the representative of that remnant in Israel which remained faithful and made possible the fulfillment of the Abrahamic covenant—"in thee will all the nations be blessed," and the showing of mercy to a thousand generations of them that loved and obeyed the God of Sinai.

II. We have next to consider the fact that the regulation of heredity was ascribed to the power of Jehovah. This thought was a vital part of the idea. That such should be the case cannot be wondered at; its cause lies in the fact that heredity was a social and not an individual idea. For if it be a social fact its regulation must be in the will of the state itself; or in autocracy or royalty; or in Nature or God. Manifestly such power could not reside in the State, for it is the State as such that sins, and it is the State that must suffer sin's penalty. Hence there must be some higher court of appeal, some supreme will above the will of the State. There can be no genuine re-

penance where the only responsibility is toward an exacting self-hood; and in like manner can there be no genuine punishment self-inflicted.

Nor can such regulation belong to autocracy or royalty at the head of the nation; for the power was beyond man and the sweep of its mighty influence extends far beyond the life-limit of a king, and survived even the stages of autocracy and the kingdom, as it had preceded them. The executive control of a state, whether placed into the hand of one or of a dozen, can only set the State above and against the individual miscreant or in opposition to a hostile nation. This is the limit of its power. It can never arise out of and above the social organism and pose as a sanction for its virtues or a judge of its follies. That the rulers in Israel should set the law and threaten a breaking of that law with the visitation of evil upon the fathers and their children is inconceivable; even the curse of Noah is only the curse of a father's wrath, standing impotent apart from the sin that awoke it and the just God who wrought its fulfillment. To quote Cicero: "What city would endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a crime committed by a father or a grandfather?"

And when we turn to Nature as controlling the judgments of heredity, we find again in her an impossible sovereign—except as Nature and religion for Israel, as for all ancient peoples, were essentially one. The rocks and the mountains were the footstool of the Almighty, the stars lay in the hollow of His hand, and every wind that blew was the breath of Jehovah of Israel. The very tendency toward idolatry is a pathetic indication of the close union of God and His world. Why were not the mountain tops the favorite resting-places of their God? Why should not the cool fragrance of the groves, formed of God's own trees, be God's own spirit clothed in a half-earthly garb? But Nature as Israel knew her was dangerous. She always seduced her admirers away from the God who made her admirable. And so it became the duty of the prophets to point to Jehovah alone as the one worthy of devotion and the one who would punish those that turn aside from Him.

This then is the clear note ringing through the Old Testament—Jehovah will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations: the State and its leaders are impotent, Nature is indulgent, God alone remains just and righteous and mighty altogether. Aside from Him there is none to whom Israel must be responsible. Her kings must stand on His side or fall with their subjects in defeat; her priests must be His servants or lead the nation through idolatry to destruction; even her prophets are but the voice of the living God calling her back to the purity of her fathers' devotion.

This truth came to have a reactionary effect upon the people of the remnant; and every calamity that befell the nation was traced back through their own to their fathers' iniquities; every blessing was similarly traced to the faithfulness of Abraham and the patriarchs. Each backward reference must have tended to deepen the idea of heredity and strengthen its ethical power. The preaching of the prophets and the earliest teaching insisted strenuously on the fact of heredity; national experience verified the insistence. But the great host of Israel was callous so that it never was aroused to the enormous significance of the disaster which had befallen it. This was one extreme to which the idea was forced, or rather, by which it was banished, through the hardness of men's hearts. The opposite extreme was only less dangerous, and finally awoke the voice of prophesy against it also.

III. We have still to note the extreme to which the idea of heredity was forced by the gradual disintegration of the social consciousness and the appearance of the more strongly individualistic frame of mind in Israel. The immediate cause of this breaking up of the social organism, and the consciousness of it, is most undoubtedly owing very largely to the captivity; although strong indications of the same tendency appeared earlier. The captivity, in turn, was due to idolatry; and hence in a certain real sense individualism in Israel was born of Israel's iniquity. It was the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the third and fourth generations. It is impossible to imagine what would have been God's method of redemption had Israel con-

tinued faithful to her knowledge of the truth. Certain it is that the manner in which He adjusted the redemptive plan to the waywardness of His chosen people is a marvellous act of love and beauty. Through their very adversity the captives were led to look for a deliverer, the Suffering Servant, the reigning Messiah. In the very chaos of Israel's shattered social-union was set the star of hope which led to the place where the young child lay—to the cradle of the founder of the new and everlasting kingdom.

In this social disintegration lurked a danger which was very early discovered by the prophets and gave rise to such teaching as that of Jeremiah: "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grapes his teeth shall be set on edge." So also the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel with its oft-repeated, "the soul that sinneth it shall die." As men tore themselves, or were torn, from the social body, they interpreted the doctrines which they brought with them, from a widely different point of view. What was a truth preëminently for the social unit becomes a curse applied to the individual. On the throne of united Israel are placed the sins of the fathers—and all ethics, all pure religion is gone. There is no longer any responsibility; "my fathers" sins have damned me and rule my lot with unyielding scepter." Jehovah is vanquished—Fate is supreme! In social consciousness a God who held in His hand the forces of heredity could possibly sway men's hearts to the truth; for whilst the nation was very largely what its fathers made it, still it was ever reminded that its earliest fathers, the patriarchs, were faithful; their heritage was faithfulness, and with the first fathers was the covenant of God established. The remote heritage was good and from it the mightiest appeals could be made. All the intervening generations of faithlessness were mere interpolations, and the present generation remained the possible heirs of the patriarchs and the certain fathers of subsequent generations.

But when individualism took shape and heredity was partic-

ularized, the immediate progenitors became the potent factors of conduct, and men began to push responsibility into the past, and as responsibility vanished, God's grasp on hereditary forces was slackened; no longer was it Jehovah that ruled the destinies of life, but a blind fate superimposed by the iniquities of the past. Then thundered the prophets "The soul that sinneth it shall die," then was the fulness of time—then came the Christ!

We have spoken of the idea of heredity as applied to Israel as a whole. We have failed to note the fact of the division of the kingdom after Solomon's reign, because even after that event there was a real social union upon questions of doctrine and ideas. The one section only anticipated the other in the general disintegration of corporate consciousness. But we must not pass over entirely in silence those allusions to the idea, so frequent through the Old Testament, which refer to sections in Israel; as, *e. g.*, the "throne of David," "the house of Eli," "Shemaiah and his seed." We may say that what was true of the idea as applied to Israel corporate, is true also of these sections in Israel. For these also are social units comprised within the larger general organism. Their fortunes were differentiated from the fortunes of the nation, in degrees not in kind, as in the case of the house of David; or else they were reabsorbed into the general consciousness after having been once thus differentiated, as in the case of Eli and his sons.

It is scarcely possible to conceive that there should not have been a subordinate individualistic idea of heredity running parallel through the history of Israel with the larger social conception. Undoubtedly it must have been observed that comparatively slight physical modifications were to be found alike in parents and their children; so also frequently the finer mental and emotional traits. Some experienced fact evidently lies behind the statement that Adah bare Jabel, the father of such as dwell in tents and own cattle; his brother Jubal the father of all that handle the harp and pipe, and Zillah who bare Tubalcain the forger of every cutting instrument of brass and iron. Israel too must have observed what the Latins experienced and ex-

pressed in the words of Cicero: "If well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the slightest doubt that there was in the olive tree itself some kind of knowledge and skill? or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious lutes, surely you would infer on the same principle that music was contained in the plane-tree. * * * If Jupiter and Neptune are Gods can that divinity be denied to their father Saturn?—if Saturn be a god, so must his father also." But the Scriptural passages regarding such individualistic ideas of heredity in Israel are comparatively rare. That there were such ideas in her early history must be supposed from the nature of things rather than proved from the records. Moreover such ideas had no ethical value for Israel in her earlier days, and in the after days they even sapped out the ethical life of other facts as we have already indicated. It was about the social idea that her history clustered; this is the center of her whole career, and when at last her members were torn asunder and flung abroad until there seemed no hope of gathering them together and reuniting them in the ideal Zion for which she longed, in the restored Jerusalem over the ruins of whose first glory she wept her grief away—the God of her fathers established a new center in whose name all nations should be blessed according to the promises—even Jesus Christ, His own Son.

IV.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

BY PROF. GEO. W. RICHARDS.

During the last year Dr. Conwell, of the Baptist church, announced in tones of solemnity, before a convention of Christian Endeavorers, that the higher critics were all dead; yes, they are all dead! He evidently rejoiced in their death as a man would rejoice over the decease of a dangerous foe. About the same time George Adam Smith, of England, declared his conviction that modern criticism, in its conflict with traditional theories of the Old Testament, has gained the victory, and that the unprejudiced and impartial student must feel constrained to accept the results of its work. Dr. Smith, accordingly, looks upon the higher critics, not as defeated foes, but as victorious friends, of truth and righteousness.

The judgment of these men is valuable because it represents the twofold tendency in our generation; the one is hostile, and conscientiously so, to the modern methods of biblical study; the other is friendly to them and welcomes their results. One feels that the points of view, occupied by Dr. Conwell and Dr. Smith, are so different, their mental habits, their conception of Christianity, their theory of the Bible so diverse that they can never reach harmonious conclusions on this question. They may find their chief comfort in announcing each other's death and attending each other's funeral. Considering the undoubted sincerity and Christian character of these men, we may be fully convinced that Christian life is not dependent upon the acceptance, or upon the rejection, of a method of biblical study. The power of Jesus Christ in the world may be hindered by erroneous, and aided by right, methods but is greater than methods, works independent of them, and molds men in spite of them.

Let us consider the *purpose* of biblical criticism, the *origin* and *significance* of the critical movement ; and the *scope* of criticism. In the light of the facts and principles thus attained, we may be able to pass judgment with some degree of intelligence. There are those who condemn criticism without giving it a hearing. They simply throw up their hands in holy horror at the sight of a higher critic. So did the pious Catholic in the sixteenth century at the sight of a Lutheran or a sacramentarian. There are others who embrace the higher critic simply because he seems to be new, fashionable and radical. They rejoice in the overthrow, not simply of erroneous traditions, but of fundamental truths. To the facts, therefore, and then to the judgment seat.

I.

After hearing many discussions on the subject of criticism and even after reading volumes devoted to it, clear definitions of the purpose and the methods of biblical criticism are rarely found. This, we believe, is the first cause of so much misapprehension and fear with regard to the movement. To the great majority of people and, perhaps, to many preachers, the critic seems to be an ally of Tom Paine and his school, bent upon the destruction of positive Christianity. A bare announcement of the conclusions of criticism, which contradict the opinions of the ages, may warrant such a view. Those who have identified Christianity with a theory of inspiration and a number of traditions concerning the sacred books, cannot give up a book of the bible, or even a tradition concerning a book, without weakening their religion. Let them renounce the historicity of Jonah and the whale, and with it goes the incarnation and the resurrection of Jesus. We believe, however, that a clear comprehension of the history of the canon, the purpose of the critic, and the true nature of the Bible and its relation to Christianity, will correct many erroneous ideas on these points.

The term higher criticism is now mainly thought of in its connection with the study of the Bible. It must not be forgotten that it was a method applied to the study of ancient manuscripts,

long before it was used in the study of biblical books. Its results in profane literature are unquestioned and are now generally accepted. Its results in sacred literature, however, are not so readily received.

Given an ancient document from Greece, Palestine or Egypt, without date, name of author, purpose and circumstances of composition, how may the scholar discover these? By an application of the principles of what is now known as higher criticism. According to Dr. Briggs the critic seeks to answer four questions concerning this newly found document—the *integrity of the writing, the authenticity, the style, and the credibility*. In questioning the integrity of a composition, we ask, whether it was written by a single author, or whether it is a collection of writings by different authors? Does it appear in its original form or has it been changed by later editors or revisers? Respecting its authenticity, we ask, whether it is anonymous, not bearing the author's name; pseudonymous, bearing a false or assumed name; or does it have the author's name attached? The style refers to the form into which the matter is cast. Is it poetry or prose; history or romance; psalmody or proverb? The credibility has to do with the truth of its statements. Was the author prejudiced or not? Did he have reliable sources? Does he accept traditions merely, or does he go behind traditions to the facts upon which traditions rest? By a universally accepted system of evidence and inquiry, these questions are studied and answered. The conclusions vary in their certainty according to the evidence at hand, yet they are, in the main, more reliable than unquestioned traditions.

To show that the methods of higher criticism are not only accepted by progressive scholars, like Dr. Briggs, we need only quote the words of so conservative a scholar as Dr. Green. He says, the problem of higher criticism "is to ascertain by all available means the author by whom, the time at which, the circumstances under which, and the design with which documents were produced." He adds, furthermore, that "such investigations, rightly conducted, must prove a most important aid to the under-

standing and just appreciation of the writing in question." However much these two representatives of American scholarship may differ in their conclusions, they do not differ in their definition of the purpose of criticism, and in their belief in its necessity and desirability.

The methods of higher criticism have been used in the study of ancient manuscripts since the days of the renaissance. Three epoch-making works are cited by most writers on this subject to illustrate the successful application of critical principles, by which the traditional views were overthrown and scientific results established. The Epistles of Phalaris were said to have come from the hands of Phalaris, a Sicilian tyrant, living in the sixth century, B. C. This was the unanimous opinion of Boyle and the Oxford scholars. Richard Bentley, however, in "A Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris," published in 1699, proved that the letters did not come from Phalaris, but were a worthless forgery. He was condemned by the scholars, whom he opposed, and public opinion supported the traditional view. To-day Bentley's conclusions are accepted without question. Bentley taught the lesson which has never been forgotten, that the titles attached to ancient documents, their authorship and date, cannot always be accepted as authentic and must be tested by a careful examination of the contents of the writing, and by all the evidence, internal and external, that may be gotten.

A second work appeared in 1795, by Fred. Augustus Wolf, entitled, "A Prolegomena to Homer." He presented the hypothesis that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not, as was supposed for centuries, the work of one man. Each of these books consisted of a cycle of heroic ballads, for a long time handed down by oral tradition and later reduced to writing by an anonymous editor. Beard, in his lectures on the Reformation, says: "Nothing could be more shocking to literary orthodoxy than this theory, yet it gradually made its way and is now, in one form or other, generally adopted." Wolf's work elucidated another principle, namely, that a document coming down from the past as a whole, with the name of a single author, may be composed of several original documents, written by different authors.

The third work, of special significance in the application of the critical method, was Niebuhr's "*History of Rome*." Before Niebuhr's time the historians took the ancient sources without question and wrote up the material in modern style. They did not inquire into the credibility of the documents, traditions, myths, and legends. They accepted Livy's statements as final authority on points in question. But under Niebuhr's critical eye even Livy's history of Rome was found in many points unreliable. Legends were evidently used as history. The historian was inclined to be influenced by national or family pride in the presentation of facts. The ancient historians were found in many respects less able to write a correct history of the centuries preceding them, than modern historians with all the sources at hand for comparison and illumination. Niebuhr did what another great historian said he did, when asked how he could write a history that stood the test of time. Von Rauke answered: "I do not go back *to*, but back *of*, the documents." He tested the stories, traditions and myths, and sifted out the facts which were historical. Henceforth ancient history must be rewritten and the traditions of the past, as well as the historians of antiquity, must stand the test of new methods of inquiry.

In ecclesiastical history very valuable service has been rendered the cause of truth, especially to Protestantism, by the same method of research. The document called the "*Donation of Constantine*," was quoted by the Popes of the middle ages as coming from the fourth century, and as being a justification of their claims of temporal authority in Italy and the West. Laurentius Valla, in the fifteenth century, proved the document a forgery by the methods of higher criticism. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant historians accept the result of Valla's work. In the same way Nicholas of Cusa showed that the Pseudo-Isidorean decretals did not come from the early centuries, but that many of the Papal letters were false, and were written to support the pretensions of Rome to temporary and spiritual supremacy.

We cite these instances to show that the critical method is not an invention of German infidels, French atheists or English deists

for the destruction of Christianity, but that it is a rational means of inquiry which has been used in a more or less exact way for five hundred years. It has been successfully applied in profane literature. It was only centuries after its application by humanists and historians in the classical sphere that Biblical scholars have ventured to apply it to the Biblical documents. If the method has been abused by evil-minded men, who seek to overthrow the church, the Bible and Christianity, it is not the fault of the method, but of the spirit of the men who abused it. If devout scholars have thus tested the sacred books, when they should have left them untouched, we are sure that it was a well-intended error which the spirit of truth will in due time correct.

After having observed the higher criticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the department of classical and patristic literature, it is not astonishing that scholars should use the same method in the study of Biblical or Hebrew literature. Just here we reach the crucial point. Is the Bible literature the literature of the Hebrew people? Upon the answer to this question depends the right of the scholar to apply literary methods to Biblical documents. If it is not literature, it cannot be subject to the tests of literature. If it is literature, then literary criticism is not only allowable, but necessary. Without answering the question, we simply state the fact that the first Biblical critics approached the Bible as if it were literature, and upon that assumption they have worked ever since. Geddes, one of the first critics of the Pentateuch, wrote: "Let the father of Hebrews, Moses, be tried by the same rules of criticism as Greek history." Eichhorn also treated the Hebrew scriptures, not merely as vehicles of a revelation, but as in form Oriental books, which were to be interpreted in accordance with the habits of mind of the Semitic peoples. Whether these men were right or wrong, the reader may decide; but we can easily see how, in the eighteenth century, such a view of the Bible might arise in the most devout minds, and Biblical criticism would be conducted in the most conscientious spirit. It would not take long until the Pentateuch would be examined with the same critical eyes as the Epistles of

Phalaris; and the historical books of Judges, Samuel and Kings would be analyzed as the documents of Rome were analyzed by Niebuhr, and the Psalms and Prophets would be subjected to the same tests as the Iliad and the Odyssey. Bentley, Wolf and Niebuhr had their followers in Astruc, Eichhorn and Wellhausen.

The result has been that critics to-day no longer accept the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of the Old Testament. They find in them several documents, which were written by different men, at different times, and finally cast into their present form by a later editor. The Psalms, as was for ages believed, were not all written by David and a few contemporaries, but are a collection of Hebrew psalmody, produced through centuries of Hebrew history. Though the prophecy of Isaiah bears the superscription of Isaiah, the son of Amos, the last twenty-seven chapters are no longer assigned to the author of the first thirty-nine chapters. In fact, the traditional opinions concerning the author by whom, the time at which, the circumstances under which, and the design with which, the sacred books were produced, have in many instances been changed, or given up altogether, for conclusions based on scientific research. When this statement is made it should not be forgotten that the substance or the contents of the sacred book remains. The spiritual food, upon which the saints of the past have fed and by which they have been quickened, has not been taken away. The manner and time of its preparation have simply been restated in the light of critical studies.

It is not our purpose to record at length the results of biblical criticism. We would refer the reader, however, to a careful study of Driver's "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament" for an excellent account of the latest discussions and conclusions on the books of the Old Testament. "The Introduction to the New Testament," by Bacon, contains a brief and clear statement of the work done by critics in the New Testament. No preacher should be without the last edition of "The Study of Holy Scriptures" by Briggs. It is an encyclopedia of the whole critical movement, both of textual and higher criti-

cism. It explains the principles applied and the results attained. The question, however, arises how criticism originated ; why was it necessary in the course of history ?

II.

The Origin and Significance of the Critical Movement. The critical faculty is a part of man's mental equipment. In a sense all men are philosophers, scientists and artists in embryo. Yet few men develop their inborn powers to such a degree that they are recognized as members of a philosophic or artistic school. So, too, all men are embryonic critics, and unconsciously exercise the critical faculty and use the critical method in their daily life. In few men, however, is this faculty developed and by few scientifically used. It seeks to prove, verify, and test the knowledge that we receive through the regular channels, the senses, written and oral tradition, and the deductions of the reason. It is the same spirit which impels the school boy to prove the answer of the problem he has worked. If the processes and means of knowledge were perfect, if memories of men never failed, if the pens of scribes never erred, if the statements of authors never deceived, then the work of criticism would be unnecessary. That knowledge, however, is imperfect and traditions need correction, no one will deny so far as profane scriptures are concerned. The theory of biblical inspiration, which was advocated long after the death of the Reformers of the sixteenth century, according to which even the vowel points of the Hebrew text were directly inspired, does not permit men to accept the necessity of criticism in the sphere of the sacred scriptures. Again, the question resolves itself into this, not whether criticism is a legitimate method of knowledge, but whether it may be legitimately applied to the Bible. It is conceded that its methods are based on universally accepted principles, and its conclusions, where the evidences are sufficient, cannot be reasonably denied.

For centuries, however, men did not use the critical faculty ; in fact the critical method was only partly known and developed. Since the sixth century A. D., the classics of Greece and Rome

were regarded with suspicion by the church. A knowledge of them was considered a questionable virtue. The writings of the church fathers and the sacred scriptures were the library of the scholars of the middle age. For a thousand years the world was cut off from the source of antiquity. The mind of man was bound by the traditions of the Church in sacred and profane lore. Roman imperialism dominated the Christian Church, so that independent thought and action were practically impossible. Under such circumstances critical inquiry into the ground of truth and the sources of tradition, were either unnecessary, forbidden, or impossible. Even the Bible was no longer read in the original, if read at all, and the fathers were studied at third or fourth hand, through the blurred and colored spectacles of commentators and dogmatists.

Such a state of things could not continue always. Imperialism in the State and traditionalism in the Church could prosper in the period when the Greco-Roman world was in its dotage and the Teutonic races were in their infancy. But when the Teuton became a youth, and felt the throbbings of his ancestral blood and the impulses of his free and independent spirit, the battle between traditionalism and science, imperialism and democracy began. The end is not yet. The scholastic movement, from the eleventh century to the fourteenth, was an effort to find a new basis for truth. It was the first protest against traditionalism or the acceptance of truth on external authority without internal authentication and conviction. The awakened reason which began an *aufklärung* already in the days of Charlemagne, was now seeking interior conviction for the dogmas of the Church. Pope Leo 9, with the sagacity which has characterized so many of the successors of Peter, saw the danger of the new method of the schoolmen. He requested Lan Franc to prove his faith "rather by sacred authorities than by arguments." The latter method was the appeal of the schoolmen to their own reason and, when carried to its conclusion, would overthrow the authority of the Church. No hierarchy is safe when the laity begins to think and to act for itself. When the Church could not suppress the brains of Western

Europe, like the emperor enslaved the tribes of the Eastern World, she entered into a fatal alliance with scholasticism. She set limits to the reason and tried to keep a bit in its mouth so as to curb it whenever it approached the domains of faith. Men like Thomas Aquinas, became, therefore, the typical schoolmen because they were willing to use the logic of Aristotle within the circle prescribed by the sentences of Peter Lombard. But history shows us how soon the holy alliance between traditionalism and rationalism was broken. Its history and its conclusions may well be compared to the alliance between Pope and Emperor in the Holy Roman Empire. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are disturbed by reforming councils, by sectarian movements which were a rebellion against ecclesiasticism, and by forerunners of the Reformation in Italy, Bohemia, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. It was the necessary outcome of the Teutonic blood in the nations of the West, entering into conflict with the Roman spirit in the hierarchy of the Church. It was free inquiry seeking internal authentication for truth, whether in science, philosophy or religion, *versus* unconditional and unquestioned submission to tradition as that was interpreted by the Church. Hence the renaissance with its revival of the human, and the Reformation with its revival of the divine.

Criticism begins, accordingly, with some degree of scientific accuracy, with the humanists in classic lore, and with the reformers in sacred literature. The spirit of criticism was working for centuries in the schoolmen, it now found formal and systematic application in the birth of the modern period. Let those, who disparage the critical studies of the present generation, not forget that the period of history which they so much eulogize, is the product of criticism. Had the scholars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries been absolutely content with the doctrines of the fathers and the interpretations of the Church, as the demand now comes from certain quarters that we should be content with the conclusions of the Reformation, we would never have had a modern era in history.

Let us see why criticism was necessary for a true understanding

of ancient literature. In the fifteenth century there was a search for, and discovery of, ancient manuscripts of Greece and Rome, which is paralleled to-day by the researches of Egyptologists and Assyriologists. "The Latin and Greek manuscripts were a revelation of a long-forgotten world to the scholars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the hieroglyphic and cuneiform inscriptions are to the scholars of the nineteenth century." Nearly all the Latin manuscripts were collected by the middle of the fifteenth century. The Greek manuscripts, including the church fathers, were gathered during the close of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. Giovanni Aurispa, an agent for the purchase of ancient manuscripts, returned from Constantinople to Venice, in 1423, with 238 volumes of heathen classics, including Sophocles, Aeschylus, Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, Lucian. After the destruction of Constantinople, in 1453 A. D., the Greek Scholars with their literary treasures found refuge in Italian Courts.

The material was at hand for a study of the past. Yet a vast amount of labor was necessary before the material could be intelligently and accurately used. The texts of various authors had to be corrected by comparing the different manuscripts. Dictionaries had to be prepared and grammars compiled with almost inconceivable labor. The philological work, which required the application of scholars for more than a century, was necessary in order that men might read with ease and exactness the ancient literature. This being accomplished, the work of historical reproduction began. The life of the ancients had yet to be written. This involved "the understanding of their laws, their worship, their military systems, their amusements." The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were devoted to this task. The process embraced textual, literary, and historical criticism. Without the application of these methods of research, we could not know Greek and Roman Antiquity as we know it to-day.

Corresponding to this movement among the humanists, there was a critical activity among the Reformers and Theologians of the church. They could not, even if they would, escape the environment in which they lived. It is only a question whether the

method is a blessing in profane literature and a curse in sacred literature or not.

There are three periods or stages in biblical criticism since the Reformation. Dr. Briggs says: "The first critical revival had been mainly devoted to the Canon of Scriptures, its authority and interpretation. The second critical revival had studied the original texts and versions. The third critical revival gave attention to the sacred scriptures as literature." Each of these critical stages was determined by the conditions with which theologians had to contend. In the Reformation criticism was necessarily confined to the canon. The Protestant reformers questioned the traditional canon of the Roman Church. They did not accept the apocryphal books nor oral traditions, as authoritative. Instead of appealing to the Latin Vulgate as the correct text, they returned to the original Greek. From the Greek Septuagint they turned to the original Hebrew. In place of the allegorical method of interpretation, with its manifold senses, they accepted the grammatical method with its one sense. But in their criticism of the canon the Reformers were much freer than many of their successors became. They did not confine their negative criticism to the Apocrypha. "Luther denied the Apocalypse to John and Ecclesiastes to Solomon. He maintained that the epistle of James was not an apostolic writing. He regarded Jude as an extract from second Peter, and said, what matters it if Moses should not himself have written the Pentateuch?" How would Luther fare in a trial for heresy before a Lutheran Council of the twentieth century? We do know that the Presbyterian General Assembly excommunicated one of its foremost scholars, because, among other things he taught that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah is not the author of half the book that bears his name. Hear, in the face of this fact, the echo of the Wittenberg Reformer, "What matters it if Moses should not have written the Pentateuch." Calvin exercised the same freedom in his study of the canon. He denied the Pauline authorship of Hebrews and questioned the Petrine authorship of second Peter. He did not hesitate to reject the

tradition that David composed and edited the Psalter. Whether these men were right or wrong in their conclusions is not for us to decide. We desire to show that the Reformers broke with tradition and sought another means of certainty and assurance. In other words, they recognized the legitimacy of the critical method in their conflict with Rome and tested the traditions of the ages by it. They could not go beyond their age and answer questions that had not arisen and could not be solved, but they did point out a method by which questions should be solved as they arose in the future. In the eyes of Roman Catholics the Reformers were heretics, radicals, anti-christs. They were hated by their church about as heartily as the men, who apply their methods, are despised by sections of Protestantism to-day.

Textual criticism, in the latter part of the sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century, aimed at a correct text of the Scriptures. The ancient Greek and Hebrew manuscripts were compared, the different ancient versions examined, and many variations were found in the texts. This fact threatened the new biblical infallibility, which Protestants upheld in place of the old papal infallibility. They had gone so far as to say, in the words of a Jewish scholar, as stated by Ginsburg, "That as to the origin and development of the vowels their force and virtue were invented by, or communicated to, Adam, in paradise." In reply to Walton, who prepared the famous polyglot, John Owen wrote, "Nor is it enough to satisfy us that the doctrines mentioned are preserved entire; every tittle and iota in the Word of God must come under our consideration, as being as such from God." He closed his tract by adding an appendix in the following words: "The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments were immediately and entirely given out by God Himself, His mind being in them represented unto us without the least inter-venieney of such mediums and ways as were capable of giving change or alteration to the least iota or syllable."*

This theory of inspiration came into conflict with the undeniable testimony of the manuscripts. The variants became the

* Quoted in *Biblical Study*, Briggs, pp. 223, 224.

bugbear of Protestants. The Deists used them as arguments against the current theory of inspiration. The Roman Catholics claimed more than ever the need of an infallible church in view of the uncertainties of the text of the Bible. Richard Simon said that the variants were proof that the "Protestants had no assured principle for their religion." Under such attacks and with the testimony of the manuscripts against it, scholars could only vindicate the Bible by a scientific textual criticism, such as was used in the preparation of the texts of Greek and Roman classics. To fall back upon a dogma of inspiration would have brought the church into contempt before the intelligent world. To return to an infallible church from an infallible book would have been a renunciation of the victories of a century in behalf of freedom and religion. Criticism alone could vindicate the Bible in that controversial age. Even the most pious and, at the same time, scholarly men were in distress. Bengel, one of the fathers of textual criticism wrote, in 1725, "more than twenty years ago, before Mill appeared, at the very beginning of my academic life, when I happened upon an Oxford exemplar, I was greatly distressed by the various readings; but all the more was I driven to examine Scripture carefully, so far as my slender abilities would permit, and afterward, by God's grace, I got new strength of heart." Bengel did not seek refuge from distress by going back to Rome or by resting proudly upon the doctrine of verbal inspiration, but by seeking light through the means which God had given him, his own critical faculty, the various sources for comparison and his ability to reach as pure a text as possible in a rational way. Westcott and Hort's new testament is the last ripe fruit of the textual criticism which, with others of like scholarship, is the universally acknowledged basis of Scriptural study.

The last stage of the critical movement, the higher criticism, followed closely in the wake of textual criticism. We saw this to have been the order of sequence in the study of the classics, and find it likewise in the study of the biblical books. In the life of Semler we have a concrete illustration of the way by which the methods of the humanists were taken over into the

field of bible study. Nash calls Semler the "Father of Modern Biblical Study" in preference to Richard Simon, the Roman Catholic critic. His experience, therefore, is all the more valuable as an illustration of the process. In his autobiography he speaks of three periods in his life: (1) He had a strong inclination to the "humanities," *i. e.*, to broad historical study of the classics. (2) Pietism got control of him and his interest in the humanities was checked. He studied the scriptures and theology only. (3) Finally his old love returned and his interest in the humanities revived. The principles, which he had gained in historical study as a humanist, he applied in his "Treatise on the Free Investigation of the Canon." He proved that the canon was not magically but historically produced and must be tested according to historical methods. He found a human side in the Bible and in the processes of biblical history, which the old theory of inspiration had totally overlooked.

There are a number of reasons why the higher criticism became a historical necessity at this time, about 1750 and why it is not to be regarded as an ungodly apostasy from the truth. Protestantism, at the end of the seventeenth century, crystallized into a scholasticism not unlike that of the middle ages. There was a gulf between the Christian consciousness and the Christian Scriptures and creeds. These latter were set over against the laity as infallible standards of truth, to which the human mind had to surrender unconditionally. Such a demand has the sound of Romanism in it. The best product of Teutonic blood, the Anglo-Saxon genius, will not obey in that unquestioning way. In principle we have a repetition of the old conflict between ecclesiastical traditionalism and the enlightened consciousness of the eighteenth century. Men, again, sought a subjective assurance for the truth in every department of knowledge. In religion the mystics tried to get it by immediate intuition, the pietists by practical Christianity, and the rationalists by proofs of the reason. The three movements of the early part of the eighteenth century, represented by the followers of Böhme, of Franke, and of Wolf, agreed in essence in reacting against an

unhuman supranaturalism, and in finding conviction for truth in the mind and heart of the individual Christian.

The supranaturalists and the rationalists agreed in their conception of the Bible. The former made it a storehouse of proof-text, by which their confessions were substantiated. The aim of the exegete was to find the confessional system from Genesis to Revelation. For, if the Bible was the direct gift of the Holy Spirit, it must contain one system of doctrine from beginning to end. The rationalists, likewise, went to the Bible to find therein the necessary truths of natural religion. These truths, of course, were presented in poetical and symbolical forms. Yet, when the Bible was properly understood and stripped of its temporary dress, it would support the naturalism of the eighteenth century. Both sides had an unnatural, unhistorical and mechanical conception of the Bible. Their view of religion was, that it consisted in a series of laws and doctrines rather than in a spirit of life. The orthodox believed this law to have been given once for all in the Bible. The rationalists believed it to have been found finally, after the lapse of ages, by the illuminated reason of their generation. Under these erroneous ideas of scripture the revelation of God could not accomplish its purpose in the human heart without many hindrances and obstacles.

Again, scholars of this period, who were no longer bound by the mechanical theory of inspiration, found certain data in the book of Genesis which led them to suspect the use of several documents in its composition. As early as 1798 Paulus claimed that the Book of Acts was written with a dogmatic purpose to defend the Apostle Paul against the attacks of the strict Jewish-Christian party. The letters of Paul were treated as real letters, addressed to living congregations with a special object in view. They were as really letters, however different their contents, as those of Cicero or Pliny. From these and other points it became evident that the Scriptures had to be studied, as other literature, in relation to the surroundings; the time of their composition, their design, their author. The literature of the Old and New Testaments was gradually produced through the conscious-

ness of the prophetic geniuses of Israel. The higher criticism, therefore, supplied the method by which the origins and relationships of the books of the Bible might be discovered, and a scientific basis for historico-grammatical exegesis might be gotten.

At this time, also, arose several positive ideas in the human consciousness, apart from which the rise of higher criticism cannot be understood. The idea of humanity had been overshadowed, for more than a millennium, in the systems of the church by a false emphasis on Divinity. The Virgin was worshipped and takes the place of humanity in Christ. The priest with his divine ordination stood aloof from the laymen. The monk with his extraordinary ideal of morality fled from the world into the desert. The Bible with its inspiration was raised beyond the range of literature and turned into a divine oracle. The whole world was under the control of demons, whose power could only be broken by the Sacraments of the Church. In the Reformation the humanists gave a new interpretation of humanity and of the world. "They broke up the clerical monopoly of learning and made it the property of the laity as well. They destroyed the, monastic idea of life, and directed attention to the equal or superior excellence of natural morality. To the monk, beauty was a snare, woman a temptation, pleasure a sin, the world vanity of vanities. The humanist saw the finger of God in reason, in science, in nature, in art, and taught men that life is worth living." *

But Protestantism, and, under the stress of the counter-reformation, Romanism, also, separated themselves from humanism. The stream of humanistic culture flowed outside of ecclesiastical channels. Yet, as in the sixteenth, so now in the close of the eighteenth century it was destined to give its contribution to the development of religion and theology. The romanticists were the prophets of the idea of humanity, without which the nineteenth century, in all its intellectual and spiritual phases, is an insoluble mystery. Herder, in 1784, published his "Ideas on the Philosophy of History." Pfleiderer says, "this work, with Kant's Critique, is considered as giving utterance to the most

* "The Renaissance," by Schaff.

important intellectual drift of the century." Hitherto history was not studied in relation to its environment. Literature was considered apart from the age and the design of its production. Herder treats history as a natural development of man's powers, impulses and actions, in relation to time and place. The phenomena of history, as well as those of Nature, must be explained by their causes and not by their supposed ends. He demanded sympathy, on the part of the Biblical scholar, with the Biblical writers, before their compositions could be understood. The first chapters of Genesis are a national religious poem, which must be understood in accordance with its original spirit and without dogmatic bias. To treat oriental national poetry as dogma is contrary to all the canons of taste and reason. God gave us no revelation concerning natural science or metaphysics except by means of the power bestowed by Him upon the human mind to find the truth. Thus argued Herder. Enough to show that he brought out the human and historic side of the Bible. He saw the human side of the Bible and the Divine side of humanity. He believed Christianity to be the ideal religion and ideal religion to be realized in an ideal humanity. Christianity was historical, an objective reality and could only be rightly understood by a study of the historical documents in sacred Scriptures.

Hegel followed in the tracks of Herder and made the idea of humanity the organizing principle of his historical philosophy. He recognized nothing as divine which was not in organic union with the human, and, therefore, an actual factor in history. Every book, handed down from the past, must be treated as a genuinely human record. Each writing is a part of the nation's life and must be interpreted in its organic connections. Revelation is to be thought of as a genuinely human process. The words of God are spoken and His thoughts worked out within the precincts of human consciousness. The Bible, therefore, is a product of human life permeated by divine spirit. It, too, has to be studied according to the historical method. Its literature is to be tested by the laws of literary criticism.*

* Nash's *History of the Higher Criticism*, pp. 118-123.

In the eighteenth century there was an outburst of lay activity, which was a product of Protestant principles. The laity began to think for themselves, untrammelled by the traditions of the past. They were weary of hierarchical dictation. They felt that they had minds and that these minds were capable of thinking. The philosophers, therefore, were mainly laymen. England is said to have been the birthplace of Deism, because it was the home of the self-governing laymen. Philosophy became the layman's theology. In the practical sphere of the Church the layman comes into evidence. Lay preachers and lay teachers take part in the pietistic revival of Spener and Zinzendorf in Germany, and of Wesley and Whitfield in England. The demand is heard all over Europe for more lay power in governments. The absolute and divine right of kings is called into question. The French Revolution is in preparation. This latter event is almost as hostile to the claims of Louis the fourteenth as the Wesleyan lay preaching was to the claims of the prelates of the Church of England. Was not the layman losing respect for the sacred and divine, in kings and in bishops? The same irreverent freedom, or as some may prefer to call it, unwarranted license, led him to study the Bible as literature, regardless of the claims made for it. The control of education passed from the clergy to the laity. F. A. Wolff conducted a philological seminar, in which he would not permit a theological student to enter. He had no prejudice against theology but wished to separate the teacher's profession from the minister's. The writers on the history of pedagogy in Germany consider Wolff's seminar of special significance. It is, accordingly, in the German university, where the state assumes control of education, that the higher criticism has found its most congenial home. For, in the university, sacred studies are carried on as secular studies, with full freedom of research. Here scholars return to facts, are unhampered by traditions, and work out to their logical conclusions the principles of the Reformation.

Without attempting to defend the positions of the men above mentioned and of the movements of the eighteenth century, it becomes evident, however, that the critical spirit is a part of a

great historic process, as well as an endowment of the human mind. Higher criticism, no less than textual criticism, is, also, an historic product. It is not a sporadic outburst of a diabolic spirit. It may be used for diabolical purposes, as every other faculty of the mind and legacy of history may be prostituted for evil. The critical study of the biblical literature, the emphasis of the idea of humanity, and the conception of a progressive historic development seem to have been the means by which Christianity found its way out of a cold and lifeless confessionalism, out of a destructive and faithless rationalism, and finally out of a dangerous and vapid mysticism. It conserves the golden veins of spiritual truth which run through the literature of the Bible. It gives proper value to the temporary framework into which these truths are cast. It sees in its revelations visions of God which appeal to man in every age and clime.

III.

The critic, however, has his limitations in the study of literature if he remains true to his calling. The textual critic has finished his work, when he has restored, as nearly as possible, the text of the original document. The higher critic has performed his mission when he has decided the questions respecting style, integrity, authenticity and credibility of a composition. The critic, as critic, can never be an exegete. He does not profess to interpret the Word of God. No critic, with his critical apparatus, can find the word of God in the Bible. He may aid the exegete and influence exegesis by placing the book in its proper historical environment. The knowledge of the time in which, the design with which, and the author by whom a writing was composed will throw a flood of light upon many of the allusions and characteristics contained in it. In the same way archæology, philology, and hermeneutics are helps to the understanding of the Bible. But the eternal, spiritual truths, which are the same yesterday, to-day and forever, can only be comprehended by the spirit of God. "Even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God." The critic, with all his subtle analyses,

and his keen distinctions, and his changes of authorship and time of composition, has not made nor marred a single spiritual truth in the Pentateuch. The sublime conception of God, the relation of God to the world, of man to God, the divine purpose of history, the eternal laws of morality, these have not been destroyed by critical work. They remain unshaken as the rock against which the waves and storms of the ocean have beaten for centuries, and will be the foundation of the saints till the end of time. A prominent scientist, who has spent a score of years in the laboratory, on the fields and in the mountains, with his microscope and his scalpel, and his crucible, says, "the one truth that remains after all his research is the word of God in Genesis, 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth.' " But he has not found it on the rocks, nor in the atom, nor in the star. God has revealed it unto him, and he cherishes it with the faith of a child.

Who needs tremble for the 23d psalm or the last 27 chapters of Isaiah? Does their truth depend on a particular author? Does their inspiration depend on a particular time of composition? The old theory was that the 23d psalm was inspired because David wrote it; the new theory is that the writer of the 23d psalm must have been inspired because he wrote the psalm. Inspiration is now proven by the inspiring power of a production, and not by a presumed inspiration of the producer. The glorious revelation of God, in the latter part of Isaiah, shines into the human heart, regardless of a proto- or a deutero-Isaiah. The author is not thought of in the presence of the truth, which there confronts the soul. Is the gospel of John the work of the apostle, or of a disciple of the apostle? Is it exact history, or is it an inner life of Christ, presented in historic parables? These are problems which interest the scholar. But the Christian transcends the problems of scholarship and hears the voice of God in the fourth Gospel, as he hears it nowhere else in the universe. To him it would not be enough to call it history. It is more than history. It is prophecy. Whoever wrote it must have been a disciple whom Jesus loved and who loved Jesus. He must have been the eagle among the disciples, who

unfolded his wings, sailed beyond the clouds, and gazed into the Light unapproachable and Glory ineffable.

We need to understand the difference between the eternal truths of God and the temporal forms in which they are enshrined. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels." The forms may partake of the limitations and the imperfections of time and space. They may even be inadequate vessels of the infinite and the eternal truth. They are the veils through which the celestial light breaks forth into the soul of man. These forms may perish; heaven and earth may pass away; but my word shall not pass away.

Who, then, may hear the voice of God in the sacred Scriptures? Not the critic, not the archaeologist, not the linguist, not the theologian. These have their mission. The child of God who cries, in the spirit of adoption, "Abba, Father," will receive from the page of Holy Writ the answer: "Behold, My Son!" The Christ who walked with the disciples to Emmaus and opened their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures, must walk with us and open our minds. Their hearts burned within their bosoms as He talked with them on the way. He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself. No one can expound the Christ in Scriptures for us but the Christ in us. He may not now walk with us, but He abides in us. As His life takes possession of the mind and heart, will the eye see and the ear hear the wondrous glory of His law. In thy light alone shall we see light. The Old and New Testaments can be no more than a dreary, barren waste for the Christless soul; but they are a luxurious Eden, fragrant with the blossom of the tree of life for the Christ-like soul. The depth of God's Word can only be reached when we are like God. Then shall we see Him as He is. As the Christ-life fills and transforms humanity in the progress of the ages, the Scriptures will yield their hidden mysteries until they are none other than the voice of God and the gate of Heaven. This we believe to be the end of history—consummation of time—to know God. "And this is *life eternal*, that they should know Thee, the only true God, and Him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ."

V.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES ON THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE AGE.

(THIRD PAPER.)

BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT, PH.D.

The preceding papers will show to the careful reader that hitherto I have strenuously avoided even a reference to mere speculative assumptions, with which the scientific market is at present overcrowded. Their influence is decidedly detrimental to intellectual progress. They are peculiar to those investigators who do not possess the capacity for waiting, who shake the tree of knowledge and, with childlike curiosity, pull down the branches before the fruit is ripe. This is especially the case in reference to the highest problems of life, because they touch the deepest interest of man and are universally discussed. But the aim of the exact sciences is the study of the mechanism of things and not that of their transcendental causes, of the *how* and *what* and not of the *wherefore*; the unknowable belongs to metaphysics and to religion, the unknown to science. The sciences of law or nature are based upon the relation of cause and effect, their deductions are mechanical, but occurring with constant regularity they lead to reflection upon such regularity, so that the logical thinking within us must have its origin in the never-changing order of events without us; thus the necessity of natural phenomena becomes our very first and real schoolmaster in the art of thinking. The sciences of events or history on the other hand, are based upon the causal relation of end and means. Nature is the realm of law; history the realm of purpose. The causality of the latter sciences is therefore neither purely mechanical nor strictly logical, but to a high degree teleological. The history of humanity represents the highest degree of teleology; the science dealing

with it shows us the end and aim of the human race and offers the means, teleologically tested, which may lead us to this highest degree under the most perfect guidance. True it is that the freedom of human action upon the highest plane is likewise conditioned by a certain necessity, but it is by no means the necessity of natural law in the commonly accepted sense of the term; the latter is only the means to obtain certain ends. The tendency of modern times to identify natural law with moral law has led to that tragic conflict between science and religion which has wrought so much havoc in human society. Its first manifestations are found in Laplace's introduction to his "*Théorie analytique des probabilités*," in which the author maintains that all events, even the most trivial ones, are subject to the great laws of nature and are just as necessary as the movements of the planetary system. There is neither chance nor free will, according to him, and if we, nevertheless, speak of a chance we do so because we do not know the conditions which necessitated that which we call chance. This view is in our day represented by the monists, chief among whom stands Professor Haeckel. Chances, of course, may occur, subject to a law of necessity, the conditions of which we do not know, as is sufficiently illustrated by the throwing of dice. It is likewise justifiable to apply the rules of probability to the statistics of all human relations and conditions, although we deal here with phenomena which are by no means the result of external necessity, but when Laplace finds the probability of even the best authenticated historical events as extremely small, he makes himself guilty of a violation of the historic law to which the mathematical concept of probability cannot be applied.

Thus we find at the beginning of the twentieth century a similar condition in the world of thought as existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Then the metaphysicians attempted to construct the laws of being on the basis of a bundle of assumptions, to-day some of the leading scientists boast of having established the moral laws on the basis of the omnipotent natural law. Both then and now the term *evolution* or development furnishes the keynote of the proof and covers a multitude

of sins, for there is no word more misunderstood and abused than the word evolution. A hundred years ago the idea of development had a purely theological significance. Herder's book on the philosophy of history furnishes sufficient proof for it. A careful examination of his reasoning shows that there is only similarity in the external forms of his terminology but not in their meaning. A few examples will illustrate my point: "I see the form of the organization rise—the manifold beings follow one another—nature passes on from larger forms to the more complex, more artistic, more exquisite, which is briefly called progression of creation—nature advanced higher and higher, found new proportions or a more poetic conception; the similarity of two species appears like a reflex of light rays, higher forms with many properties appear as a compendium of the features of many lower genera, and man is formed through the compression of all forms," etc. All these expressions, reminding us vividly of the theory of recapitulation, include with Herder the thought of the creator. For he calls the whole world a supply house of divine invention, a chief image of his art and wisdom, and in the introduction he speaks of the way of God in nature, of the thoughts which the Eternal one has embodied in action in the whole series of His works. The assumption of a direct blood relationship never occurred to Herder. The same is true of the philosopher Schelling; to him the gradation of organisms was not the result of a real evolution: "the hope of several naturalists to prove the origin of all organizations as successive, as a gradual development of one and the same original organization must vanish through our explanation. The claim that the different organizations have arisen through gradual evolution from one another is due to the misunderstanding of an idea." But he still thought of a simple series: "One is tempted to believe that in all the different forms of creative nature a common ideal which the product gradually approached was the guiding principal. The different forms into which it changes most probably appear only as the different steps in the evolution of one and the same organization." And since in the eighteenth century the interest in physiological investiga-

tions was far more predominant than that in comparative anatomy both naturalists and philosophers chiefly dwelt on the functions of life. They laid much stress upon the fact that all living beings possessed the same manifestations of nutrition, motion, irritability and reproduction, and applied to it the term unity of nature or briefly organization. Schelling distinctly says: "The continuity of organic nature is not to be sought in the transitions of form and organic structure but in the transitions of function. Instead of unity of product we have here the unity of force of production throughout the whole organic nature. It is not *one product* but *one force* which impeded at certain stages results in producing so many variations of form. It is therefore time to show this gradation in organic nature and to prove that sensibility, irritability, growth are only branches of *one force*."

Schelling distinctly speaks here of a *continuity* of all natural causes, not of an actual process of *transformation*; continuity, however, is to him a mere thought, an ideal relation, an expression which is to indicate that all animal species may be arranged in an ascending series. Hegel represents the same view, when he says: "Nature is to be looked upon as a system of gradations, one necessarily arising from another which it most nearly verifies; but not so that the one was produced by a natural process from the other, but only in its underlying idea, which is the basis of nature. Metamorphosis only belongs to the idea as such, for only the variation of the idea or concept is development. Such nebulous imaginations as, *e. g.*, the so-called origination (*Hervorgehen*) of plants and animals from the water, or the origination (*Hervorgehen*) of the more highly developed animal species from the lower forms lie beyond the ken of thoughtful reflection."

I think it is clearly shown by the above quotation that the idea which originated with Herder and is therefore best designated by the German word *Entwicklung* (although we find it already in Aristotle's *ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὁυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ὑπάρχει*) conveys an entirely different truth than that which was first designated by Herbert Spencer as *evolution*, of which he says in "First Principles," § 115, "Evolution under its primary aspect

is a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration of matter," and later on in § 145: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

The German philosophers used the word development to signify a definite sequence of concepts, *i. e.*, their logical order or disposition; applied to the animal kingdom they meant by it a clear survey of concepts and definitions referring to the natural properties of animals, and called by the zoölogists classification. The naturalists adopted the word *Entwicklung* or *evolution* together with the speculations that clustered around it and interpreted it in the light of exact science not as a process of *gradation* but of *transformation*.

It is just here where the heat of the intellectual battle has been most intense during the last fifty years. The philosophers were undoubtedly correct in their interpretation of the term, they used evolution in the sense of development from the simple to the complex in the logical order of things and in contra-distinction from *emanation* which signifies the origination of the lower from the higher, while the scientists' application of transformation includes both evolution and emanation, *i. e.*, both progression and retrogression. They were misled by the double meaning of the word "*Entwicklung*" and carried through the open flood gates of speculation.

What then was the effect of this confusion upon the intellectual life of the age? We may state it in one sentence: *Scientific empiricism deteriorated into rationalism*. As long as the exact scientist remained true to the inductive process of thought, he had decidedly the advantage over the philosopher, but as soon as he began to use a "hypothesis" or "working theory" as a legitimate basis for axiomatical deductions he lost his claim as an exact scientist. Experience and experiment assumed a secondary rôle and were only afterwards used to confirm the speculation.

The natural light of reason was to interpret without any actual experience the properties of the things of nature. In a certain sense everybody is a rationalist, even the most prosaic investigator, aiming only at the collection of actual facts, because it is inherent in human nature to construct, what we do not know, from the conclusions of a pure reasoning process, and there are many who can never free themselves from the ban of the rationalistic principle according to which all clear thought-combinations of the human reason must either be true or at least possible. To this category of thinkers belong Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, who preached the infallibility of the human reason which does not need the aid of established facts, but we must also classify Professor Haeckel and his school with the same category as long as they insist upon using the hypothesis of evolution in Spencer's sense as an indisputable *fact*. We certainly agree with Haeckel when he says in the Preface to his "Systematic Phylogeny": "As a matter, of course, our phylogenetic history (history of relationships) is and will remain a building of hypotheses, just as its sister, historic geology. For it endeavors to gain a connected insight into the course and causes of past events, the immediate investigation of which is impossible to us. Neither observation nor experiment can give us direct explanations in reference to the innumerable processes of transformation, through which all the forms of our modern plants and animals had to pass since their ancestral series began. Only a small portion of the products which those phylogenetic transformations have evolved, lies before our eyes in tangible form; the far greater part remains forever hidden to us. For the empiric documents of our phylogenetic history will always remain to a high degree disconnected, however much their sphere of knowledge may be enlarged through continued discoveries." But when he contradicts himself, as he does in his famous "Confessions of Faith of a Naturalist," and says: "*We know definitely* that the organic world upon our earth has developed itself just as continuously as Lyall has proved for the inorganic world," and in another lecture: "The descent of man from an extinct

tertiary chain of primates (monkeys) is an *historical fact*," we certainly cannot endorse him, however much we believe in the incontrovertible *hypothesis* of such human descent. This rationalistic tendency has led to the false conclusion that the descriptive natural science had been transformed through the theory of descent into an *historical science*. However, the true historian is like the artist who paints the portrait of a famous man, unless the features are absolutely life-like the artist has failed, so with the historian, unless he portrays the past with life-like reality, mastering, sifting and scrutinizing the vast material of traditions with the eye of a critic, he cannot lay claim to the name of an historian, but for the exact scientist there is no such process in existence, he must be absolutely objective, he must suppress his speculative predisposition and confine himself to the facts without comment, *i. e.*, he cannot give a life-like picture of, *e. g.*, the palaeozoic era because such proceedings lie beyond the ken of exact science; generalizations such as Professor Haeckel attempts in his monism are metaphysical rather than physical.

Nevertheless, the conflict which stirred the intellectual life of the past fifty years to its very depth, has likewise borne its rich fruit of *positive results*. The sifting was absolutely necessary in order to separate the chaff from the wheat. The conflict between the purely metaphysical tendencies of the first half of the nineteenth century and the strongly empirical of the second half was inevitable. It clearly demonstrated the limitations of each sphere and pointed the way to higher ideals, carrying with them the proper solutions for the greater problems of philosophy and life. No age can exist without a reigning philosophy just as little as without religion or without art. The intellectual side of man seeks a unifying formula to give adequate expression to the scientific conscience of the age. To-day it is no longer the universe or the cosmos which stands in the center of philosophical interest, but man—man as an ethical being, as a social factor. The social problems stand in the foreground of all scientific discussions, nature-philosophy has yielded its supremacy to cul-

ture-philosophy. We claim that the exact sciences have largely wrought this change. Perhaps not directly, but indirectly, biology being preëminent in this respect. While Carl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche may be called the leaders of the extremely opposite tendencies in sociological questions, Comte and Spencer deserve the credit of having created the first definite system of sociology, and they stand both on the platform of the exact sciences—on the firm basis of the laws which have grown out of the long struggle connected with the theory of evolution. If biology has established anything, it has proved that every being is a unity and that it is governed by internal laws, which are the same for all. We may formulate these laws as follows: (1) The *law of correspondence*, i. e., locality, manner of living and of habitat are in perfect correspondence; (2) the *law of organic harmony*, i. e., every being is a part of the whole; (3) the *law of adaptation or variation*, i. e., manner of being and of habitat adapt themselves to the changed conditions of a changed locality. Plants transplanted from inland localities to the seacoast gradually acquire thick, fleshy leaves, while in dry, sandy places the leaves would become pubescent and glandular, in order to protect themselves against evaporation; (4) The *law of the division of labor* or the *differentiation of organs*. The greater the distribution of labor becomes among different organs, the more perfectly it is done. In the lowest animals, e. g., general sense-perception is concentrated in the outer integument. In the highest, it is differentiated into eye, ear, nose, etc., so that the entire labor of the organism can be carried on so much more perfectly; (5) the *law of development*, i. e., every organism develops from simple to more complex and perfect conditions; (6) the *law of formation*, i. e., the integral parts of every being influence all the additional parts in such a way that a body of definite form arises, e. g., as a particle of salt will attract other particles in such a way as to give rise to cubes or in alum to octahedrons or in germ cells of a pear blossom to pear trees, etc.; (7) the *law of coherence*, i. e., the individual organs are dependent upon the whole organism as well as upon each other, e. g., carnivorous teeth

condition carnivorous claws, highly-developed bone processes condition strong muscles; (8) the law of *economy in space and number*. All these laws are the verbal expressions of the results of exact biological inquiry into the conditions of the various communities of life. They have, of course, nothing to do with the teleological laws of the historic sciences. They only represent one side of the question, viz., that of cause and effect; the causal relation of purpose and means, or the moral aspect of the question belongs to the domain of the historical sciences.

The first direct fruit of modern biological research was the rise and development of *social physiology*, the real founder of which is the great astronomer, Adolf Quetelet. It is true, the Neapolitan philosopher, Giambattista Vico, had at the end of the seventeenth century expressed the hope in his "*Scienza Nuova*" for a more exact knowledge of our social compact, speaking already of a biology of nations, but it was left to Quetelet of Brussels, to combine mathematics and physics with anthropology, statistics and political economy. He was the first one to recognize and to analyze groups of phenomena in the manifestations of the living social body at the very time when August Comte had published his "*Philosophie Positive*." But while Comte at the end of his work declares that positivism had as yet nothing to say on the subject of the social sciences Quetelet with great precision laid down the problem of the descriptive anatomy of the social body, in order to build upon it a physiology, the real science of the vital phenomena of society. Since his time the study of sociology has assumed enormous dimensions and found its numberless interpreters. The science of nature thus accomplished what metaphysics had sought in vain, to lead man back to himself. Through the natural sciences "the man" became in the fullest sense of the word "the proper study of man." During the last half century observatories have been established over the whole civilized world, in which every form of human being and human action is being studied; these are the *statistical bureaux* with their administrative organs. The first statistical congress was held in Brussels in 1853, when Quetelet himself advocated the erection

of such social observatories and explained the scientific principles of his vast enterprise, which did not deal with the individual primarily but with the entirety of those millions which we call people, nation, society, forming a higher unity or community within which individual variations disappear without disturbing the observations of larger and far-reaching phenomena. Such a comprehensive view embraces, so to speak, an anatomical, descriptive part, including the determinations of the ratios of sex, of age, of marriage, of general appearance and of bodily deficiencies, and a physiological part dealing with the ratios of births, deaths, crimes, etc. Out of these simple beginnings have grown in the course of time new branches of the historical sciences, dealing with social and economic influences. Moreover, the comparative study of life communities or life groups and their mutual relations gradually developed new interpretations of historical phenomena, which might be termed sociological interpretations. May it be hunger or economic distress which forces a people to struggle for more favorable conditions of existence; may it be religious fanaticism or national chauvinism which stirs up the masses and entices them to political revolutions; in every case such movements are always directed by one mass against another mass, may they be nations, races or social groups. There are no other political actions, there is no historic event which does not grow out of or express social antagonism, biologically termed "struggle for existence."

Historians may argue till doom's day whether the French Revolution was the work of the encyclopedists, the result of Voltaire's and Rousseau's revolutionary writings or whether it was caused by hunger, the fact remains that the so-called "third class" fell upon and destroyed the two higher classes, viz.: nobility and clergy. The same is true of our late Spanish-American war. Some say it was caused by commercial interests, others by party interests and still others maintain that pure humanitarianism was at the bottom of it, the fact remains that an Anglo-Saxon group attacked a Romanic nation, in order to take from it a desirable possession. All historic phenomena are in the end

conflicts of heterogeneous groups, be they national or social. This modern conception of history is not materialistic nor idealistic but sociological, and the logical outcome of the inductive method of modern science. It is here where natural law and historic law meet, the personal bias is ruled out, sociological law stands between the two. The modern historian dare no longer enter upon his work with preconceived notions, as, *e. g.*, with the purpose to show what great leaders his country has had. He would naturally make an effort to ascribe all the historic events to the personal merits of these men, but he would not render any service whatever to historical science, with such proceedings. Individuality in this sense has only value when it embodies within itself the feelings, thoughts and desires of great groups; but even the activity of such political geniuses cannot be the object of scientific historiography; on the contrary the latter has to demonstrate how the various wants and interests of these groups resulting from social and economic conditions found expression in the personality of their leader.

If, *e. g.*, a historian would try to ascribe the expedition of Alexander the Great against Persia to his desire for new undertakings and adventures, he would certainly find it impossible to reestablish such a claim scientifically, for its source could only be some subjective biography written for the purpose of either flattery or reproach. But if we say, that a warlike mountainous people, suffering hunger in its barren habitation and obeying the impulse for self-preservation, found itself forced to the extremity, to descent into the fertile plains of Asia Minor and to overpower the rich, cultivated land of the next neighbor and to rob it of its treasures, then we utter a truth which can be proved always and everywhere under similar conditions; for this is a universal social phenomenon, it originates with the instinct of self-preservation common to all social groups. Of course, if the people suffering from want are a weak people, they will be forced to help themselves in some other way; this alternative shows the difference between natural law and historic law; the former shows always the same unchanging resultant of cause and effect, the

latter deals with intelligent purposes and means to carry them out according to conditions; it points to a Divine Providence and its methods to train and develop nations and races. It was hunger which drove the people of Israel into Egypt; it was dire distress which caused them to rebel against their taskmasters and to follow their divinely appointed leader through the Red Sea to the land of milk and honey.

It is impossible to discuss within the compass of this brief paper all the ethnographic, geographic and economic conditions which enter into the sociological consideration of the historical sciences; suffice it to state that the natural sciences, especially biology in its broad evolutionary aspect, have gradually led to the sociological treatment of history and have given the chief impetus to the social philosophy which is the characteristic work of our modern intellectual life. All scientific reasons testify that such results are the normal outcome of a healthy intellectual progress. These reasons are first, the possibility of knowing the truth, which is the ultimate end of all science; second, the demonstration of a natural process, which is the primary object of every science; finally the possibility of formulating the final laws of all social development which is the highest aim of all science leading from the empirical to the philosophical "world-view." The final salvation of humanity must come from such deepening and broadening of the human intellect through human knowledge, it is only in this wise that we can grow into the knowledge and stature of the perfect man. Happily, a broad intelligence is becoming more and more the common good of all; it is the business of education to see to it that it leads upwards to the knowledge of Him, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, even the Christ.

VI.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAMILY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF RELIGION.

BY REV. GEORGE BARKER STEVENS, PH.D., D.D.

DWIGHT PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN YALE UNIVERSITY.

Psalm 103. 17, 18: But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto childrens' children; to such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his commandments to do them.

There are two general ways in which we may think of the operation of the divine grace upon men. We may conceive of God as acting upon them directly, immediately; as it were, from above downward; or, we may think of Him as influencing our souls indirectly, mediately, through those divinely constituted relations in which he has set us. These two conceptions are in no respect inconsistent, and both correspond to reality; but I am sure that the latter is too little appreciated and emphasized. It will furnish us our subject on the present occasion.

These organic relations to which I refer are best represented by three institutions: The family, the church and the nation. The first is the most fundamental because it underlies both the others.

The Bible constantly emphasizes the social operation of divine grace. The primitive gospel, announced in Genesis, declared that God would bless all the families of mankind through the life and history of a single tribe or race. The Old Testament religion made much of the natural relationships of men; it taught that "the seed of the righteous is blessed." Christianity took up the same truth and its early progress was largely by the accession of households. Paul recognizes a continuity of family-religion in whose great benefits Timothy has shared. He says:

"I have been reminded of the unfeigned faith that is in thee; which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice; and, I am persuaded, in thee also."

We may safely assume that this method of God in blessing the race through its organic relations can never become antiquated.

The subject, then, which these considerations suggest is this: The Significance of the Family for the Propagation of Religion.

The view which I wish to present is, that the Christian household is the principal "means of grace"; that the family is the chief factor in the preservation and upbuilding of the Church. In consequence of the power both of heredity and of environment, our connection with Christian parents, our organic relation with Christian society, infinitely surpasses (so far as we can judge) all other means whereby we are led on into the Christian life.

Let us first consider the religious significance of *heredity*.

The Christian world has always laid great stress upon the moral import of heredity in its doctrine of original sin, crudely as that doctrine has often been conceived. But beneath all the curious speculations of theology respecting original sin, there has lain a momentous truth—the truth of the significance of heredity for the moral life; the truth that the sins of the fathers *are* visited upon the children—a truth to which modern science is adding impressive emphasis and ample illustration.

There is a tremendous *fact* corresponding to the old phrases: "original sin" and "hereditary sin," though in New England we prefer, as, I dare say, you also do, to use other phrases and speak of "hereditary tendencies to sin," since it is an axiom in ethics that sin, in the strict sense, is voluntary and personal and cannot be transmitted by descent.

But how perfectly obvious it is—and this is the main point—that if heredity has so great a significance for the moral life, it must have it not only on the side of *sin*, but equally on the side of *goodness*. It is a very poor rule of nature or of morals which does not "work both ways." It is a great pity that the Church

has mainly recognized the religious significance of heredity only in a one-sided way. Theology has had much to say of "original sin," but little of "original righteousness" or "goodness"; or rather, it has used the latter phrases in a wholly different sense. But sin and goodness are propagated in the same ways and according to the same laws. The significance of heredity is as great for the one as for the other and no greater. "Grace travels by the same conveyance as sin," Dr. Bushnell used to say.

But of this redemptive power of our organic relations, the Church has never had a clearly defined doctrine. Theology has not even a name for it. The Christian world has often neglected, obscured, and even denied it. Yet it has lived on, as it were, in the sub-consciousness of the Church and has asserted itself in her sacraments when it had been lost in her doctrine, in the generally prevailing practice of household baptism, which stands throughout the Christian centuries as a token of the significance of heredity as a means for the promotion of holy virtue. Descent is not only a medium of depravity, but of goodness. If evil multiplies its power and extends its sway through our race-relations, so also does righteousness. If by these means sin abounds, so also does grace. Nature would be the implacable enemy of the moral life of man if her laws conspired only for his downfall. But to suppose this is pessimism. The forces which work death when they are perverted, minister blessing when rightly used. The moral laws of habit and of descent are in themselves good. When turned in the right direction, they are, as we may say, God's universal means of grace. No tenable theology, no reasonable interpretation of experience, will try to drown the music of that refrain which we hear in the grand hymn of creation in Genesis: "And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good." The law of heredity is good. Happy we if in its application to us it has been a means for the transmission of good tendencies and a right start in life! Happy we if ours has been a truly Christian heritage; if the first roots of our being were struck into the soil of a truly religious family life.

Heredity, indeed, remains a mystery, but we must not, on that account, ignore its power. We must recognize it as a factor in our divinely ordered life—a power which works for good as well as for evil. Virtue, it is true, cannot be transmitted, any more than sin can be. Character, good or bad, is our own. Yet our native inheritances are a kind of natural basis for character. They create the presumptions of our moral development. Out of that mysterious world of moral antecedents from which we come, we trail after us a heritage of inclinations which is pretty sure to make the difference between the right and the wrong direction in life.

But let us bring our subject out into the light of a plainer principle. We can see that the family-relation is the principal means of grace when we consider the influence of our personal relations and surroundings, especially in the formative years of childhood. Into the atmosphere of religion the child of Christian parents is born. The spirit of the household meets him upon the threshold of his life. The child begins his existence in an organic dependence—a relation not yet involving full individuality. He is a creature of capacities and impressions, held and nurtured within the common life of the home; molded, not at first by teaching so much as by nameless subtle influences which flow far beneath all conscious effort on the part of his parents and all conscious reception on his part. No theory of salvation which ignores the social transmission of moral and spiritual power corresponds at all to the facts of life. Why are we Christians? Because we were born and nurtured in the household of faith. I do not forget that some are converted to Christianity from the ranks of the irreligious, but to most of us the Christian family was the channel of the divine grace. I am convinced that religion is chiefly propagated, and the Church chiefly built up in the world, through the operation of the organic life of the Christian household.

I therefore say deliberately: I believe that the atmosphere of a Christian home means more and does more for the religious life of one brought up in it than all other religious agencies com-

bined. God saves most of us through the agency of the Christian home, and, whatever our theories, our experience teaches that the Christian family is, and always must be, the primary "means of grace."

But if this is so, then we can set no limit to the operation of divine grace as respects the time of its beginning. We cannot say that people can become Christians only in adult years. The grace of Christ as mediated through the Christian home, meets us at the very portal of life. The normal thing, therefore, is that children should appropriate the truths and life of religion in proportion as they apprehend their meaning. Children ought to grow up Christians and ought never to be, or to imagine themselves to be, anything but Christians. This is what does happen in multitudes of cases, and would happen far more commonly but for the baleful influence of theories which deny its possibility.

The prevalent theory has been practically that which Bunyan somewhere illustrates. He says that when God wants to make great oak trees he lets them stand long in the forest exposed to storm and tempest; so when he wants to make great Christians he leaves them long subject to the hardening processes of the sinful world. Practically this theory is that you cannot be a Christian—certainly not a great one—until you have gone a good long way in a career of sin and irreligion and then by a mighty revolution you may be brought into the Kingdom of God. It is not to be denied that occasionally an experience corresponds to this theory, but such cases are exceptional. The sinful life does not strengthen men so that, when converted, they make better Christians, but weakens them and leaves scars in the moral life which with greatest difficulty, and often never, are effaced. How much better and how much more reasonable and natural is it to believe that children may grow up into the Christian life, receiving Christ and His truth according to the measure of their understanding of it; developing in the religious life from the first, as really as they develop in the intellectual and the moral life. We half assume this to be possible, even if in

theory we deny its possibility. All good Christians teach their children to pray as soon as they can lisp the name of Jesus, and to believe in Him and to accept such Christian truths and ideas as they can understand; and the children grow up in that belief and habit—and yet, how often are they taught that they must remain strangers to God's grace, aliens to His Kingdom until sometime in adult years they have a unique experience whereby they become His disciples. Will you allow anyone to enter your home and teach your children that they belong to the neighbors, and must do so till, sometime hence, they may decide to join your household? If not, then do not teach those same children that the household of faith into which they were born does not take them in until they decide to come into it from the sinful world. Teach them rather that they can and are fully expected to grow up Christians; to belong to the fold of Christ always and never more really than in their early and tender years. Christ's flock has lambs in it as well as sheep.

For some years it has been a part of my work to take part in the examination of candidates for the Christian ministry. Among the statements required is an account of their Christian experience. It has interested and impressed me very much to observe that, in the great majority of cases, the narrative of their religious life usually runs something like this: "I was brought up in a Christian home and always believed in Christ, and desired to be His disciple. I can point to no time when I was converted; I grew up a Christian." In earlier times this narrative would not have been "deemed satisfactory"; it sometimes elicits objections now. But if our theories will not square with it, or make a place for it, so much the worse for the theories. They simply prove themselves inadequate and inconsistent with the facts of life, and such is the theory of adult conversion only. Such is the theory that in regeneration God works only by direct supernatural power. We must supplement these theories by the view that the greatest moral powers which operate upon us—such as the power of heredity and family-life—are also gracious and redemptive; that God is not absent from those natural rela-

tions in which He has placed us but is working in and through them for our salvation. In nature God's power is, indeed, seen in the stroke of lightning straight out of heaven, and in catastrophes like the earthquake and the tempest—but much more commonly and no less really, in the quiet processes and orderly growth by which His wonders are wrought. So in the sphere of His grace. A Saul may be smitten to the earth. An Augustine may be suddenly transformed. But it is no less truly the grace of God which gives us a heritage of good tendencies and blesses to us the influences of home and draws out our religious nature in a natural and normal development. Ah! my friends, how much better every way to have taken the right direction from the beginning. How much better to have lived on in filial obedience in our Father's House than to have tried the "far country" of sin for a season.

I will add three suggestions in closing:

1. Let us cherish strong convictions respecting the religious significance of the family-life. Let us believe that the power of the family is redemptive; that it is one of the methods of the divine love to lead us on into the Christian life through the action upon us of our divinely constituted relations; that the divine mercy meets our children at the outset of life and speaks to them of a love in which their very life is rooted and of a Saviour with whom they have from the first a real spiritual relation. We parents are commissioned in God's providence to be the agents by whom that relation shall be apprehended and realized.

2. Let us heartily believe and act upon the belief that it is not the exceptional but the natural and normal thing which ought always to happen, that children reared in the atmosphere of religious households, should grow up into the Christian life and as children, be Christian children, as truly as afterwards they are Christian men and women. But if this is to happen what ought the household to be! Who can imagine the life of some so-called Christian families operating as a means of grace to the children? When the spirit of the home misrepresents Christianity and be-

lies its true nature and requirements, *there* is sacrilege indeed. If the family-life is to be a channel of grace to the children, it must be purified and sweetened by the spirit of Christ.

3. It seems to me eminently desirable that we should better understand and more heartily believe in household-baptism and in the great and precious truths—none greater, none more precious—which it represents, namely: the redemptive purpose and effect of the organic law of the family; the sanctifying power of Christian parenthood, and the true meaning of the sacraments as signifying not primarily something which we do and thereby publish before men, but as signifying something which God does *for us* and offers *to us* in the grace of the gospel—"signs and seals" of the gift of life bestowed in Jesus Christ our Lord.

VII.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

ESSENCE AND EXTENT OF THE MORAL.

The idea of morality in general seems to be plain enough. We all imagine that we understand it thoroughly, until suddenly we are startled by some concrete question which throws the whole subject into confusion. Then we begin to ask, what is the moral—what is it that constitutes the essence of the moral in distinction from that which is not moral? There is no doubt, for instance, that the question of the observance of Sunday is a moral question. But how about the question of the running of railroad trains and stage coaches on Sunday? Is that a moral or merely an economic question? Shall it be decided on principles of utility and convenience, or on principles of morality? And who is responsible for its decision, one way or another? What about the question of divorce? Is that a moral question, or is it merely a question of natural inclination, or of social convenience and law? Is there any morality in the manner in which a man conducts his business—in the wages which he pays to his employees, or the profits which he charges on his goods? Or, to rise higher, into the sphere of the civil or institutional life of men, how is it with collective, social, and national acts and policies? Can these be classed under the category of the moral? Can they be said to be either morally right or wrong, or should they be judged merely on principles of convenience and utility? There can be no question that if one man were to put his hand into another man's pocket and take out his purse, the act would come under the category of the moral, and would be pronounced morally wrong. It would be stealing; and it would be stealing even if the man, instead of retaining the purse for his own use, should slip it into the pocket of a friend for the benefit of the latter. But what if the government, that is, the whole body of

the people, should perform a similar act under the form and power of taxation? Would it then cease to be a moral performance and become merely natural and economic in its character? What shall be said, then, about the question of a protective tariff? Is it an economic or a moral question, or is it both? And can there be such a thing as an economic operation and condition that is not also moral in its bearing? What about wars of conquest, which benefit the nation that engages in them? Are they to be judged merely from the standpoint of apparent utility to the successful side, without regard to the suffering and loss entailed upon the other side? Usually, when not swayed by self-interest, prejudice or passion, the moral reason of mankind is capable of answering such questions correctly. When, however, a man's interests are affected, or when his prejudices are aroused, then doubts may arise; and after doubts have arisen, it will usually not be difficult to find arguments in favor of the conclusion which one *desires* to see established; and then, in order to maintain the truth, it becomes necessary to go back and begin with fundamental principles of ethical thought.

What then, is the fundamental conception of the moral? What distinguishes a moral act or condition from one that is not moral? Herbert Spencer says it is the fact of *teleology*. A moral act is an act that is adjusted to an end. Action adjusted to an end according to Spencer, is *conduct*; and conduct is good in proportion as it promotes the ends of life in self, in offspring, and in one's fellows, and bad in proportion as it frustrates these ends. As a material definition this may be allowed to be correct. It is, however, material only, and therefore one-sided and incomplete. It defines the *content* of a moral act, but neglects the *form*. But in morality form is as important as content. Adjustment to an end does not of itself make an action moral. In order to this the adjustment must be the voluntary product of the actor. There is adjustment to ends everywhere in nature. The curious action of the Venus-Fly-Trap which catches and kills insects, whereby the soil around its roots is enriched, or of the Pitcher-Plant which, in a leafy receptacle, stores up a

supply of water for a dry season, is action adjusted to an end. The action of a bee building a honeycomb, or that of a squirrel laying up a store of nuts for the winter, is action adjusted to an end, likewise. It is, however, not moral action; for the adjustment is not produced by the self-directing will of the agent, but by the universal will acting in the constitution of nature according to an unvarying law. Hence in the sphere of the vegetable and animal world there can be no responsibility, no crime, no sin. There may be a *failure* of law, but there can not properly speaking be a *violation* of law. We never think of attaching moral blame to the actions of a plant or of an animal. There are also certain operations in human life which are of a like natural or spontaneous character. Breathing, for instance, though it is an action adjusted to an end, is yet not a moral action. Much of human activity in the early stages of life is merely instinctive. It is the spontaneous action of the natural life in agreement with its own inherent laws. If such spontaneous action happen to be contrary to the laws of reason and conscience—the law of the flesh unconsciously warring against the law of the spirit—the agent is not responsible for the result, because that result has not proceeded from his own self-determination, but has simply evolved out of the general energy of his natural life.

Hence, in order to make Herbert Spencer's definition of morality complete, we must add to the notion of action adjusted to an end the idea of self-determination or freedom. Freedom is the necessary form of morality. Moral action is voluntary action; and it is voluntary not merely in the sense that it is performed *willingly*, that is, without compulsion from some external source; but it is voluntary in the sense that the will, or rather the person in willing, moves itself by the idea of an end or good which it has formed for itself. The bee and the squirrel are moved by the power of an end which the Creator has formed for them. Man moves himself, or directs the energy of his will, by the idea of an end which he has formed for himself. This is what makes him a moral being in all that pertains to his self-conscious and volitional life. Moral action or conduct is action consciously

directed by the idea of an end which the mind of the actor itself has formulated. Such an idea of an end constitutes the *motive* of an action; and no action is moral without a motive. Consequently a being that is incapable of a motive, is incapable of morality. And the ability to act according to a choice of motives is what we call *moral freedom*; and this constitutes the indispensable form of morality. All voluntary action, accordingly is *formally moral*, and as to its contents must be either good or bad.

But voluntary action, or action freely determined by the idea of an end, reacts upon the nature of the subject or agent, and leaves an abiding impression which, when accumulated to a certain degree, we call *character*. Character is the permanent stamp impressed upon the soul by a continued course of conduct, and is the mark of the worth or worthlessness of a soul; while, on the other hand, actions which are not voluntary, or actions which are not *conduct*, leaves the character unaffected. For such actions a man has no responsibility. No man is responsible for actions which have no rational motives and are not free. A person acting in a state of insanity, for instance, is not held responsible for his acts, unless his insanity itself should have its cause in his own volition, as in the case of drunkenness. It would, however, be a mistake to infer from the fact that there can be no moral act without a motive, that therefore the motive alone constitutes the moral quality of an act as good or bad. Kant's famous dictum that "there is nothing in the world, or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification, except a good-will," if understood in the formal sense in which it was first intended, is therefore one-sided, and must be pronounced erroneous. The quality of a moral act is determined by its content no less than by its form or motive. An act of assassination, for instance, does not become a morally good act by being committed with a good motive, such as the idea and purpose of ridding the country of a tyrant, or the church of an enemy. St. Crispin, it is said, was in the habit of stealing leather and making it up into shoes for poor people. Here the motive was good,

namely, the desire that poor people should have shoes ; but the manner of carrying it out, the material part of the act, namely, the stealing of the leather, was not good ; and, therefore, the act was not a good moral act. In order to a good moral act it is, then, not sufficient that the motive be good, and the will, but the content of the act, the thing done, must be good likewise, or in harmony with the divine end of human existence.

Formally, however, it is true that every action performed according to the idea of an end, that is, freely and voluntarily, is a moral action. Every such action involves responsibility, and reacts upon the character, and helps to fix the value of the personality. It involves responsibility, inasmuch as its determining cause, its *aitia*, is the will or self of the actor. We speak of motive determining action ; but motive, as we have seen, is the idea of a good which the mind has formed for itself. A determining motive, accordingly, is the idea of a good to which, in comparison with other ideas of the same class, likewise framed by itself, the mind or will at any time gives the greatest weight. It is, then, not the end or motive as something coming to the mind from outside of itself, that is the cause of a moral action, but the will or self that creates the motive ; and what makes the action moral is just the fact that there is no other cause for it than the will of the actor. Suppose a person sees a sum of money lying in a place where he could easily and safely appropriate it to his own use. If the mere sight of this money constituted a motive determining his will, the act of appropriation would not be free and consequently not moral. But the mere sight of the money is not the motive at all ; it is made into a motive only by the mind itself, when it transforms the sensation into a desire of possession, or when it prefers the good of possession to the good of honesty. Or, if for the sum of money lying in a drawer, we were to substitute the money to be made out of the labor of one's fellowmen, or out of the profits to be made out of the trust-covered goods which one is selling, the reasoning would be the same. The prospect of gain could be a motive, a temptation, to immoral action only to a mind *willing to be governed* by

such a motive. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil became a source of temptation to the woman only "when she saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable to look upon to make one wise." It was her own look that converted the object before her into a source of temptation.

But an act of which the self is its own causality, however its exercises may have been solicited or stimulated by influences acting upon it from without, or by sensations and feelings arising from within, is a free act; and for such an act the agent is personally responsible. He cannot avoid its influence upon his character and he is bound to give an account of it to the moral governor of the world, and to bear the consequences of it in his own moral sensibility. And of this nature are all voluntary acts without any exception. A man's whole conscious life thus stands under the authority of the moral law and for every act he performs, and for every word he speaks he must give an account in the day of judgment. But this only means that in the sensibility of his conscience every man must experience the pleasures and pains which inevitably accompany good and evil acts. For a time the transgressor may not be conscious of the feeling of the moral pain in his soul, as a man with a diseased body may not always be sensible of the physical pain, but ultimately it is sure to come, and to manifest itself in his whole inward and outward condition. The pleasure or pain accompanying moral action will, of course, not in the beginning be of an external, physical character. For a season at least the wicked may flourish like a green bay tree. But in his soul, in his conscience, he must always bear the consequences of his own deeds—self-satisfaction and bliss if his deeds have been in harmony with the divine end of human existence, and remorse and pain if they have been contrary. But ultimately the inward and the outward, the state of the conscience and the state of the physical life must be brought into agreement, and every man must receive, in soul and body, and outward estate, the just reward of his deeds. This law cannot be annulled by any outward arrangement or transaction in behalf of

sinners. The gospel indeed proclaims a message of forgiveness; but it is *forgiveness of sins*—the eradication of the law of sin and the healing of the moral nature of the soul by the spiritual power of the Redeemer—and not the mere evasion of the consequences of sin, along with persistence in the law of sin and the love of sin.

Now all this is plain enough so far as the individual person is concerned. For him everything is moral that is voluntary and free. For everything that comes to pass through the choice or decision of his own will, he is responsible, and must give an account to the moral author of his being. And for whatever in his conduct does not correspond to the law of the moral universe, as revealed in nature and conscience, or to the law of truthfulness, purity, benevolence, justice, he is liable to moral punishment; and this liability to punishment is not abrogated by any seeming advantage which his conduct may have involved in a material point of view. Deceitfulness, or unfairness, or violence in one's business relations with men, taking advantage of their ignorance, or weakness, or want, in order to the enrichment of oneself, though it may bring earthly advantage, does not for that reason fall outside of the sphere of morality, but on the contrary does render the subject liable sometime "to open his eyes in hell." All this, we say, is perfectly plain so far as the individual man is concerned. Every man must give an account of the deeds—not of *some*, but of *all* the deeds—which he has committed in the freedom of his will, and must bear the consequences of such deeds in his own soul. But how is it, now, when we reach the sphere of the collective, the social or institutional life of men? Can there be morality here, too? Can there be responsibility here? Can there be guilt or innocence in respect of acts which men commit, not in their individual, but in their social, capacity? And if so, where does it lie? Can there be morality in governmental acts and policies? Where or what is the moral subject in such case? In an absolute monarchy, where everything is supposed to depend upon the will of the ruling sovereign, we might imagine that sovereign to be the sole moral subject, bear-

ing the entire responsibility of every governmental act and policy. A little observation, however, will soon convince us that there is really no such thing as an absolute sovereign. A savage chieftain like an Arab sheik, or the head of an Indian tribe, doubtless, comes as near wielding absolute power as does any ruler in the world, not even excepting the Czar of Russia; and yet he is omnipotent only so long as he is in harmony with the public opinion of the tribe over which he rules. He can do only what the common will of his tribe sustains him in doing. The same is true of any ruler whatever, no matter what may be the conditions of his government. Who, then, is responsible for his public acts and policies? The ruler himself personally? This could hardly be. The Czar of Russia is not more guilty of the atrocities of his government than are the majority of his people. Or shall we say, the tribe, or nation, as a whole? But, then, where is the will of the tribe, or its conscience? Where is the tribal or national subject, that could be punished apart from the individuals of the tribe or nation? And the same reasoning will apply to the acts and operations of higher and more perfect organizations of men. Of corporations it is usually said that they have no souls. But if they have no souls, then neither have they consciences. And how, then, could they be moral beings? How could they be punished in their corporate capacity for any violation of moral law committed in this same capacity?

Shall we say, then, that corporations are exempt from the consequences of the violation of moral law? Shall we say that morality holds only of acts which men commit in their separate, personal or individual capacity; and that acts committed by bodies of men, like corporations created by law, or governments created and sustained by what is called the national will, have no moral significance, and can never in any form come into judgment? When one man deliberately and willfully kills another, or when he kills another by criminal negligence, he is guilty of murder; but when a great railroad company, in order to increase its profits, deliberately so arranges its schedules as to invite accidents—making, for example, four heavy passenger trains pass

the same station within ten minutes of time, while the telegraph operator is busy handling baggage, thus making inevitable collisions in which hundreds of victims are immolated to the god of greed—what shall be said of that? Is there nothing moral in that? Is it only a question as to how the high officers shall get their fifty or hundred thousand dollar salaries? Or is it at most only an economic question that can be settled, if it needs to be settled at all, with dollars and cents? We think such questions must show the utter untenableness, if not perverseness, of such a position. And yet we often hear such views deliberately brought forward, sometimes from ignorance, and sometimes in order to escape consequences which are unwelcome to those affected thereby.

In opposition to all such evasions we are bound to hold that man's social and civil as well as individual life stands under the authority of the moral law, and must be judged by the application of that law. Man is man only in society; and the greater part of his activity is exercised, not in solitude, but in communion with his fellows. In fact it is society that makes the individual man really a moral being. If one man were alone in the world, he could neither be rational nor moral. The fundamental material principle of morality, according to the most recent ethical teachers, is *righteous love*. But there could be neither love nor righteousness, if there were in the world but one moral subject. This shows how profoundly the individual man is dependent upon the life of society in order to his moral development. But how, then, could it be supposed that society itself in its collective or corporate capacity is not moral in its constitution, and that its acts possess no moral qualities? Do collective acts not affect the ends of human existence? Do they not affect human weal or woe, and does not their effect appear in individual character? But if they do, then it must follow that organized societies, corporations, states, nations, are morally responsible for their collective acts and policies, as really as individuals are responsible for their personal acts. And yet corporations and states are not moral subjects, in such sense that they could bear

the responsibility of their acts apart from the individuals composing them. As such they are only abstractions; and if individual members of the body politic could sometimes unload their guilt upon these abstractions, which can neither be happy nor unhappy, it would doubtless be agreeable enough. This would be something like the old idea of "race-sin" and "race-guilt"; although even this latter was believed to involve the individual somehow in misfortune. The logical realism supposed to be implied in the conception of *race* was believed somehow to involve a distribution of the moral qualities of the race to all the individuals embraced therein. But these ideas are now exploded. There is, indeed, such a thing as race unity, or solidarity; but this is a law of an *influential connection of individuals*, laterally and successively, not a connection of persons in such way as to give rise to one generic person that could be supposed to be the common subject of the merit or demerit of all. There is no such generic subject that could bear the sins of the race; and so there is no such generic national subject that could bear the common sins and guilt of a whole people.

There remains, then, only one supposition, namely, that every member of a social community is responsible for its corporate acts *in proportion as he consents to them*. Saul of Tarsus stood by and "consented" to the shedding of the blood of the first martyr Stephen, keeping the clothes of those who were stoning him; and this involved a participation in their guilt, which he could never afterwards forget. So every member of a "soulless corporation" is responsible for all its acts to which he either explicitly or implicitly consents. Every director of a railroad company is morally responsible for every murder that is committed on its tracks in consequence of the policy of greed to which he has given his consent. Nor is it with such responsibility as it is with the liability to damages in the case of the destruction of property. If two men have done ten dollars worth of damage to the property of another, they can make good the damage by paying five dollars a piece. But if two men have committed a murder, the law cannot be satisfied by hanging each of them half.

When two or more men consent together to commit a crime, then each one is guilty of the whole crime. So each member of a corporation must be accounted guilty of the *whole* sin which that corporation commits. It is in this way also, we think, that responsibility for national acts and policies must be apportioned. We believe that the supreme moral judge will so apportion it. No man can be a member of a nation, and give his consent to the murder of a weaker nation, without incurring the whole unmitigated guilt of such a national crime.

National policies and modes of conduct cannot be considered *unmoral*, as if they were merely the spontaneous products of nature. They have their origin in the intelligence and will of the nation—that is to say, in the intelligence and will of the individual persons of whom the nation is composed; and these, then, are bound to bear the responsibility for them in proportion to their individual consent and endorsement. The “nation” has in late years been made into something of a fetich, in whose name not a few crimes have been committed. Now, doubtless, the nation is a reality; but it has not reality enough to save from guilt or punishment those who sin in its name. Acts committed in the name of the nation are, in fact, committed by the will of the individual actors and of those who agree with them; and these, then, are the responsible moral subjects. It follows, accordingly, that all public questions—questions of finance and of taxation, questions of protective tariff and of free trade, questions of legislation of all sorts, questions of war and peace—all these are moral questions, for they have a bearing upon the end of human existence; and that all who cast a vote in favor of one side or the other, take the responsibility for the result, unless indeed they are too ignorant to understand the meaning of the questions in issue. And even then a vote in favor of a morally bad or indefensible policy is morally wrong, although the degree of guilt may be palliated by such ignorance. If this conception of the responsibility of public functions were the prevalent conception, it can easily be seen how much purer and how much more honest all such functions would be. The theory that political

questions are not moral questions, and that a vote on one side or the other has no moral significance, which is held by many politicians and some theologians, though by no writers on ethics that we know of, is probably responsible for the current notion that a man's character, if his private life is fairly correct, is not affected by any degree of turpitude in politics. If what has been said in this article be correct, then this very theory is itself immoral; and every voter who supports an immoral man for office, becomes partaker of his immorality. And voting, the most fundamental exercise of the right of citizenship, the means of expressing one's consent to or dissent from proposed national policies, becomes an act of the highest moral significance; for in such policies is revealed the agreement or disagreement of the national will with the divine idea and end of human existence.

CHRIST IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The religious value of the Old Testament consists in its testimony of Christ. "Ye search the Scriptures," said Jesus to the Jews, "because ye think that in them ye have eternal life; and these are they which bear witness of Me." And in this witness consists their permanent value to the Christian church and the Christian preacher. The Old Testament bears witness, of course, to many things, and has more than one ground of value. It bears witness of a certain progressive knowledge of God. There is a certain theology enshrined in its pages. This, however, is limited and conditioned by the thought of the age in which the Old Testament originated. It is a theology that passes gradually from polytheism, through henotheism, into monotheism, and is not the absolute and final form of the knowledge of God, at whatever point it may be apprehended. So the Old Testament bears witness to a certain knowledge of history, of geography, and of science. The Jews had a certain knowledge of the surface of the earth, of the progress of the events thereon, and of the processes taking place in nature. This knowledge is reflected in their sacred Scriptures. But it is not in this knowl-

edge that the value of those Scriptures for us is to be found. In fact this knowledge was very imperfect. It was manifestly so in all matters relating to geography and science; and it was no less so in all matters relating to history. The fact of inspiration does not vouch for the historical accuracy of all narratives of events contained in those ancient Scriptures; just as it does not vouch for the accuracy of all statements relating to matters of science. Again, those Scriptures bear testimony to the practice of a certain system of religious worship, having grown up gradually on the soil of human nature, and consisting for the most part of material rites and ceremonies, especially including sacrificial offerings, by means of which the wants of the Diety were originally believed to be supplied. Now the various features of that ancient system of worship are very interesting to the student of religion; but its religious value to the Christian, except in so far as it may perhaps point to something more simple and spiritual beyond itself, is not very great. It implies a low conception of Deity, and of the service which man owes to him. Once more, the Old Testament bears witness to a certain form of piety and morality. In the Law, in the Prophets, and in the Psalms we meet with certain religious and moral sentiments and modes of life, corresponding to the degree of religious and moral knowledge possessed at the time. We read, for instance, of Abraham endeavoring to offer up his son, Isaac, as a burnt offering to his God, and of Jephtha actually offering up his daughter. Manifestly these forms of religion and morality, which we meet with in the Old Testament, are very imperfect, and can have no direct value as rules for our present moral and spiritual conduct.

It is, then, not in its pragmatic knowledge of past events and circumstances and rules that the value of the Old Testament consists, in distinction from that of other ancient religious literature, but in its testimony of Christ—in its Messianic spirit and tendency. This Messianic spirit is what gives to those ancient scriptures a permanent value for the Christian church, which can not belong to the Vedas, or to the Zend-Avesta, or to any other body of religious literature in the ancient world. This is a

proposition which we presume no theologian would care to dispute. All would agree that what makes the Old Testament to be a book of supreme value to us is *the fact that it has Christ in it*. But in defining this presence of Christ in the Old Testament scriptures there would at once appear a diversity of views. Some would propose to find it in distinct prophetic utterances and intimations, out of which systems of "Christology" and "Soteriology" can be constructed; such as the sentences, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," "A star shall come forth out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel," and others of like import. For the apprehension of this class of persons, Christ is in the Old Testament only as He is there in a definite number of distinct, direct or indirect Messianic prophecies, types and shadows. But this theory of Messianic prophecy and typology in our day encounters very serious difficulties. As George Adam Smith has shown, in a work noticed in the April number of this REVIEW, this theory is both too *vague* and too *narrow* for any practical purposes. In the first place, it is too *vague*. Let the passages be carefully studied which have been supposed to yield a metaphysical system of Old Testament Christology, and we shall be astonished to see how little they really do yield. Take a few of the most familiar in the way of illustration. There is, for instance, Nathan's prophecy, in 2 Sam. 7:12-16, concerning the seed which Jahveh will raise up for David, whose throne He will establish for ever, whom He will never remove as He removed the house of Saul, to whom He will be as a Father, and whom He will regard and cherish as a son. In the sense intended by the writer this prophecy was fulfilled in Solomon and his descendants, and means only that David's posterity shall be a divinely established and divinely protected race of kings in Israel—Jahveh's protégés, in the same sense in which Homer also speaks of "Jove-begotten" and "Jove-nourished" kings among the Greeks. The same sense must be supposed to belong to Ps. 2:7, "Thou art my son: this day have I begotten thee." The psalm was doubtless originally a coronation ode, and

expresses the oriental conception of the royal office. The king was said to be begotten of God, because he was supposed to be by Him established upon his throne. The psalm, accordingly, is by no means a mine of metaphysical theology. The Immanuel prophecy in Isaiah 7 has long been regarded as a clear prediction of the virgin birth of Jesus, and of the divine-human constitution of His person. In its original sense, however, nothing could be further from its true meaning. The substance of the prophecy was a sign for King Ahaz, not for far-off future ages. The pregnancy of a young woman not yet married, and her bearing a son and calling his name Immanuel, was to be a sign for the trembling king that, in a very short time, before the child should know to refuse the evil and choose the good, the confederacy of Ephraim and Syria against Judah was to come to naught; but that afterwards evil times should arise in consequence of the aggressions of Assyria. This prophecy, though not without a Messianic import, surely contains little that could be made available for the construction of a formal doctrine of Christology.

But, in the second place, the theory of Messianic prophecy now under consideration is too narrow for the demands of the case. If the passages which have been supposed to be clear Messianic predictions, either direct or indirect, and the typical events which have been supposed to foreshadow the person and history of the Messiah, be closely examined in the light of modern Biblical knowledge, it will be found that there are very few left that have any bearing upon the subject at all. At least they are not at all capable of sustaining the weight which has been suspended upon them. Statements which have been believed to contain predictions concerning the person and life of Christ, and concerning New Testament events generally, are, when closely looked into, found to have clear reference to events connected with the time in which they were written. A very few pages would contain all the passages that have ever been claimed as Messianic prophecies; leaving the bulk of the Old Testament writings without any bearing upon the Messianic idea. But this was not the understanding which Jesus and the apostles had of the Old Testament

scriptures. Jesus believed, not merely that there existed a few passages, the so-called direct or indirect Messianic prophecies, that bore witness of Him; but He evidently believed that the whole body of scripture, as the Jews possessed it, fulfilled this mission. The *scriptures* "are they which bear witness of me," not merely a small collection of special passages. After His resurrection He said to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus: "Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into His glory? And beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, He interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself." One can easily understand that that was no ordinary interpretation of "Messianic prophecies." Instead of a few predictions concerning Himself, scattered here and there throughout the Old Testament, Jesus found the whole of the Old Testament scriptures to be one consistent witness of Himself; although it is not necessary to assume that He supposed this witness to be the same in all its parts, or that He believed the scriptures to have been written by the "law of correspondence," or allegory. The human soul is in the whole body, and yet it is not in all the parts of the body alike. Nor is it there by any mechanical contrivance and arrangement. And so Christ is in the Old Testament, not by any special calculation on the part of its writers, but by virtue of the inspiring presence of the Messianic idea in the life of the Messianic people. And this was evidently the view which the writers of the New Testament entertained of the relation of the Old Testament to Christ. Indeed their treatment of New Testament events as "fulfillments" of what was written in the Old Testament is often very puzzling, because of the absence of any apparent connection. These "fulfillments" often look like mere fanciful or forced comparisons, with little or no reality to rest upon, like Matthew's quotation from Hosea: "Out of Egypt have I called my son." But does not this prove that the whole manner of looking at the case then was different from what it came to be in later times? By "fulfillment" the writers of the New Testament did not mean what is meant by that term now. Now we usually mean such a correspondence of

an event to a previous description or statement, as would justify the notion that the event must have been plainly in the mind of the speaker or writer. In this view prophecy is history written in advance. And as thus regarded, Christ was in the Old Testament in the form of a definite series of distinct features of an intellectual image, which can now be collected and put together, and formed into a metaphysical system of theology, Christology, and soteriology. But such a view can not be borne out by any true interpretation of the Old Testament. In fact it is hard, artificial, mechanical and incredible.

Christ is in the Old Testament in a wholly different way. He is in it as the *spiritual ideal* of all its teaching. The Old Testament is the record of an advancing revelation of God—of His person, His attributes, and his character—a revelation which came to its completion in the person, life, and teaching of Jesus Christ. Christ is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15), "the out-beaming of His glory and the stamp of His substance" (Heb. 1:3). Such was the moral assimilation of Jesus to God that the former could say, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." And again, "I and the Father are one." In the person and life of Jesus there is an expression of the person and life of God; and there is an expression of the person and life of God, because God Himself is there. Jesus does not represent God as a substance and character foreign to Himself; on the contrary, God manifests Himself in Jesus. But this divine self-manifestation, or self-revelation, is conditioned by the apprehending and comprehending capacity of man. God can express Himself only so far as man can hear and understand Him. Hence the process of divine revelation must be progressive, pedagogic, and disciplinary, just as we are told in the opening verses of the Epistle to the Hebrews that it was: "God, having of old spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath in these last days spoken unto us in His Son." Now, it was this speaking of God in the prophets, and in the holy men of old, that resulted at last in the composition of the Old Testament scriptures. It is a significant fact that the Jews

called their historical books *Nebhiim*, *prophets*, *the inspired*—*nebhiim' rishonim*, the former prophets, in distinction from *nebhiim acharonim*, the later prophets, or prophets proper. This fact implies that the object of the historical books was not supposed to be mere history, and that their origin was referred to a divine presence and power in the writers. There is something divine in these Old Testament scriptures because there was something divine in their authors; and that divine presence is "the testimony of Jesus." These prophets had caught glimpses, visions of the being and character of God; and these visions had filled their minds, and thrilled their souls, and moved their pens in the composition of their books, as the painter's ideal moves his brush. And these ideals of the divine life and character are parts of one grand ideal, which, in the fulness of time, appeared in its wholeness in the person and life of Jesus Christ. We may say, therefore, that whatever there is of goodness, of truth, of love, of mercy, and of righteousness in the Old Testament, is there as a ray of light culminating in the glory of Christ. And this is the way in which the Old Testament bears its witness to Him forever. Its teaching concerning God and man looks steadily towards that ideal which became fully revealed at last in Jesus Christ.

It is usually said that what is revealed in the Old Testament is mainly the *righteousness* of God. The God of the Old Testament is distinguished, first and foremost, from the gods of other nations by his righteousness. There is a measure of truth in this representation, and yet it is not the whole truth. In the advancing education of the human race it was necessary that the justice of God should first be emphasized, and that men should learn to respect justice; but it was necessary also that His other attributes should not be thrown into the shade; and neither were they. When the Lord proclaimed Himself to Moses as a "God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin; and that will by no means clear the guilty," there is certainly more in this than a mere exhibition

of law and righteousness. In fact, this is a vision of the Christian ideal of God, that comes to its full manifestation only in the face of Jesus Christ. And whenever such ideals appear in the Old Testament, there we have the accents of this testimony which Jesus perceives so distinctly, and which we should perceive more distinctly if we were more like him than we are. Dr. Smith, in the work already referred to, calls attention to the fact that this testimony of Jesus appears in places where it is not usually looked for; and he points especially to two passages in the way of illustration. The first is the song of Deborah after the destruction of Sisera and his host, and the second is the elegy, or lament, on the death of Saul and Johnathan. At first view there does not seem to be much of a Christian spirit in either of these compositions. The former has strains which sound vindictive and revengeful, and the latter has nothing about God and a future life, after the manner of a modern funeral hymn. And yet the more one ponders these ancient Hebrew poems, the more he will discern in them a tenderness and a pathos, that make them thoroughly human, and, therefore, also thoroughly divine, that is, Christian, in their spirit. And the fact that we have generally so little sense for this presence of the spirit of Christ, and that we can perceive Christ only when he comes to us along the hard lines of doctrinal propositions, is a proof, no doubt, that we ourselves still lack very much of that spirituality which Christians ought to possess.

The spirit of Christ is the spirit of love, of goodness, of grace, of truth, mercy and peace. Wherever love is, there is the spirit of Christ. It was a highly characteristic circumstance that Jesus opened His ministry in the Synagogue of Nazareth with the quotation from Isaiah: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath annointed me to preach good tidings to the poor: He hath sent me to proclaim release to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." This was the Messianic, nay, the perfectly *human*, ideal that hovered before the mind of Jesus, when He first appeared preaching the

Gospel in Galilee. To realize this ideal He had come into the world. But this was also the Messianic ideal which occupied the minds of prophets and seers of old. What was the prophetic ideal of life, as we find it in Hosea, Amos, Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the rest of Israel's great teachers? It was the ideal of humanity and love, over against a hard and cruel materialism that ruled the time. At the time when Hosea and Amos prophesied in Israel there was "great prosperity" in Samaria. The princes and rich nobles, with their fine ladies, extorted the sweat and blood of the poor for their own profit, and themselves fared sumptuously every day, while they carefully and scrupulously performed their religious rites, and offered their sacrifices out of their bloody gains. That was *their* ideal. And for that the prophets denounced against them the judgments of Jahveh; for though Jahveh is a God of mercy, yet mercy must be just. Hence the prophet exclaims: "Hear this word, ye kine of Bashan that are in the Mountain of Samaria, which oppress the poor, which crush the needy, which say unto their lords, Bring and let us drink. The Lord hath sworn by His holiness that, lo, the day shall come upon you, that they shall take you away with hooks, and your residue with fish hooks." And again another: "Hear this, O ye that would swallow up the needy, and cause the poor of the land to fail, saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set forth wheat? making the ephah small and the shekel great, and dealing falsely with balances of deceit; that we may buy the poor for silver, and the needy for a pair of shoes, and sell the refuse of the wheat. The Lord has sworn by the excellency of Jacob, Surely I will never forget any of their works." But it is needless to multiply quotations. The careful reader of Scripture knows the story by heart. He knows what the spirit of prophecy is: it is the spirit of humanity, of equity, of love, of mercy, of judgment and of truth. And this spirit is the witness of Jesus. But the Jews received not this witness. They had made for themselves another Messianic ideal. They expected their Messiah to be a great earthly king, after the manner of David or Solo-

mon, who should exalt their nation, bring honor and distinction to their priests, and add to the wealth of their rich and worldly Sadducees; and Jesus they crucified. And what has the church done since? Has she always received the witness of Scripture to her Lord? Or has she not likewise failed to comprehend the Christian ideal, and so come short of the fulfillment of her mission among men? If the synagogue turned the king of hearts into a king of arms, the church has too often turned Him into a theory—a theory that was hard and cold, and had no moral power over the hearts of men. Abstract theories of two natures, theories of two wills, and the like metaphysical subtleties have engaged her attention to the neglect of His spirit. While He felt called to preach the Gospel to the poor and to lift up the down-trodden and oppressed, the preachers of “apostolic succession,” alas, have too often felt themselves called to apologize for the grasping greed and oppressive cruelty of the rich and mighty. This is the Gospel which the church has too often preached; and the result is loss of influence and power.

But another fundamental trait in the prophetic ideal of the Messiah, is the picture of suffering and sacrifice. The suffering servant of the Lord, as he is portrayed in Isaiah and elsewhere in the Old Testament, in accordance with the universal law of human history and of moral progress bearing the sins of His people, and by suffering and death winning for men the blessing of life and happiness—that is the image of the Christ in the Old Testament. And how perfect is the counterpart in the New? And wherever that image appears, in the writings of the Old Testament, in the works of modern literature, or in the actual scenes of life, there we have the witness of Christ. The early church saw this witness everywhere, not merely in scripture, but in the life and economy of nature as well. To the early Christian imagination nature was full of types or figures of the cross. There was in all this doubtless much that was fanciful; but it involved the correct feeling after all of the universal significance of vicarious sacrifice. Wherever we look, in the world of nature or of history, we find the law of vicarious sacrifice to be the law of

life and progress. And wherever there is self-sacrifice in behalf of others, as in the case of the mother giving birth to offspring, or of the warrior laying down his life on the field of battle for the benefit of his country, and home, and kindred, there we have a witness of Christ. And of this witness not only our sacred scriptures, but all moral history is full. But see now what the most pretentious and the most intolerant of our traditional theologies have made of all this. They have turned it into an incredible doctrine of substitution, imputation, and expiation, that is dishonoring to God, and repulsive to human reason, and have persecuted honest Christians for not accepting the wretched caricature of a sublime truth. For a sublime truth there is hidden under all the mass of error, namely, the truth that "he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." *With His stripes we are healed*: not putatively, not fictitiously, for in that there would be no redemption, but really and truly. Giving His life as a sacrifice of love for sinful men, He has brought the divine life and love into our life, so as to redeem us, in fact and not in fiction, from the law of sin and death.

But we cannot go further into details on this subject now. Enough has been said to enable us to see that Christ is in the Old Testament in very truth, and to give us a sufficiently clear idea of the manner in which He is there. He is there in the form of the moral ideal of humanity that breathes upon us from its pages. And He is there on every page. He is not there merely where theologians have discovered some "direct" or "indirect" prophecy or type of Him. In fact, as we have already seen, there is not much of that kind of prophecy or type; for generally, when these direct and indirect prophecies, which are supposed to yield such fine metaphysical systems of divinity, are closely examined in the light of modern biblical knowledge, they are found to vanish into thin air. But this is not true of the spirit of Jesus, which is in the whole of scripture—not merely where His name is found, but everywhere. Even in passages of

the Old Testament which have not at all been labeled *Messianic*, the spirit of Jesus will be present for our instruction and Christian edification, if only we have not been educated out of the power of perceiving it. What Jesus says of men's personal relation to Him, is true here: "He that is not against us is for us." So whatsoever in nature, in history, and above all in scripture, is not contrary to Jesus, must be regarded as a witness; and wherever this witness is, there is Jesus Himself, and there is His spirit. Let it not be said that the "spirit of Christ," as here understood, is something too airy and subtle to be of any benefit for our spiritual life. It is something subtle and delicate, of course; but so is the whole matter of religion. Religion is something spiritual, something at any rate that cannot be touched with hands and feet, or screwed into stiff and unyielding theological formulas. Formulas may not be without their value; but one may have the formulas about Christ, and yet not have the spirit of Christ. And, on the other hand, it is quite possible that Christ may be preached where there are no changes wrung on the orthodox theory of His person—a statement, however, which we would not have regarded as putting a low value upon orthodoxy, or correctness of Christian belief. Only to be able to discern the spirit of Christ in everything directly, is something greater than to be able to pronounce correct doctrinal propositions.

Let this spirit be seized in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, and made the object of Christian preaching; and then those ancient Scriptures will again become instinct with life and power, as they were in the days of the apostles. And such result will not depend upon the question of the authorship of those ancient scriptures; nor will it depend upon the question of their historicity. The ideal embodied in a picture, which speaks to the sensibility of the beholder, does not depend upon the historical character of the picture at all. All that is required in order to this end is that it be true to nature. And so it will be with the scriptures of the Old Testament, with which we are now particularly concerned. This Christian character and influence will depend, not upon the veritable accuracy of all their statements

concerning miracles and other strange things, but upon the presence and power of the living ideal of Christ therein. And we believe that the present eager study of the Old Testament is more and more enforcing this truth. The criticism, even the higher criticism, of which many are now so much afraid, is not making faith in the Old Testament more difficult, but more easy. It is not an enemy to faith, but a friend, which Christians will no longer want to fight, when they have learned better to understand it. For while it has put an end to the notion of the Old Testament as a collection of oracles which the ordinary reason of men cannot comprehend, it has advanced the idea that it is a body of literature which in all its diversity of form and character presents essentially one ideal and one spirit, namely, the ideal and spirit of Jesus Christ; and it is this ideal and this spirit that form the bond between the Old Testament and the New, and between the whole of sacred Scripture and the modern Christian mind. The Christian mind can consider any Scripture as sacred only because it finds therein something of the spirit of Christ.

THE NEED AND VALUE OF CHRISTOLOGY.

As may be inferred from the preceding article, we are entirely in sympathy with the position that theology, or religious philosophy, is not religion. As dogma is not gospel, so philosophical and theological knowledge is not piety or godliness. To confound these things can not be otherwise than disastrous to the spiritual interests of human souls. There may be true Christian religion and sound Christian faith without much theological knowledge. There are multitudes of Christians who could not recite a creed, nor repeat the articles of a confession. On the other hand, there may be much religious and theological knowledge, based merely on outward report and tradition, without much real religion in the soul. Men may be able to deal readily with cut-and-dried dogmatic conceptions, as children may deal with algebraic symbols, without having any real consciousness of what these conceptions stand for. Religion itself is a feeling of

dependence upon and communion with God, and a life determined by such feeling; and they are not wrong, therefore, who insist that religion should not be confounded with theological or dogmatic knowledge.

But we can not agree either with those who, like some of the theologians of the Ritschlian school, would entirely separate religion from knowledge. The human soul is one, and whatever affects it in one part of its constitution, must affect it more or less in all. While religion is primarily a matter of feeling or sentiment, it nevertheless touches the intellect and the will, and must profoundly affect their states and modes of action. Hence, there must always be a close affinity between religion and morality. Religion is not morality; and yet religion divorced from morality can not maintain itself long as true religion. But the same relation must be supposed to hold also between religion and knowledge, or faith and reason. To forbid speculation in religion, or in regard to religious matters, because religion is not knowledge, is, therefore, to say the least, a proceeding that is of doubtful service to religion. And to do so because religious knowledge may be supposed to be handed down traditionally in a body of doctrinal propositions, would be something still worse. Hence, religion, or religious teachers, should not discard or despise the human reason. It was an evidence of limitation of the mind of Luther that he once called reason "the devil's bride, the beautiful strumpet, the devil's chief harlot, that should be drowned in baptism." Such sentiments are not in harmony with the true spirit of religion. Religion must regard nothing that is human as foreign to itself. To hold that men should be satisfied with faith, or with religious phenomena, without inquiring into their reality, is to demand what is impossible. Phenomena can be of permanent value to the human mind only if they are known and believed to be expressions of reality. This is a condition of any correct theory of knowledge. Even the theory of idealism must presuppose reality back of the ideas which are apprehended by the mind. If these ideas were nothing but the arbitrary creations of the individual mind, they would not long continue to be

entertained. An ideal conception of the universe does not at all imply that the objects of thought are mere projections of the finite mind. In order that such a conception may have any claim to rationality, it must assume that the objects of thought are realities constituted by the thought and will of the Infinite Mind. The mental phenomena which lie at the basis of our systems of thought, are probably not material or "lumpish" realities in the traditional sense of the term; but they must nevertheless be assumed to be objective realities, posited by the Absolute Mind which is the author of the universe. And intellectual activity can only have any interest or value for men, so long as this transcendent reality of its objects is acknowledged.

And the same thing must be true in the realm of religion. Religious phenomena can have value only so long as they are believed to rest upon transcendent spiritual realities. This truth can nowhere be better exemplified than in the sphere of Christology. It is quite true, of course, that theories about Christ may be accepted without any devotion to His person or obedience to His commands. This has often been the case, no doubt, in the history of Christianity and of Christian theology. How otherwise could we explain the fanatical devotion of Christian emperors, monks, and schoolmen to intellectual formulas about Christ's person, in entire absence of His mind and spirit? Men who can curse and burn others for not holding the formulas about the constitution of Christ's person which they hold, certainly do not possess the spirit which makes one a follower of Christ. So, on the other hand, love of Christ and obedience to Christ may exist without any theoretical Christology. Men may love Christ, who, like St. Paul, have never heard of the doctrine of a miraculous conception, or of a twofold constitution of His person. And yet in the case of rational men thinking about Christ must come in the course of time. The experience of love will some time present a problem to the understanding that must be solved. The question, What think ye of Christ? will sooner or later present itself to every thoughtful Christian believer, and the answer given must have a distinctly favorable or unfavorable

bearing upon his faith. True thinking concerning Christ can work no injury to the faith; and false thinking can never benefit it, no matter what may be the proofs to which it may appeal. In thinking about Christ, as in thinking about every other object connected with our holy religion, it must always be taken for granted, of course, that the result to be attained is truth and not error. Men think because they love the truth and want to be sure that they possess it.

Such thinking concerning Christ began early in the apostolic age. It was speculative thinking, by which an insight was sought to be gained into the nature of Christ's being and into the influence exercised by Him over the hearts and lives of men. Christ presented Himself in the message of the Gospel as a man, a suffering, struggling, praying man among men. He not only lived among men, and in the form of a man, but He was evidently affected by the limitations of man and felt the wants of a man. And at last He was crucified and put to death under Pontius Pilate. But Christ had for Christians *the value of God*. They recognized Him as the *Lord*, risen from the dead, exalted to the right hand of God, the everliving and glorious head of the whole Christian community, and in relation to this community at least exercising functions of the Godhead. They prayed to Him. They offered Him divine honor and worship. They regarded Him as King in the kingdom of God, and as Judge and Heir of the world. If the discourses of the fourth Gospel are nothing more than utterances, in their own words, of the impressions produced by Jesus upon the first and second generations of His disciples, they show us that, at least in the community of those disciples, he was regarded as something more than an ordinary man. There is a certain oneness between Him and God which does not belong to other men. While all men, in agreement with the teaching of Jesus, are regarded as sons of God, yet Jesus is represented as the Son of God in some special sense, the only begotten of the Father. And this representation is not in conflict with the impressions made by the synoptical Gospels. Even in Matthew and Luke Jesus claims a knowledge of the Father

that quite transcends the knowledge of ordinary men, and a relationship to the Father that could be claimed by no other man. Even apart from the introductory chapters of Matthew and Luke, which are by many regarded with suspicion, the image of Jesus as portrayed in the synoptical Gospels makes upon us the impression of one whose divine sonship is of such character as puts Him distinctly on the side of God as over against ordinary men. Hence His immediate disciples regarded Him as their Lord, who had for them the value of God, and whom, if they did not call God, they worshipped as God.

But how could they reconcile such conceptions and such practices with their monotheism? This question must necessarily have arisen early among the disciples of Christ. They were strict monotheists; and they could not admit the ideas of divine men, or of gods in human form—of demigods and heroes, born of divine fathers and human mothers—which were so familiar in Greek mythology. If Jesus, then, had for them *the value of God*, what was He in fact? How was He related to God? The ideas of *Messiah* and of *Son of God*, which were familiar from the Old Testament, offered no solution of this question; for the most common conception of the Messiah was the conception of a king of Israel, descended from the royal house of David, and ruling in the power and might of Jahveh; while the notion of Son of God usually meant no more than the idea of one who is especially favored and protected by God, and in New Testament times at least seems to have been convertible with the notion of Messiah. The terms Son of God, Son of Man, Son of David, and Messiah, stood essentially for one conception. This point was referred to in the preceding article, and needs no further elucidation. It throws no particular light, however, upon the question, What think ye of Christ? But the problem here presented was solved early in the Apostolic age by identifying the Jesus of the Gospels with the *Word* and *Wisdom* of contemporary Jewish thought, and with the *Logos* of Greek and Alexandrian speculation. This solution appeared first in its fundamental features in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the

Apocalypse, and finally in its completed outlines in the prologue of the fourth Gospel. In Jewish thought the Word or Wisdom of God, though a personification rather than a true personal being, is the mediator and servant of God in the creation and government of the world. See Proverbs 8 and Wisdom of Solomon 7. The idea of the Logos was the product of the Greek mind, springing especially from the soil of the Platonic and Stoic philosophies. In its Stoic form particularly, in which it was received in the Hellenistic, or Greek-speaking Jewish, world, it denoted the divine reason, or *nous*, as the active principle in the creation and government of the world considered as immanent in the cosmos. Here was a divine principle, one with God and yet not God, transcendental as to its ground and yet immanent in the universe, the cause of its order, its beauty, and its teleology. It was the life of God as a rational principle and power, expressing and embodying itself in the growing and developing cosmos. And now what more natural than that thoughtful Christians of the Apostolic age should solve the problem which the appearance and work of Jesus presented to their minds, by identifying Him with the Divine Word or Logos? They said: *The Logos has become man, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. With this tremendous proposition they gave a metaphysical significance to an historical fact, and, as Harnack says, "drew into the domain of cosmology and religious philosophy a person who had appeared in space and time."

Was this a valid solution of the Christological problem? Was it a satisfactory answer to the question, What think ye of Christ? Does it satisfy the demands of the human reason in our own age? Now, we may easily admit that in the form of some of the theories to which the Logos conception has given rise in the history of Christian doctrine, it is not satisfactory. It may have given rise to propositions which, in fact, are unthinkable, and which are therefore more of a mystery, or rather of a riddle, than are the original realities which they are intended to explain. No theory intended to explain a phenomenon, or series of phenomena, can be valid, if it contradicts the laws of our own reason, or if we are

unable to connect with its words any distinct meaning. For what is explanation? It is the bringing of a fact within the reach and under the laws of our intelligence, and thus making it comprehensible to us. But if in the attempt of doing this there is involved a violation of the laws of reason, there is manifestly no explanation, and the attempt is futile. If in the exposition of some mathematical problem we should be required to believe that one is three, or three are ten, we should suppose that there were some mockery offered to our intelligence, and should turn away from the whole problem. How is it, then, with the theories which have been offered to explain the person and work of Christ? Can we understand the idea of one person existing in two natures which in themselves are incommensurate, or of one person having two wills, or two intelligences? Can we understand the idea of an eternal divine person, a self-conscious, omniscient, and omnipotent substance, having become a finite human personality, or having entered into combination with the finite nature of man in such way as to share in the finitude and weakness of the latter, while at the same time preserving its own infinitude and power? Can we think of such a being as living a real human, moral life among men—as actually suffering hunger, for instance, or temptation? If we can not, then the language in which such propositions are expressed offers to us only riddles, and nothing more. And of such riddles the Athanasian Creed, for instance, is full. The older theology, indeed, thought that it had disposed of all such difficulties when it had distinguished between the properties of the two natures. *Secundum naturam divinam*, for instance, Christ was omniscient, omnipresent, impassible, incapable of hunger, temptation or pain; *secundum naturam humanam*, on the other hand, He was capable of hungering and thirsting, of weariness, of temptation and death. In reference to all of which we would now say, great indeed is the merit of *secundum*; but under the operation of it, what becomes of the unity of Christ's person? Surely any theory which destroys that must be untenable. We may believe *mysteries*. We can believe facts which we do not understand; but we cannot believe any thing that *contradicts* our reason.

To say that we must accept such things on authority of revelation is nothing to the purpose ; for any revelation that does not bring its statements under the laws and within the capacity of our reason, is not revelation for us. If one speaks to a child it is necessary to adapt his words to the laws and the capacity of the child's mind ; otherwise the things spoken will not have any meaning for the child. And so any revelation that should contradict the laws and capacities of our minds would mean nothing for us.

Now it may be that the traditional Christologies are all more or less in this condition. While all containing elements of truth, yet Athanasianism, Arianism, and Socinianism may each be unsatisfactory to us. In other ages, under other conditions of training, in the light of other philosophical principles, the incongruity of these theories with reason may not have been so strongly felt, and they may even have been useful in the advancing development of religious thought. But to the present generation they may have become utterly meaningless and useless. Such a failure of theories, however, will not annihilate for us the fact of Christ nor of Christianity, nor will it put an end to our thinking on the subject. Christology is an absolute demand of the Christian reason. The Christian believer is bound now, as much as he was in the apostolic age, to give an answer to the question, What think ye of Christ ? And any Christological theory now must acknowledge the divine character of Christ, as it was acknowledged from the beginning. In fact there are reasons now for the acknowledgment of the divinity of Christ which did not exist in the apostolic age. Among these reasons now are the wonderful history of Christianity for nineteen centuries—its conquest of the Roman Empire, and its dominion over the modern world—and the lives and experiences of an innumerable multitude of Christian people. And if speculative thought concerning Christ now is a necessity for the cultivated Christian mind, as it has always been, what better foundation can there be for the beginning of such thought than that contained in the prologue of the Gospel of John ? "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and

the Word was God. All things were made through Him ; and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. In Him was life ; and the life was the light of men. * * * And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, a glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." No matter that this Gospel, and especially this prologue, was probably not composed by the Apostle John. No matter that the doctrine of the Logos had its origin in earlier Jewish and Greek thought. The question of the origin of a religious, as of a philosophical, doctrine, is not of much importance. The important question is whether it is true. There are sublime truths in Plato as well as in Isaiah. And the fact that they are in Plato and not in Isaiah, does not make them any the less true. All truth is divine truth, no matter through what channel it may have been received. This is a fact that was clearly recognized by some of the ancient Christian apologists. "Philosophy," says Clement of Alexandria, "like a schoolmaster has guided the Greeks, as also the law did Israel, towards Christ," and what is true in philosophy may be regarded as a divine revelation, no less than what is true in the Law and the Prophets. According to Justin Martyr the reason of philosophers and sages among the Greeks, was no less a derivation from that divine Word which became man in Christ, than was the inspiration of the prophets who spoke in the Old Testament.

The doctrine which identifies the Jesus of the Gospels with the Logos of Greek thought, then, is not invalid simply because the Synoptic Gospels fail to discover this identity. Adolph Harnack, who expresses doubt as to the admissibility of this identification, because "the way in which we conceive the world and ethics does not point to the existence of any Logos at all," nevertheless admits that "a man must be blind not to see that for that age the appropriate formula for uniting the Christian religion with the Greek thought was the Logos," and then adds, "Nor is it difficult even to-day to attach a valid meaning to the conception." Leaving aside, then, for the present, the Origenistic doctrine of an eternal generation of the Son, and the Atha-

nasian doctrine of a personal pre-existence and equality of essence of the Son with the Father, let us see what this doctrine of the divine Logos may mean for us now. It is a well-known fact that the doctrine of the divine self-consciousness and personality has always created difficulties in philosophical thought. Self-consciousness, without which personality is inconceivable, presupposes a not-self as standing over against the self, in contrast with which the latter realizes the thought of self and with this the fact of personality. Hence, it has generally been maintained that the definition of God as a person must necessarily imply limitation. This would doubtless be the case if the not-self were supposed to be on the outside of God, either as His own creation, or as an eternal, inexplicable existence. In either case the being of God would somehow be bound up with the being of the world, and the absoluteness of His existence would be destroyed. But suppose the not-self implied in self-consciousness be taken to exist in God Himself, as His conception or idea of Himself and of His own states. The not-self, then, would be God Himself as His own object. Would not that supposition fulfill the conditions of self-consciousness and of personality? "A spirit," says Lotze, "has personality, or rather is a person, so soon as ever it knows itself as unitary subject in opposition to its own states and to its own ideas; these states and ideas it recognizes itself as uniting in itself, as the subject of them, while they are only dependent states in it." And, again, "The thought of God's personality does not require us to assume a reality outside of Him and limiting Him, but only the production in Him of a world of ideas to which He finds Himself in contrast as to His own states."

It is, then, not an arbitrary notion, but a necessity of thought that requires us to postulate in God, as the condition of self-consciousness, a thought or word as the reflection and expression of the system of ideas which are the product of His eternal mind, and in relation to which He knows Himself as subject or person. But is not this essentially the same thought as that which we find expressed in the prologue of the fourth Gospel: "In the

beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God"? God never was without the thought of Himself, or without an ideal reflection of His inward states. And this thought, or reflection, or in Hebrew phraseology, this *word* or *wisdom* was always before God, or in relation to Him, as one brought up with Him. But what is a thought, or an idea? A thought is not something separable from the thinking mind, as a ripe apple is separable from the tree that bears it. A thought, or its articulate expression, a word, is a modification or state of the thinking and speaking subject. A thought is the self in a certain modification or state. And in agreement with this it is said that the Word, which was in the beginning, and which was in relation to God, *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, was *God*, *θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος*. The Word or divine system of thought, by distinction from which God eternally realizes Himself as a personal being, in its identity with His own inward state is in this sense God Himself. But this ideal word, or system of thought in God, must also be regarded as the principle, both in respect of form and energy, of the external universe. Certainly the universe can not be regarded as the product of blind caprice or chance. When God created the world, He only realized in space and time the ideal or image of His own being. This image, or wisdom, or word, was the mediator of the outward creation—the master-workman of all God's works. Or, in the language of the fourth Gospel: "All things were made through the Logos, and without Him was not anything made that has been made." We confess that to us Harnack's doubt as to the existence of any Logos, that is, any governing principle in nature and history, seems unaccountable. Certainly the world is an organized rational system, having its end in man and in the goal of human history. All science and all philosophy, we believe, point to this conclusion. The reason, and life, and energy everywhere manifest in the world, come to a personal manifestation in the sphere of humanity. In a sense it is true even that God first attains to consciousness in man, in the sense, namely, that the reflected God, the thought-world in God, becomes here a self-thinking world. Of course, this

thought-world, or self-thinking world, is not a chaotic world. It is systematic and organic. But there can be no organism without an organic principle, that draws all the independent elements around itself, assigns to each its place, and holds it firmly there. Such a principle must be assumed in the ideal world within the divine mind. And if the many ideas or thoughts—thoughts begotten of the divine wisdom and love—which are to become real in the individual personalities of history may be regarded as words or *λόγοι* in the divine world-system, must we not suppose that there is among them one central principle or *Λόγος*, likewise destined to a concrete realization in the organism of humanity, who in all things is to have the preeminence—the one central man, in whom, through whom, and with reference to whom all things were made—the Christ of God, the King in the kingdom of God?

Viewed in this light we can have no difficulty in regarding Christ as divine, and as a legitimate object of divine worship. That which constitutes the essential being and character of Christ—His proper individuality—must be recognized as a mode of the divine being, imparting to Him a unique divine quality. It may be objected, however, that in the view here presented the same thing is essentially true of all men. Are they not all realizations of divine thoughts begotten of the divine love? How otherwise could men be considered the offspring of God, and children of God? However we may suppose the process of evolution, manifestly going on in space and time, as being related to the eternal creative agency of God, the soul that comes to be must be regarded as an expression of a divine thought, which as we have seen before is the same thing as a state of the divine mind. Or we may say with T. H. Green, of Oxford, that the human soul is a *mode* of the divine consciousness reproducing itself under the organic conditions of space and time. But as thus represented, it may be asked, what is Christ more than any other man of fine organization and noble character? There seems to be no difference in kind between Him and other men, but only a difference in degree. It

should be remembered, however, that in modern methods of thought the distinction between *kind* and *degree* has lost much of the importance which was once supposed to belong to it. The old debate as to whether species and varieties in nature differ in kind or degree, no longer means anything; for we have now learned to understand that difference in degree, when carried sufficiently far, becomes difference in kind. But Christ, the central man, the firstborn of all creation, who in all things has the preëminence, is so different from all other men, that in fact He constitutes a new kind of man. But, if we adopt this view, can we say also that Christ is God? While we can easily ascribe to Him *divinity*, can we also ascribe to Him *proper deity*, as it is sometimes called? Now, if by this is meant *Godhood* in the full and absolute sense, according to which God is one and there can be no other, then we are bound to answer the question in the negative. A state of God's being, or a mode of God's consciousness, is not God in this sense; and Harnack is doubtless correct when he says that in the sentence, *The Word was God*, the term is to be taken in a *predicative* sense. It must be understood to denote, not the Godhood substantively, but rather an attribute of God. This at least seems to be the sense in which the writers of the New Testament without exception understood the divinity of Christ. We would here remind the reader that, with the single exception of the excited and rhetorical exclamation of Thomas (John 20: 28), whose meaning is by no means clear, Jesus is never unequivocally called God in the New Testament. The two passages, Rom. 9: 5, and 1 Tim. 3: 16, in which such a designation used to be discovered, are now by many explained in a different sense. The meaning of the first passage depends upon the punctuation; and the phrase "God blessed forever," according to the punctuation adopted by editors like Lachman and Tischendorf, and commentators like Erasmus and Meyer, refers, not to Jesus, but to God in the absolute sense. In the second passage we now read "who" for "God." But what is of more importance is that it is the uniform practice of New Testament writers to distinguish Jesus clearly from God. The for-

mula, *The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ*, recurs continually in the writings of Paul. See 2 Cor. 1:3, Gal. 1:3, Eph. 1:3, Phil. 1:2. The same distinction is also made in the Epistles of James and Peter. It means that the Father is the God of Jesus Christ as really as He is of other men, and that Christ cannot be called God without distinction or reservation. This truth Jesus Himself assumes when He prays to the Father as His God. While Jesus is divine, while He stands in special relation to God and men as Mediator and Redeemer, yet He is Himself man, as to the whole constitution of His being. "There is one God, one mediator also between God and men, Himself man, Christ Jesus," 1 Tim. 2:5.

What we have here written is not intended for a new Christological dogma. It is only intended to show that the Logos doctrine of the New Testament may be taken in more senses than one, and that if the traditional theory thereof be no longer considered tenable, that does not compel us to give up the doctrine itself. Any theory on the subject can only be a product of speculation, and should not be confounded with the substance of the Gospel. Such theories are not intended to be preached. The man who, on the text, *What Think Ye of Christ?* should attempt to unfold a metaphysical theory of Christ's person would thereby prove that he had missed his calling as a preacher; and if he should go further and denounce and berate his fellow Christians for not understanding or accepting his theory, the case would be worse. If one man has a right to speculate and advance theories, another has the same right. Speculation may be a necessity for some minds in order to render to themselves an account of their faith; but it must never be supposed to be of the essence of the faith. And while one man's speculation may be helpful to another, no one should ever presume to have the right of compelling another to accept his own theories. Now we believe that the theory here but imperfectly presented has certain advantages in the present posture of theological thought. In particular, it makes room for certain fundamental conceptions of Christianity which are not consistent with

any merely moral or humanitarian conceptions of Christ. There is, for instance, the conception of the unity of Christ with humanity universally considered. Christ is related to men by bonds which are deeper than any merely intellectual and moral conditions. Christ is the head of humanity, the head of every man. This is a profounder conception than that which makes Him the head merely of a so-called *deutero-Adamitic* humanity, without any organic relation to humanity as a whole. And this conception, symbolized in the rite of infant baptism, finds its justification in the idea of *the central man*, to which we have been led by the consideration of the incarnate Logos. Again, the Christian Gospel and Christian experience unite in representing Christianity as a life in God with Christ, which is deeper than any mere thought or feeling. The practical Christian life is something deeper than religious life in any other form and has peculiar characteristics. Christ is in it as no mere religious teacher can ever be in the life of his followers. Buddhism is the product of the teaching of Buddha; but Buddha is not personally in the life of those who accept his teaching. He is not for them a personal source of strength, of lofty ideals, and aspirations. Buddha is dead; but Christ is living, and is a personal source of spiritual power for His people. The Christian preacher is a preacher of Christ. It is His aim to make Christ to be present, not ideally only, but really, to the souls of those to whom he preaches, as a living source of power. Now if Christ were "a mere man like other men," this would manifestly be an impossible thing; but as the incarnate Logos, the central and ideal man, He may be with and in His people to the end of the ages, according to His promise, as the Mediator of divine love, and light, and life.

DEFENDING THE FAITH.

Under this caption *The Evangelist*, of New York, has a sensible article, from which we make the following quotations: "This is more than defending a system. To insist upon some dogmatic theory of the divine methods, some definition of men,

some notion of one's own, is not to defend the faith once delivered to the saints. There are a good many difficulties in the way of defending the logical system elaborated by Augustine of Africa, Calvin of Geneva, and the men of Westminster. For one thing, it is too large for ordinary thinking, too angular to fit the lines and curves found in Scripture and in men. It happens, therefore, that a preacher falls into the estate of polemical talking, of special pleading on didactic lines only, toiling to prove truisms on the one hand and to explain mysteries on the other. * * * What is commonly meant by 'good doctrinal preaching' is some agonistic endeavor to restate the confession of faith. There is a habit of mind created by such religious meditations as are concerned not so much with one's own state of heart and relations to God as with the mistaken notions of some other Christian people; which craves the excitement of an argument, the decapitation of lay figures set up for the sport of overthrowing them.

* * * Now we affirm that it is this mistaken notion of defending the faith which has enfeebled the preaching of our Church and lost us hosts of hearers. A sermon framed to defend the system is apt to fail to defend the faith. For faith must be the life of the human spirit, its beating heart, its greatest love, its highest hold." We only add that it is not only the Presbyterian Church that has suffered evil consequences from this perverse method of "defending the faith."

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[Any books noticed in this REVIEW can be purchased, at the lowest prices, of the *Reformed Church Publication Board*, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.]

THE RELATION OF ST. PAUL TO CONTEMPORARY JEWISH THOUGHT. By Henry St. John Thackeray, M.A., Examiner in the Board of Education, Formerly Scholar of King's College, Cambridge, and Divinity Lecturer in Selwyn College. Pages, 280. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1900.

Sacred writers, like other writers, are conditioned by their environment and by their age. Their literary productions have their roots in the intellectual activity of the people to whom they belong. This is not inconsistent with their originality. No man's originality can be absolute, but only relative. Some things a literary genius gets from himself; but much also he gets from the treasures of the intellectual life of his people. His originality consists in the setting which he gives to things new and old, fully as much as in the invention of things new. We should not be surprised, then, to meet with this book of Professor Thackeray's, in which the attempt is made to trace to their source in pre-Christian Judaism many things which have heretofore been regarded as absolute revelations of St. Paul. St. Paul, doubtless does present Christian truth often in an original form. He was not related closely to the other apostles; and he testifies himself that he did not receive much from them. He was not anxious at all points to square his gospel with that of the other apostles. There existed then no such thing as a definite quantity, or deposit, of infallible Christian truth, handed on from one apostle or preacher to another; and St. Paul wrought out his gospel in entire independence of every other apostle. But St. Paul was also connected with the intellectual and religious life of his fellow men; and in working out his gospel, he worked into it not a little of the religious and doctrinal material which he found in that world of Jewish thought, within which he was trained, and from which he emancipated himself only gradually and imperfectly.

The Jewish world in the century before and during the life of St. Paul was not intellectually a barren desert. It was a world of no small amount of activity and the activity of it, moreover, affected the development of the new religion of Christ itself. The time was when, between the supposed conclusion of the Old Testament canon, about 444 B. C., and the birth of Christ, there was believed to be a theological blank. It is so no longer. In the first place, we now know that the canon of the Old Testament was not completed in 444 B. C., but that some of its books date from the

second century before Christ. And in the second place, we know that during the intermediate period there was going on quite a high degree of literary activity, that books were multiplied which have been recovered in modern times in the form of manuscripts and translations, and that doctrines were started then which were afterwards embodied in Christian writings, and have been for ages regarded as a part of the body of revealed Christian truth. Of this Jewish apocryphal literature we have a general though brief account in the introductory chapter of the volume before us. We can do no more here than mention a few names. The *Book of Enoch* is one of the most interesting works of the century before Christ, and gives us an important insight into the working of the Jewish mind of that time. After this we have the *Psalms of Solomon*, the *Book of Jubilees*, the *Assumption of Moses*, the *Book of Antiquities* ascribed to Philo, *Second Esdras*, the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, the *Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *Apocalypse of Moses*. To these must be added the great mass of *rabbinic literature* which came to its completion in the *Talmudical writings*; and the *Alexandrian literature*, which was certainly used by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews and by St. Paul.

The title of the second chapter is "Sin and Adam." Here there are a number of points on which St. Paul's teaching coincides with the teaching of the Jewish apocrypha, and where the Old Testament has no parallel. If the Old Testament contained similar teaching, then the fact of a coincidence between Paul and the Jewish apocrypha would not signify anything; for Paul and the apocrypha might then both have their ground in that Old Testament teaching. But when, in the absence of such common ground, there is manifest agreement, then the inference is unavoidable that the later writer depended on the earlier. Now such relation, according to our author, exists between Paul and the *Wisdom of Solomon* in regard to the consequences of Adam's fall. In *Wisdom 2: 23*, we are told that "God made man for immortality, and as an image of His own nature made He him; but through envy of the devil came death into the world, and they who are of the party of the latter tempt him." A simple glance will reveal the similarity between this and *Romans 5*. But is not all this in the third chapter of *Genesis*? Our author says it is not; and we believe that anybody who will study that third chapter of *Genesis* without any preconception or bias, will be of the same opinion. To read the third chapter of *Genesis* in harmony with Paul, one must first read Paul into it, or, as it is usually expressed, interpret the Old Testament in the light of the New. But no such violence is necessary in order to harmonize Paul with the apocrypha. The statements made by Paul were already in the Jewish mind previous to the time of Paul. How had they come to be there? That question we need not now answer. Another writer,

Eccl. 25 : 24, expresses the same thought as follows : "From the woman comes the beginning of sin, and on her account we all die." "According to Jewish ideas the effects of Adam's fall were not confined to man, but extended to the irrational world—to animate and inanimate nature. The whole world was put out of its proper course; but the losses then sustained were to be made good in a future age." This was Jewish teaching; and it is all reflected in Paul's statement that "creation was subjected to vanity," when Adam fell. The terms "first Adam" and "second Adam" are also referred to a pre-Christian source.

In the chapter on "The Law" we refer to but one point, namely, Paul's adoption, in Gal. 3 : 19, 20, of the Jewish tradition that "the law was ordained through angels by the hands of a mediator." In the fourth chapter, on "Justification by Faith or Works," the author maintains that Paul uses the term *justification* in a *forensic* sense, that is, in the sense of *imputation*, and that this is in harmony with Jewish modes of thought in the age of Paul, in spite of the zeal of the Jews for the law and for justification by works. On the subject of the "Last Things," which forms the contents of the fifth chapter, our author holds that St. Paul likewise began on the basis of common Jewish theological theory, and that he changed his mind several times before he reached the conclusion of his doctrine. "How is the idea of a final judgment in which recompense is to be made according to men's actions consistent with his doctrine of grace, according to which man can claim no merit for his works before God?" That is one of the questions which more than one generation of thoughtful theologians have pondered without obtaining any satisfactory solution. Our author points out three variations of doctrine on the subject of eschatology. There is, first, the Jewish idea of the nearness of the Messianic age, of an outward manifestation of Christ in the air, of a sound of the trumpet and a raising of those who sleep, and then a meeting of Christ upon the clouds. Then there is, secondly, the doctrine which meets us in 1 Cor. 15, to the effect that there must take place a transformation of the earthly into a heavenly body before it can inherit immortality; and that the process of transformation will be a vital-organic process, somewhat like that which takes place in a grain of corn when it is transformed into a new plant, and yet a process sustained throughout by the power of Almighty God "who giveth to every seed its own body as it has pleased Him." Our author here notes the fact that a similar theory is found in the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, which dates from the end of the first century. This implies, of course, that Paul did not quote from Baruch; but rather that the ideas contained in Paul and Baruch were in the Jewish air at the time. But there is, thirdly, the later theory, contained in 2 Cor. 5, and in Phil. 2, concerning the "house from heaven," and "being with Christ" immediately after death. Ac-

according to this view the resurrection comes immediately after the end of this life. Can anyone *reconcile* these divergent views? Evidently there is here development of thought. As the apostle grew in experience, and as he advanced in years, and perceived that he was not going to live unto the *parousia*, he gradually came to the conclusion that the resurrection would take place not at the end of distant ages, but here and now; and to this conclusion he may have been helped by the ferment of Jewish as well as Christian thought around him.

The subjects of the remaining chapters of the volume under notice are respectively *The World of Spirits*; *The Use of the Old Testament*; *St. Paul the Haggadist*; and *Literary Connections*. We can do no more here than single out a few points at random in order to show the interesting character of this book. There is an extremely curious passage in 1 Cor. 11: 10 where, for the purpose of inculcating the lesson of modesty upon women, the apostle refers to the order of creation of the sexes, and then continues: "For this cause ought the woman to have (a sign of) authority on her head, *because of the angels*." *Because of the angels*—what does that mean? Long expositions have been written to little purpose. But the bizarre representations of the angels in the *Book of Enoch* and in the *Book of Jubilees* will at once make plain its true meaning. That meaning is that there is real danger of female beauty attracting the lustful desires of angels with evil consequences to their possessors; as Sara attracted, with such dire consequences, the lusts of Asmodeus. Such a view would have little convincing power for us, if it stood merely in *Enoch* or in *Jubilees*; but how when it stands in St. Paul? In this connection we quote the conclusion of our author concerning the serpent in Genesis: "The identification of the serpent in Genesis with Satan—not found earlier than in the *Book of the Wisdom of Solomon*—is seen in 1 Cor. 11: 2, 3, and Rom. 16: 20." Unquestionably the serpent in Genesis is supposed to be a natural serpent. Is the authority of the apocryphal author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* sufficient to turn it into a spiritual being?

There are a few more points on which we must briefly touch. In 1 Cor. 10: 4 the apostle speaks of a "spiritual rock" which followed the Israelites in the wilderness and furnished them water to drink. In Gal. 4: 21-31 we have the curious allegory of Ishmael and Isaac, Sinai and Jerusalem, of which Luther once said that "it was too flimsy for an argument."—*Zum Stich Zum Schwach*. Then, finally, in 2 Tim. 3: 8, we have the story of the Egyptian magicians, Jannes and Jambres, withstanding Moses. How shall such stories be explained? Shall they be invested with the authority of supernatural, divine revelation? So the older theologians maintained. But we are now in a position to explain the origin of such stories, and that, of course, takes away

much of their mystery. There was among the Jews a species of teaching called *haggada*, which consisted in the embellishment of a plain and simple historical narrative by legendary accretions until they had quite outgrown their original form. The *Song of the Well*, in Num. 21: 17, 18, which was doubtless a song connected with the predatory warfare of the primitive Israelites had been thus embellished by successive *haggadoth* until it had grown into the story of the rock following the Israelites in the wilderness. Thus Paul found the legend existing in popular story, and utilized it for purposes of instruction. The story of Jannes and Jambres had a similar origin in Jewish tradition. When points of the Old Testament law were illustrated by means of additions, the result was called a *halacha*. Paul was not fond of *halachoth*, because he was not fond of the law. He did, however, admit one; it is the allegorical treatment of the story of Ishmael and Isaac, which had force as an *argumentum ad hominem* for his own times, but does not serve to make the Messiaship of Jesus any more certain to us. Nor do we believe that it was intended for anything more than an *argumentum ad hominem*. On the three instances just noted our author makes the following general remark: "They are all used merely by way of illustration, no emphasis being laid upon their historical worth. The rock which accompanied the Israelites and gave them spiritual drink is the type of Christ, of whose body and blood the Christian partakes, the history of Ishmael and Isaac is a type of the open persecution, that of Jannes and Jambres, of the more crafty and secret opposition which he must expect to meet." But here we must bring this notice to an end. The subject is one of intense interest, and one which every conscientious theologian will want to study for himself. But for such a study a work like the present is indispensable.

THE NEW EPOCH FOR FAITH. By Rev. George A. Gordon, D.D., minister of the Old South Church, Boston. Pages, xvii + 412. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York, 1901. Price, \$1.50.

The purpose of this volume, as stated in the preface, "is to discover and announce the chief significance for faith of the nineteenth century. It is believed that the great witness of that century is the witness to man." Humanity during the nineteenth century entered into a new consciousness of itself. Man has come to know himself as he never knew himself before. He has come to understand something of his power and of his worth. The confession so often heard in earlier ages, and especially in the circles of Puritanism, "I am a worm, and not a man," is not heard often now. But this new appreciation of humanity has resulted also in a new appreciation of Christianity as the religion of the Divine man. Deep in the consciousness of the present age Christianity has its immovable foundation. It is, however, Christianity in a

new form and under a new aspect. This does not mean, of course, that Christianity in its essential nature is something different now from what it was in the past, but that the form of its apprehension in thought and feeling now is different from what it was when the nineteenth century began; and that the difference, while it has been brought about through many struggles that often shook the very foundations of the faith, is greatly in favor of the form that has now been gained. If at times there has been something of an eclipse of faith, the darkness is now about past, and a purer light has begun to shine.

These are the fundamental thoughts which Dr. Gordon has elaborated in this volume. And the volume may be regarded as a sort of inventory of theological stock at the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. It serves the purposes of an orientation in Christian and theological thought, showing us where we are and whither we are tending. Whether the bearings have always been rightly taken, and the courses always correctly given, is a question that will, of course, be differently answered by different persons, according to their various training and their personal idiosyncrasies. But those who have read Dr. Gordon's earlier works, especially his *Christ of To-Day*, need not be told that they will find in this volume a rich provision of thought, that will at least make them think, if it does not serve to make them wise. Most intelligent readers, however, who will approach the book with open and candid minds, and are willing to bestow upon it the amount of attention required in order to understand it, will be stimulated and helped to a better comprehension of Christianity, and a brighter and more cheerful outlook into the future. It should be remarked, however, that the book is not one of easy reading. It requires close attention. This is due in part to the weightiness of the thought, but in part also to the *weightiness* of the style. Dr. Gordon's style is not always transparent and easy. It is necessary for the reader often to stop and reconstruct sentences before their real meaning will be apparent. We give one illustration. On page 378 we read these sentences: "History implies that the progressive rise in the character of religious conceptions is the result of the pressure of the infinite upon the spiritual nature of man. Deliverance comes in this way from the suspicion that the supreme religious conception is an invention, a beautiful but wholly arbitrary imagination." The first of these sentences is clear enough. But it takes some time to discover that what the author means in the second is, not that deliverance comes from the suspicion that, etc., but that deliverance from the suspicion comes, etc. Such instances might be multiplied; but this would be an ungracious task; and we refer to the matter only to advise the reader not to lay the volume aside if he finds that it does not "read like a novel." Let the volume be studied, and it will abundantly repay any effort which the reader may bestow upon it.

The contents of the work are arranged in seven chapters, headed respectively: *Things Assumed*; *The Advent of Humanity*; *The New Appreciation of Christianity*; *The Discipline of Doubt*; *The Return of Faith*; *The New Help from History*; and *Things Expected*. The things assured are the being of God, the moral order of the world, the worth of history, the immortality of man and the social life beyond time. These are basal things for Christian faith, and may be presupposed in a work, the main purpose of which is to treat of the fortunes of Christianity in the nineteenth century and of its outlook in the future. Nevertheless, some attention is bestowed upon these fundamental conceptions—enough to make their meaning clear to the attentive reader. On the worth of history it is said (p. 20) "Humanity as a whole is an imperishable value for God, and the final significance of God for man must ever be God in man. Of man's universe, the incarnation is the center; and God in history, in society, in the redeemed but progressive life of mankind is the permanent aspect of the infinite love." Such propositions must be seriously pondered in order that their full reach may be comprehended. On the subject of humanity, the author considers some influences which have served to retard its proper conception in the Christian world. One of these is the old notion of the fall in Adam, with all which that implies. This notion Dr. Gordon rejects. He holds, however, that "the notion of inherited depravity is true, but one sided. It needs to be supplemented by the notion of inherited excellence" (p. 34). Another of the influences retarding the proper conception of humanity, and serving to infuse brutality, ignorance and perversity into the institutional life of mankind, is the old idea of election. "Israel made the mistake of supposing that its election of God meant the rejection of other nations. And the Christian church has repeated Israel's mistake. It has set the seal of divinity upon Israel's inhumanity; and it has signally failed to appraise at their true value the really great things of (Israel's) civilization" (p. 45). And one of the significant results of the nineteenth century has been that it has overthrown forever this cruel doctrine of election, and has introduced, with the idea of the universal divine fatherhood, the idea of human brotherhood. The century which has abolished slavery and commenced the work of missions among all nations, could not tolerate the theory of a double decree of election which denies the love of God to the majority of men while it claims it for the few. "The limitations and the inhumanities of the traditional theology are disappearing before the irresistible logic of missions" (p. 85).

In the chapter on the *New Appreciation of Christianity* we have the remark that the fundamental idea of the gospel may be stated in the one sentence that "the glad tidings consist in an ideal incarnation of God in the interest of a universal incarnation." "The eternal wisdom," it is said further, "was made

flesh in Jesus Christ * * * He is the perfect human utterance of the moral being of the Infinite" (p. 128). In this connection is discussed the prophethood, priesthood, and kingdom of Christ. In connection with the second of these conceptions we have some remarks on the subject of the atonement. "The atonement of Christ," we are told, "still shines through His priesthood; it is part of Christian truth and history and can not pass away. The neglect into which it has fallen is due largely to the blindness of its teachers. The subject of the atonement has come down to this generation burdened with mountains of immemorial misunderstanding. It has been turned by an unmeasured accumulation of unmeaning or irrelevant jargon into the superlative unreality. It has been divorced from rational insight, from the principles of moral obligation, and made to do duty as a Christian truth in servitude to pagan notions, and as a satisfaction to pagan sentiments and superstitions" (p. 148). That is strong language; but who that knows anything of the history of the subject will say that it is too strong? Some of the unchristian doctrines that have been passed off in the name of Christianity, have been professedly based upon the Bible. Hence in the revolution of thought which the nineteenth century has witnessed, the Bible too has come to be apprehended in a new light. "Among intelligent people the Bible can never again be what it has been, the complete and infallible authority, from its first page to its last, upon faith and practice. This means loss. Literal security for faith is no longer found in the indiscriminate use of the Bible. It can no longer coerce the reason or override the conscience. As an unquestionable authority for the support of questionable opinions it is no more. Never again can it be deemed conclusive proof of a belief that a text from the Bible may be quoted in its favor * * * For the literalist the loss is absolute. The letter that killeth is killed; but this itself surely is an immense gain" (p. 171). All will, of course, not assent to these propositions; we believe, however, that the majority of the most thoughtful theologians will do so. But that will imply that the age has radically shifted its ground on the whole subject of religious authority. It is no longer either an infallible church or an infallible Bible, taken merely in an outward way, that can command the assent of the faithful; but the only ultimate source of authority is the Christ in the reason and heart of the believer.

The chapter on the *Discipline of Doubt* is rich and instructive, but we have room only for one or two remarks. The phrase *discipline* of doubt implies that doubt has its uses in the development of Christian thought. It serves to clear away a mass of error before faith can again exercise itself in its full vigor. Dr. Gordon does not join in the indiscriminate condemnation of such sceptical writers as Hume, Rousseau, Voltaire and others. They did more good than harm. If Hume overthrew a worthless sys-

tem of philosophy, upon which had rested a worthless system of theology, he deserves more praise than censure. Rousseau and Voltaire were mockers; but there was little in the religion and politics of France in their time that did not deserve all the shafts of ridicule which they hurled against it. Had the church and the state not been rotten to their core, Rousseau and Voltaire would not have mocked. It is through the discipline of doubt that the return of faith is ever prepared for. And yet the return of faith is more than a mere reaction against scepticism. We hear much about reaction in our day. The traditionalist expects a reaction against criticism, the dogmatist against rationalism, and so on to the end. Those who take comfort in such expectations should by all means read this book of Dr. Gordon's. The return of faith, according to this writer, does not imply a rehabilitation of the old theologies, but a theological reconstruction of Christianity. The old theologies are dead. Calvinism, for instance, is dead beyond any hope of a resurrection. Nor should there be any lamentation for it. "For the race as a whole, and for the thinker who judges schemes of thought from their bearing upon the interests of mankind, there is indeed little to choose between Calvinism and atheism. The soul of man has had a sad time under all forms of that nightmare" (p. 262). Whoever knows anything of the history of New England theology, knows how true all this is, and cannot join in any lamentation over the demise of Calvinism. "Why should it be considered an indication of a sound mind to give allegiance to a theology that has no longer any relation to the moral ideal of a good man and a living church? The radicalism for which the best people are longing is that which will make it clear as sunlight that the orthodoxy of to-day holds God in His eternal intention and everlasting endeavor, free from all logical evasion and hide-and-seek methods of explicit and hidden decrees, and in absolute honesty for humanity. The seminary that shall take that position may receive persecution, but it will command the men who command the future" (p. 269).

Time was when history, as it was then construed, was supposed to be on the side of the theory of a divine exclusivism—the theory that God's grace and favors were intended for the few, while the many are cursed—the theory which still lingers in the minds of some capitalists, and in those of their ignorant worshippers, that God evidently intends that the few should have everything and the many nothing, because He has given the few the power to get everything. The elements of this theory are simple. Humanity began its career in a perfect moral creation. But then came a fall, a mass of perdition, and the selection of a few out of the mass as vessels of the divine mercy. There is no history here. What we call history in this case produces nothing, either in the case of the individual or of the race. But the modern study of history, in the light of the evolutionary theory, gives us a far

different conception; and Dr. Gordon could well entitle one of his chapters: *New Help from History*. According to this new way of reading history, there has been immense progress for the race as a whole; and that progress may well be considered as a prophecy of still greater progress to come. "Mankind began in the depth of animalism. * * * It began with nothing but possibilities. From that remote and almost unimaginable position the race has come to its present attainment" (p. 360). And in view of the attainment thus far achieved, certain expectations may well be entertained as to the future. It may be expected that "the sense of humanity will more and more develop all human interests, and among them the forms of religious belief" (p. 387). It may be expected that "the humanity of Jesus Christ will become more and more controlling in all thinking about the character of God and the nature and destiny of man" (p. 390). It may be expected that "the idea of human life in this world as an education, will more and more take the place of the idea of probation" (p. 392). It may be expected that "an ethical view of life of the utmost vigor, combined with an unrestricted hope for man will more and more dominate the Christian mind" (p. 396). And it may be expected, finally, that "all contradictions of human hope will prove but mightier fulfillments of it;" as the contradictions of the Hebrew Messianic hopes were followed by fulfillments in a far higher and nobler sense. But at this point we must stop. Those of our readers who desire to know more of the thought and method of the book under consideration, are referred to the book itself, which will amply repay them for its cost, and for the time and effort expended in the study of it.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? *Sixteen Lectures Delivered in the University of Berlin during the Winter Term 1899-1900.* By Adolph Harnack, Rector of, and Professor of Church History in the University, Berlin. Translated into English by Thomas Baily Saunders. Pages, 301. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d Street, New York, 1901.

The original title of these lectures, *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, which is well reproduced in the English title as given above, indicates clearly the general subject with which they have to do. What is Christianity? What was it in the beginning? What has it become? These are the questions to which the discussion is devoted. And this discussion is conducted throughout from the standpoint of the historian rather than from that of the apologist or religious philosopher; although in the discussion of the original nature of Christianity the fundamental essence of religion in general must, of course, come more or less into consideration. The author remarks, however, that for us there is no other religion than the Christian. "Other religions no longer stir the depths of our hearts." Christianity is religion in its ultimate essence and in its purest manifestation. Religion pertains to man in his most fundamental and unchanging being. It is not a mere exponent of

moral and social conditions, although it lives in and determines all the activities of the human soul and affects all its external and internal relations. In itself considered "it is eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God."

These lectures may be divided into two nearly equal parts, the subject of the first part being the fundamental essence of Christianity, or of the gospel, and that of the second part, the modifications and changes which the gospel suffered in the course of Christian history. "We shall deal first of all," says the author, "with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and this theme will occupy the greater part of our attention. We shall then show what impression He Himself and His Gospel made upon the first generation of His disciples. Finally we shall follow the leading changes which the Christian idea has undergone in the course of history, and try to recognize its chief types. What is common to all the forms which it has taken, corrected by reference to the Gospel, and, conversely, the chief features of the Gospel, corrected by reference to history, will, we may be allowed to hope, bring us to the kernel of the matter" (p. 15). In these sentences the author outlines the course of thought to be pursued in the subsequent lectures. The first two lectures deal somewhat with the sources of our knowledge of essential Christianity. These, according to Professor Harnack are "Jesus Christ and His Gospel." But in order to know Jesus Christ we must study Him not merely in His original self-manifestation but also in the impression which He made upon the first generation of His disciples—we must listen not merely to what He tells of Himself, but also to what His disciples tell of the effect which He had upon their lives. For a knowledge of the original message of Jesus, or of His self-manifestation, we are directed to the first three Gospels; for a knowledge of His impression upon His contemporaries we are referred to the fourth Gospel and the remaining literature of the apostolic age. We have thus two classes of sources for our knowledge of Christ and His Gospel, of which the first is of primary importance, although the second could by no means be dispensed with.

In regard to the Synoptic Gospels Professor Harnack makes the remark in opposition to Strauss, that, while in some of the narratives the miraculous element is obviously intensified, there is after all not much that is mythical. The narrative of events and discourses which they contain are for the most part authentic. This, however, does not apply to the stories of the miraculous birth, of which the oldest tradition knew nothing. Nor does it apply without much reservation to the narratives of miracles. The presence of these narratives in the Gospels does not indeed make these narratives incredible, but neither does it guarantee their historicity. Where the distinction between a fixed order of nature and an operation in nature disregarding this order is not yet clear, or where the question concerning such a distinction has

not yet been raised in any vigorous form, there are no such things as miracles in the strict sense of the word. At the time when the New Testament writings were composed "miracles" were believed in everywhere, among Gentiles as well as among Jews; but that very fact must serve to make that belief suspicious. "We are firmly convinced," says Professor Harnack, "that what happens in space and time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an interruption of the order of nature, there can be no such things as miracles" (p. 26). Then, after a classification of the stories of miracles in the New Testament, the last of which embraces "stories of which we cannot fathom the secret," the discussion of this subject is ended by the remark: "It is not miracles that matter; the question on which everything turns is whether we are helplessly yoked to an inexorable necessity, or whether a God exists who rules and governs, and whose power to compel nature we can move by prayer and make a part of our experience" (p. 30). Even the question of the bodily resurrection of Jesus loses much of its significance in this view. "If the resurrection meant nothing but that a deceased body of flesh and blood came to life again, we should make short work of this tradition. But it is not so. The New Testament itself distinguishes between the Easter message of the empty grave and the appearances of Jesus on the one side, and the Easter faith on the other. * * * The Easter faith is the conviction that the crucified one gained a victory over death; that God is just and powerful; that He who is the firstborn among many brethren still lives" (pp. 160-1). Professor Harnack, accordingly, would not allow that the Christian faith rests upon the miracle of the resurrection taken in a literal sense. He says: "Either we must decide to rest our belief on a foundation unstable and always exposed to fresh doubts, or else we must abandon this foundation altogether, and with it this miraculous appeal to our senses" (p. 162). The Christian faith demands certainty that Jesus now lives at the right hand of God. Could such certainty be established by any documentary evidence or any process of historical proof? Professor Harnack would answer, no; and yet he admits that the "grave of Jesus was the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death is vanquished, that there is a life eternal."

What was the substance of the Gospel as Jesus proclaimed it? According to Harnack it consisted of three facts, which, however, could easily be reduced to one; they are: *Firstly, the Kingdom of God and its coming; secondly, God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul; thirdly, the higher righteousness and the commandment of love.*" These three facts are discussed at some length; and in connection with the first the question is raised as to the kingdom of the devil and of demons. Some theologians have held that it is impossible to believe in Christ

without believing in a devil, and in a kingdom of demons. Professor Harnack, as might be expected, is not at all of this opinion. These beliefs formed a part of the current thought of the time in which Jesus lived; but they are not at all of the essence of the Gospel. He cautions his readers, however, that the fact that "such absurdities" are reported in the Gospel is no sufficient reason for declining to accept these Gospels. After having defined the general conception of Jesus' Gospel, the author goes on to discuss this Gospel in relation to the following problems: (1) The question of asceticism. (2) The social question. (3) The question of public order. (4) The question of civilization. (5) The Christological question. (6) The question of creed. In reference to the first question Professor Harnack contends against the theory that the Gospel is "strictly a world-shunning and ascetic creed," and in this connection rejects the Catholic doctrine of a "lower" and "higher" morality. In regard to the second question the position is taken that the Gospel is not directly concerned with economic and social questions; and yet they are declared to be in the wrong who think of Jesus as having been, like themselves, a "conservative," and who respect all social differences and ordinances as "divinely ordained."

But the subject to which the theologian will turn with most interest is the Christological question. The question here, is not what did His contemporaries think of Jesus, but, what did He think of Himself? What did He declare Himself to be according to the primitive Evangelical tradition, from which the discourses of the fourth Gospel must, of course, be excluded? Professor Harnack contends that He never demanded the acceptance of any doctrine concerning His own person. What He did require was obedience to His commands, as the commands of God. "Not every one that saith unto Me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven; but he that doeth the will of My Father." He makes no claims to be something other than man. "This feeling, praying, working, struggling and suffering individual is a man who in the face of his God also associates himself with other men" (p. 126). Yet as a man He distinguishes Himself from other men. This distinction is expressed by means of two titles which He assumes, namely, *Son of God*, and *Messiah*. What do these titles in the mouth of Jesus mean? According to Professor Harnack the first is expressive of His peculiar knowledge of God. He knew God as no one ever knew Him before; and he knew Him as the Father, with all which that term implies. Hence He knew Himself to be the Son of God in a special and peculiar sense. How He came to possess this knowledge no one can now tell. "How He came to this consciousness of the unique character of His relation to God as a Son; how He came to the consciousness of His power, and to the consciousness of the obligation and the mission which this power carries with it, is His secret, and no psychology will ever

fathom it." Professor Harnack does not agree with those who claim that Jesus never presented Himself as the *Messiah*. He did not often use the title, perhaps because it was used in such various senses in Jewish thought; but his triumphal entrance into Jerusalem would have been an assumption of Messianic dignity, if there had been nothing else.

The second part of the discourses forming this volume is devoted to the task of exhibiting the history of the Christian religion in its leading phases, and of examining its development in the apostolic age, in Catholicism, and in Protestantism. Jesus during His lifetime founded no religious community. Such a community, however, was bound soon to arise. What were its leading characteristics? Professor Harnack thinks there were essentially three: first, the recognition of Jesus as the living *Lord*; second, the experience of religion as an actual reality involved in the consciousness of a living union with God; thirdly, the leading of a holy life, and the expectation of Christ's return in the near future. In the apostolic age a number of speculative ideas came into Christianity, largely through the influence of Paul, who did not misunderstand Christ, nor was he the actual creator of Christianity, as has sometimes been maintained. Among these ideas perhaps the most influential was that relating to the death of Christ as the expiation of human sin. This is a speculative idea which had no place in the original Gospel. It is, however, not for that reason inconsistent with the Gospel. On the contrary it doubtless expresses a great truth, which however finds no adequate expression in any of the modern theories of the *atonement*. Christ's "death had the value of an expiatory sacrifice," says Harnack, "for otherwise it would not have had strength to penetrate into that inner world in which the blood-sacrifices originated; but it was not a sacrifice in the same sense as the others, or else it could not have put an end to them; it suppressed them by settling accounts with them" (p. 158). The idea of the *church* also was a creation of the apostolic age, and had important results. "What came from within was joined by something that came from without; law, discipline, regulations for ritual and doctrine were developed, and began to assert a position by a logic of their own. The measure of value applicable to religion itself no longer remained the only measure, and with a hundred invisible threads religion was insensibly worked into the net of history" (p. 182).

The post-apostolic age, from about A. D. 80 to A. D. 200, was the period during which Christianity developed into Catholicism. This was a serious transformation of the original gospel, and yet one which was inevitable in the circumstances of the times, and in which the substance of the gospel was still preserved. What did Christianity achieve during this period? "It waged war with nature-worship, polytheism, and political religion, and beat them back with great energy; and it exploded the dualistic philosophy

of religion" (p. 194). We are reminded here of the contest of the church with Gnosticism. It was during this period, however, also that the essence of the gospel arrayed itself in the form of Hellenism. "The influx of Hellenism, of the Greek spirit, and the union of the Gospel with it, form the greatest fact in the history of the Church in the second century, and when the fact was once established as a foundation it continued through the following centuries" (p. 200). But according to Harnack the most influential idea derived by the church from Greek thought during this period, was the idea of the *Logos*, or *the active central idea of the cosmos*. Jesus Christ was now identified with this idea. The term *Logos*, *Word*, had been applied to Him earlier, as, for instance, by John, but only as a *predicate*. Now, however, it came to express His very essence. "No philosophical Jew had ever thought of identifying the Messiah with the *Logos*; no Philo, for instance, ever entertained the idea of such an equation. It gave a metaphysical significance to an historical person; it drew into the domain of cosmology and religious philosophy a person who had appeared in time and space; but by so distinguishing one person it raised all history to the plane of the cosmical movement." Was this identification of the Christ, the Jewish Messiah, with the Greek *Logos* a legitimate operation? Harnack expresses doubt. We express no opinion, because we have no room now for elaboration. And we must simply content ourselves by stating that, according to Harnack, the old Catholic church developed, in later times, into the Greek Catholic Church on the one hand, and into the Roman Catholic Church on the other. The former is the primitive gospel in alliance with the whole of the Greek life, mythology, polytheism, and all; while the latter is the gospel in similar alliance with the whole Latin spirit. Essentially the same thing is true of Protestantism and its relation to the German spirit. The essential elements of Catholicism, both Greek and Roman, are traditionalism, intellectualism or orthodoxism, and ritualism; while of Protestantism they are inwardness and spirituality, the fundamental conception of God as love or grace, the idea of worship as being in spirit and in truth, and the idea of the Church as a communion of faith.

This somewhat extended exposition of the contents of the work before us will serve to give our readers some idea of its great importance and value in theological literature. Professor Harnack is a master of theological learning in all its departments. Of course, it is understood that he is a follower, in the main, of the Ritschlian tendency of thought. Many of us will not be able to follow him. We ourselves are not able to do so in all respects. For instance, to mention nothing else, we can not be satisfied with the abstract separation between religion and speculative or philosophical thought which Harnack and other Ritschlians constantly assume. We grant that the Gospel is not philosophy; and yet

we maintain that the facts of the Gospel are only tenable on the supposition of the reality of certain speculative or philosophical ideas. But we do not propose to make any further criticism on the book before us, but rather to commend it to the careful study of our readers, of which it is abundantly worthy. We are quite sure that any one who will carefully study this book, will begin his study of theology anew, from the foundation up, and he will begin with the New Testament itself. No "orthodox system," whether Lutheran, Calvinistic or Armenian, can any longer satisfy him. Nor will he be able to rest in the sycretism and *Allwisserei* of the later Mediationists. We have only to add that Professor Harnack's style is clear, and that the translation of the book is excellent. Hence the reading of it is no hard task, notwithstanding the fact that the treatment of so much material in such brief space required a good deal of condensation.

CLEARING THE WAY. By Rev. Xavier Sutton, *Passionist*. Pages, 180. Price, 10 cents. Paper Binding. The Catholic Book Exchange, 120 West 60th Street, New York.

This tract, which bears the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of New York, seems to be intended especially to commend the Catholic faith to Protestants; but we suspect that it was prepared with an eye also to Catholics who are growing suspicious of some things in the Catholic creed and ritual. At any rate the style and manner of reasoning seem to us to be better adapted to the minds of luke-warm Catholics than to those of intelligent Protestants. Among the subjects discussed are the Church, the papal infallibility and supremacy, the sacraments, the Latin Liturgy, indulgences, purgatory, invocation of the saints and devotion to the Virgin Mary, the Rosary and Angelus, pictures and images, veneration of sacred relics, Feasts of the Church and the like. On the subject of the Church, of course, we have the usual argument as to the infallibility and exclusiveness of the Roman communion. That argument runs about as follows: Christ established but one church, out of which there is no salvation. That church may be known by the marks of holiness, catholicity and apostolicity. These marks apply to none but the Roman Catholic communion. Hence she alone is the true Church of Christ, while all other communions are mere creations of men, and therefore, *sects*, in which there is no true light, and no possibility of salvation. This Roman Church is infallible as a teacher of religious truth, because Christ promised the Holy Spirit to Peter and the apostles to lead them into all truth, and because she has never been proven to be fallible. She is, therefore, the infallible teacher and interpreter of God's revelation, and the supreme authority in matters of faith and practice for all men. The Bible is not sufficient as a guide to religious truth, because, though infallible, it is yet in many respects obscure, and does not interpret itself. To be of

any use it needs an infallible interpreter; and such an interpreter is the Church represented in the bishops with the Pope at their head as the fountain of authority for the whole Christian world. It is not the Bible interpreted by private judgment, but the Bible and tradition as expounded by the Catholic Church that constitute the source of all religious knowledge and certitude. Hence to reject the authority of the Catholic Church is to reject the authority of God Himself and imperil one's salvation. And all that the Catholic Church has ever taught, or is now teaching, however repugnant to human reason it may be, must be accepted as infallible divine truth.

Such is the theory which runs through this little book, and determines all its statements concerning divine truth. "We know this doctrine to be true because it is the teaching of Scripture and tradition as interpreted by the Catholic Church," is its constant refrain. On this theory we have a few things to say in the way of criticism. In the first place, the foundation article on which the whole structure rests is an assumption which to our mind involves a self-evident absurdity. To say that the church is infallible because it has always claimed to be infallible, and because it has never been proved to be fallible, is an absurdity in logic, and an untruth in fact. Any one who is familiar with history knows that the conduct and decisions of the Catholic Church have not always been in conformity with truth. The argument on this point has often been conclusively made out. But suppose the claim were a valid one, and the church were an infallible teacher of an infallible revelation, what guarantee would that afford of the infallibility of the knowledge of common Christian people? The church tells me that I can not understand the teaching of an infallible Bible without the help of an infallible teacher. But how, then, can I be certain that I understand this infallible teacher, and that I may not still be in error? Of course the same difficulty holds also with regard to the Protestant view of an infallible Bible as the sole source of authority in religious knowledge. Here is the point in which the seventeenth century Protestantism and Romanism meet on common ground, and where, in our conviction, they are both wrong. We refer to but one more point. In the tract before us we have the authority of the Catholic Church, the unanimous consent of the fathers, the Church judging according to Scripture and tradition constantly placed in opposition to the private judgment of Protestants. For instance, we are told that the practice of praying for the dead is not based upon private judgment, but upon "the practice of the Church in all past ages; the positive doctrine of the ancient fathers and tradition; and the decrees of general councils." But the basis of the whole doctrine after all is a statement in the Second Book of Maccabees which is counted among the canonical scriptures upon the testimony of St. Augus-

tine and other church fathers. It appears, then, that what is now considered unanimous consent or tradition was once merely somebody's private opinion. Why may not Luther's opinions, or Calvin's, be worth as much as Augustine's or Jerome's? But, after all, what is the value of any religious doctrine that is based merely upon external authority, whether of Bible, tradition, or church? Unless a doctrine authenticates itself to the Christian reason and conscience, no external authority whatever can give it validity.

THE REDEMPTION OF AFRICA—A STORY OF CIVILIZATION, WITH MAPS. STATISTICAL TABLES AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN MISSIONS, By Frederic Perry Noble, Secretary of the Chicago Congress on Africa, Columbian Exposition. Volume I. Pages, xxv + 474. Volume II. Pages, 382. Fleming H. Revell Company, Chicago, New York, Toronto, 1899.

These two stately volumes constitute a very encyclopedia of knowledge concerning the dark continent of Africa, which has for ages been regarded as a land of mystery. They are written in a style that is at once clear and fascinating, and, even apart from the interest involved in the matter, makes the reading of them a pleasant entertainment. The author, in a prefatory note, says that "In endeavoring to write history he desired to contribute to genuine literature. As a class, books on missions are not works of literary art—do not belong to literature proper. Need this be? Must writings on the coming of God's kingdom consist simply of dry facts and drier statistics? Should enrichment of diction, style and theme be banned? Rather, ought not the subject to render it imperative that the matter be made as interesting, picturesque and vivid as it is the power of style to do? So thought, so written." We think the intelligent reader will not be disappointed in the expectations raised by this announcement. As to the religious or denominational standpoint from which the work was written the author says: "Those who view Protestantism as damnable heresy may mourn that its missions are characterized as Christian. They who regard the Roman Church as Babylon, the harlot and its bishop as ante-Christ or the man of sin, will grieve that the Vatican mission colonies are treated as Christian missions. To neither sectaries does his work address itself. History, like intellect in the palace of art, may sit as God, holding no form of creed, but contemplating all."

The work is divided into three books, whose respective subjects are: "The Ancient and Medieval Preparation," "The Religious Partition," "The Expansion of Missions," to which are added appendices on various subjects of interest, and complete indexes of persons, places, societies and subjects. To the mere student of history the first book will perhaps be the most interesting. Africa has had a long history in the affairs of humanity. It is inseparably intertwined with the beginnings of Biblical history in

the Old Testament, and also with the beginnings of the Christian Church. How much Egypt may have had to do with the training of the ancient people of God may perhaps never be fully known; but the student of Church history has at least some idea of how much early Christianity owes to African learning, piety and influence. Some of the most interesting chapters of Mr. Noble's work bear upon this subject. He reminds us of how much Alexandria had to do with preparing a language and a philosophy without which Christianity could never have made its way into the Græco-Roman world; and shows how later on it was Egypt and North Africa that gave to the Church its greatest theologians and teachers. Pantænus, the founder of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, and Clement and Origen were Egyptians; and so was Athanasius, the father of Greek orthodoxy and framer of the traditional doctrine of the person of Christ; and according to Mr. Noble it is at least not improbable that he may have had a strain of negro blood in his veins. The greatest teachers of the Latin Church, whose theories have given direction to Latin theology down to the present time, were either natives or residents of North Africa. Among them were such men as Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, and above all the great Augustine, without whom the Roman Catholic Church would never have been possible. It is a singular fact that both the founders of Greek and of Roman orthodoxy belonged to the African Church, whose candlestick has so long been removed and its place occupied by the religion of the Koran.

The history of the rise and spread of Mohammedanism, and of the fall of Christianity before the advancing hosts of the Crescent throughout Africa, is graphically told in these pages by Mr. Noble. What is Mohammedanism? Mr. Noble answers, *Pseudo-Christianity*. That may sound strange to one who has not given the subject much consideration or thought, and we are not sure that it is a sufficient or satisfactory answer. We have always thought Mohammedism might be accounted for by considering it as a product of Arab paganism with an infusion of some Jewish and Christian ideas. But Mr. Noble points out that, if African Christianity had been *pure* Christianity Mohammedanism would have been impossible, and that is doubtless correct. But unfortunately when Mohammedism arose the African churches had been corrupted by the re-introduction of most of the elements of Greek and Latin paganism; and this corruption was at least an influential occasion, if not the direct cause, of the origin and extension of Islamism. Mr. Noble quotes the following sentences from Dean Stanley: "Springing out of the same oriental soil and climate, if not from the bosom of the oriental church itself, in part under its influence, in part by reaction Mohammedanism must be regarded as an eccentric, heretical form of Eastern Christianity. This was the ancient mode of regarding Moham-

med. He was considered not the founder of a new religion, but rather, one of the chief heresiarchs of the Church." This view receives color from the fact that Mohammed regarded Jesus, the son of Mary, as the messenger and prophet of God, illustrious in this world and in the next, although not quite equal to himself. But, however, we may account for the origin of Mohammedanism, it is certain that for a time it swept Christianity from the face of the African continent, where it doubtless did some good among the savage tribes to whom it came, but also much evil by encouraging the slave-trade and other inhuman iniquities.

But Mohammedanism is now effete, and possesses no self-rejuvenating, self-reforming power. It is a religion without morality and without life, as Allah is a god without character, pure absolute will, a typical oriental despot, who sends men to heaven or hell according to his own inexplicable pleasure. Hence Mohammedanism is now bound again to give way before the advancing progress of Christianity. And to tell how the Christian forces are organized, and how they are working for the accomplishment of this result, is the main purpose of Mr. Noble's composition and publication of these volumes. Before he approaches the direct account of Christian missionary enterprises in Africa, however, he devotes a chapter to the *Environment of African Missions*. In this chapter he treats of the physical features of the country, of its climates and products, and especially of the diseases which are peculiar to different sections of the continent. Maps are given showing precisely what particular disorders prevail in a given locality. To the missionary intending to engage in the African service, and to missionary boards, this is an especially valuable feature of the work before us. We next have a treatment of the races inhabiting the African continent, and a map showing their distribution; from which it appears that the area of the Negroes is next in extent to that of the Bantus, while Hamitic and Semitic races also occupy no inconsiderable spaces of territory. Accounts of the civilization and religion of these peoples are given, and are very interesting. We quote a few sentences concerning the Negro as he appears in his native habitat. "The Negro is immoral. So far as he knows the difference between right and wrong, he recognizes the obligation of duty. His code of ethics in its plane is as strict as the commandments of Moses and Jesus for us. He is an overgrown child, and his faults as a barbarian are those of human nature. Demonstrative, self-indulgent, impulsive, theatrical and vain, he is a kindly man, no worse than our own barbarous ancestors. Generally he treats the slave as a member of his family. Though on occasion as cruel as only boys and savages can be, he lacks the lust for blood and torture that made the Iroquois a hell-hound."

In the remaining parts of the work before us we have a detailed account of the missionary operations of the various Christian de-

nominations in the African field, and of the results which have thus far been achieved. Although there remains much yet to be done, and although Mohammedanism and paganism darken still by far the greater part of the continent, still the strategic points everywhere are in the possession of Christianity, and the conquest of the whole continent is already assured. It may take ages yet to finish it, but even now *The Redemption of Africa* is not an inappropriate title for a book treating of the history of its evangelization. Into the details of this history we can not here enter. The reader who is interested in the subject will want to study the book for himself. It ought to be on the shelves of all theological libraries, and within reach of all theological students. Persons who want to be thoroughly familiar with the subject of missions in one great part of the world should not fail to read it

JESUS IN THE HOME—SAVING THE CHILDREN: *Gracious Nurture in the Family.* By Geo. B. Russell, A.M., D.D., LL.D. Pages, 220. Price, 75 cts. Reformed Church Publication Board, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, 1901.

This book is intended for the use of Christian families. It is not a treatise on doctrinal theology so much as a call upon Christian parents and children to recognize the nature and place of the family in the plan of saving grace. "Christian nurture," says the author (p. 9), "finds its own domain here as nowhere else. God has constituted the family for the special good of the children of men. New-born children are here divinely planted, so that the proper nurture and care be given them in order that they may meet the purpose of their creation. By birth and baptism in the covenant, the divine powers reach out in favor of the redeemed children, and the Lord puts it upon the family to lay hold on this help to save ransomed souls." The author of this book is a believer in baptismal grace and in the value of infant baptism; but he does not regard baptism as an *opus operatum*, accomplishing its purpose merely in consequence of its performance, without regard to Christian family nurture or the conduct of baptized persons.

We are glad to see that in these pages Dr. Russell does not countenance the once current theory of *total depravity*. He recognizes, as all must do, the fact of hereditary depravity. "Infants inherit the sinful nature of their parents under the curse," he says (p. 14). It may not be plain to what part of the sentence the phrase *under the curse* is intended to refer. What is it that is *curst*? We are inclined to believe that the phrase is used rather from force of habit than from any distinct conviction as to its meaning. At any rate the author goes on immediately to say that this bad inheritance "is not the primal fault, but the misfortune of those children thus born. They by nature are all prone to grow as weeds in the garden, on the wrong side of goodness and truth; and if there be no remedy to prevent this proclivity or

tendency to evil, they naturally come to the bad." Evidently this presupposes the Zwinglian rather than the Calvinistic doctrine of original sin. But there is a remedy to this proclivity to evil in human nature. For while there is a tendency to evil, there is also a substantial goodness in the human soul, which is propagated by heredity, and capable of development through parental nurture and training in the family. This goodness, however, is not in the soul independently of Christ. "There is down in the inmost soul of the new-born infant," says Dr. Russell (p. 25), "room and fitness and human capacity for receiving new spiritual influences, correcting and regenerating its bad tendency." And surely this deep tendency in human nature to goodness, is itself something good, and not bad. Is this, then, Pelagianism? No, for this goodness is in the human soul because Christ has been born into humanity. "The soul," continues Dr. Russell, "related to the divine Creator, especially in Christ's birth as the son of man, is adapted for salvation from sin and death. Not only has the Lord God provided in some general way an antidote for sin's deadly virus; but He has constituted our nature with an inward want and longing for spiritual help; and He has made the soul capable of early receiving moral regeneration, which restores the original 'good' image of the divine likeness in which man was made, the offspring of God."

Whether Dr. Russell would accept all that is logically involved in the principles here enunciated, we do not know. He protests somewhat vigorously against the theory of evolution. He holds that while "from babies have grown all the big people of this earth," yet to this rule Adam and Eve were exceptions. They were never anything like children. They were by one act of God, without any process of evolution, made perfect human beings, physically, intellectually and morally. And this perfection constituted the image of God, which has been lost through sin, and is now "restored" through redemption. But this is not a matter of much consequence in a work of such practical nature as that now before us. No matter how Adam and Eve were made. We know at least how we and our children are made. And we know, too, how much parental influence and family life have to do with the training of our children and with the character which they will ultimately develop. Heredity and environment—prominent conceptions in the theory of evolution—are at least powerful factors in the training of child life. And it is the design of Dr. Russell's book to call the attention of the Church and of parents to the need of the proper direction of those factors. Children must be trained in the way in which they should go. They must be brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. Without such training and nurture no sacramental rites or "covenants" will save them. And the baptism of infants always presupposes such training and nurture. In conclusion we express our convic-

tion that the circulation and reading of this book throughout the Reformed Church will do good. A copy of it ought to be in every family, as well as in Sunday-school and pastor's libraries.

THE WILL AND THE WAY. By Susan M. Belser. Pages, 334. Price, \$1.25. Lutheran Publication Society, 1424 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa., 1901.

This is a "purpose," novel, written to amuse and instruct the young. The story is that of a young girl, Jean Andrews by name, who enters college in spite of the opposition of her parents, and, aided by her brothers, also college bred, finally crowns her efforts with success. The various scenes and incidents of college life, both in class room and dormitory, are portrayed with a vividness which shows the writer to be thoroughly acquainted with her theme, and in real sympathy with student life. The romance element is present in the life of one of the teachers, Miss Oneile, who, after years of waiting, is finally united to her lover. The words of Jean Andrews herself reveal the meaning of the title of the narrative: "The 'way' is hard work and the 'will' to do it leads to success." The volume is well worth a place in the Sunday-school or family library.

H. H. R.